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3 February 1983

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No. 2701

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SAUDI-LEBANESE TIES VIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 145, 20-26 Nov 82 p 16

[Text] Saudi Arabia was the first Arab state to be visited by President Amin al-Jumayyil in an official capacity, coming as he did at the head of a large, high-level delegation consisting specifically of Shafiq Al-Wazzan, the prime minister; Dr Eli Salim, minister of foreign affairs; and Dr 'Adnan Maruwah, minister of health. [By comparison], Al-Jumayyil's visit to Morocco was brief and quick, lasting only a few hours, and was of an unofficial nature. He was not accompanied by a delegation on the trip and no detailed discussions on various aspects of the Lebanese situation or developments in the region were held during it.

The purpose of this visit, which took place last Sunday and Monday, was to express the special, large and continuing Saudi role in Lebanon and to confirm President Al-Jumayyil's insistence on Lebanon's identity, as well as his reliance on Saudi support in order to insure the withdrawal of non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and buttress the existence of this country as an independent state possessed of its own sovereignty as well as saving it from the whirlpool of war and beginning its reconstruction on a broad scale.

The Saudi officials took all possible steps to honor President Al-Jumayyil and the accompanying delegation, while the Lebanese side was eager to express its gratitude to the kingdom for having stood by Lebanon's side under the most difficult circumstances, as well as for the large, constructive, and positive role which King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz assumed with regard to the Lebanese crisis. King Fahd was at the head of those receiving Al-Jumayyil, and he presented him with the 'Abd al-'Aziz sash during the evening banquet, in addition to presenting Al-Wazzan with the 'Abd al-'Aziz medal. President Al-Jumayyil, for his part presented the special order of Lebanon to King Fahd, this award being the highest Lebanese medal. He also presented Prince 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, the crown prince, deputy prime minister, and head of the National Guard, with the Lebanese sash.

A well informed Lebanese source told AL-MAJALLAH that Al-Jumayyil was eager to open "all sections of the Lebanese dossier" with King Fahd. The Lebanese president held two sessions with the Saudi monarch, in addition to a private meeting shortly after his arrival in Riyadh. Both the Lebanese delegation and the high officials of the Saudi state participated in these talks, in addition to the Saudi ambassador in Beirut, Shaykh 'Ali Al-Sha'ir. It appears clear from these talks that the new era has certain priorities and apprehensions which can be summarized in the following points:

\*the first concern is the removal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and the extension of the government's legitimate authority over all Lebanese territory;

\*the second concern is to save Lebanon from "the game of international conflicts," by relying on the support of a state like Saudi Arabia;

\*the third concern is to realize true national concord in Lebanon, and to follow a policy which preserves for this country its distinguishing Arab role, in addition to rebuilding Lebanon;

\*the fourth concern is to confront the continuing Israeli plans in this country which take various forms and which aim at creating "powerful Israeli influence" in it.

Al-Jumayyil was eager to inform King Fahd and the Saudi officials of the results of his world tour which included the United States, France and Italy, as well as the efforts which he is exerting in various arenas to remove Lebanon from the whirlpool of war. In return, King Fahd reviewed with the Lebanese president the efforts which have been made to realize peace in the region. The King emphasized the necessity of liberating Lebanon from the Israeli presence, and rejected anything which would harm the Arab consensus worked out at the Fez summit. He also emphasized the need to support the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Saudi information minister Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani reflected the results of these discussions by saying they were "tantamount to a new beginning for the intensification of efforts exerted on all Arab and international levels for the liberation of Lebanon, so that it may extend its legitimate authority over all its territory, and thereby regain its security, stability and prosperity." Dr Yamani added: "the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia observes with great pleasure all the achievements realized by President Al-Jumayyil and his respected government during the short period of his rule, especially insofar as his efforts to return peace, stability and security to all the cities and regions of Lebanon are concerned. The kingdom wants to confirm its strong desire to exert all efforts to strengthen the progress towards the salvation of Lebanon."

President Al-Jumayyil announced before leaving Riyadh for Beirut that "Lebanon has the best of relations and the strongest of ties with the kingdom and the royal family, which is headed by King Fahd, adding, "participation in the salvation of Lebanon has become an Arab concern." And he added that "the hand of the kingdom has constantly been in Lebanon's hand, supporting Lebanon's cause and helping to reduce its suffering."

#### Explosion in Tyre

Al-Jumayyil's visit to Saudi Arabia was completed after the government of Al-Wazzan had gained the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, and after the deputies had agreed to give the government mandatory powers for a period of 6 months in various areas save reform of the elections law and the citizenship law. Israel is continuing to exert pressure on Lebanon to hold talks leading to the "normalization" of relations between the two countries and not merely to the achievement of a common understanding in military and security matters

accompanying the withdrawal of the Israelis. Al-Wazzan openly charged Israel with stimulating the clashes in the Shuf area between the Druze and the Christians, clashes in which many were wounded or killed.

But last week witnessed an event of great importance. On Thursday, the 11th, the Israeli military command post in Tyre exploded, and the 7-story building it occupied was turned into rubble. The Israelis admitted that 75 of their own had been killed--both officers and men--and that 28 others had been wounded, in addition to the death of 14 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners who were in the building, which had been used previously by the PLO. This incident is considered the worst which the Israelis have yet been exposed to in Lebanon, leading to the announcement of an official day of mourning in Israel and shaking "Israelis' confidence in South Lebanon," according to a correspondent of THE LONDON TIMES. The Israeli opposition exploited this incident to demand from Begin that he withdraw from Lebanon. An investigation was opened into the causes of the incident. Information from informed sources in South Lebanon indicate that the explosion was caused either by a "suicide operation" carried out by a youth who used his car to burst into the building or by the placing of explosives within the building itself. The Israelis gave conflicting accounts of the operation, the substance of which was that the incident was caused by a gas explosion in the building, which then led to the detonation of the large quantities of ammunition stored in it. After this incident, the tension in Al-Biqa' region increased to a point where the Palestinians and Syrians fear the Israelis will undertake "reprisal operations" in response to the explosion in the building. An Israeli newspaper summed up the situation of the Israelis in Lebanon by saying: "The illusionary chain of victories has begun to collapse like a paper fortress."

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CSO: 4404/107

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ISRAELI KNESSET MEMBER MAINTAINS EGYPT TRADE REDUCED

TA131422 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Jan 83 p 2

[Report by economic correspondent Ze'ev Struminsky]

[Text] Contrary to the denial made 2 days ago by Trade and Industry Minister Gid'on Pat of the reports about the cessation of commerce between Israel and Egypt, the chairman of the Knesset Public Audit Committee Mk Avraham Katz-'oz said yesterday that the information about the Egyptian sanctions against Israel is correct.

Katz-'oz was referring to a report in yesterday's DAVAR about Pat's remarks. Pat denied the information that had reached the Public Audit Committee that Egyptians have stopped issuing importation permits for Israeli goods and have barred the Egyptian Bank from issuing letters of credit to ensure the financing of the Israeli exports to Egypt, which it had been doing until now.

Speaking to the DAVAR correspondent, Katz-'oz stressed that the Egyptian sanctions had indeed been imposed and, moreover, that the source of the information was in the Trade and Industry Ministry itself, of which Pat is in charge. "Pat does not know what is happening in his Ministry," said Katz-'oz, noting that the information had been confirmed by the head of the Egyptian desk at the Foreign Ministry, Tzvi Qedar.

Katz-'oz added that Egyptian merchants had in the meantime even stopped asking their country's authorities for importation permits for Israeli products, since they have already received numerous rejections of previous requests. He added that it is, of course, true that Egypt continues to sell oil to Israel, but the payments are made via third banks and not directly to Egyptian banks.

CSO: 4400/166

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

INCREASE IN LEBANESE TOURISM--Nazareth--The number of Lebanese citizens visiting Israel increased by some 20 percent in December compared to the previous month. Sources at the Interior Ministry said yesterday that in December 6,500 Lebanese entered Israel, 5,000 of them through the Rosh Hanikra checkpoint. Many of the Lebanese tourists are Maronite and Shi'te, with few Sunni Moslems expressing interest in visiting the country. Although some Lebanese have exploited their visit to do business in the country, the majority have come to sightsee and to visit the holy places. Meanwhile, the Interior Ministry has stopped issuing permits to Israelis to visit Lebanon. The ministry will reconsider issuing permits next month if the security situation in Lebanon improves. [Text] [TA170844 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Jan 83 p 3]

CSO: 4400/166

## PROBLEM OF NATIONALIZATION, SHUTDOWN OF PAPERS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 22 Dec 82 pp 1, 12

/Article by Muhammad Hasan al-Banna: "The Republican Decree Does Not Abrogate the Law Setting a Maximum Compensation for Nationalized Papers"/

/Text/ Yesterday the Administrative Judiciary Court ruled on the contestation of the constitutionality of the decree on Law 179 for 1963 regarding the maximum compensation which is to be paid to the owners of newspaper firms whose ownership devolved upon the National Union, on grounds that that decree on the law entailed a violation of the provisions of the constitutions passed since 1956, that these constitutions permit a maximum to be set only in the case of agricultural ownership, and that this decree constitutes an infringement on private property.

The court determined to submit the case of Mustafa Amin and the heirs of his late brother 'Ali Amin to the Higher Constitutional Court. Mustafa Amin and his brother's heirs had contested the president's decree and had demanded that the defendants be compelled to pay them the sum of 388,182.933 pounds, which is the sum determined by the committee the court had appointed to assess the value of AKHBAR AL-YAWM's assets. The decree on Law 179 for 1963 had set a maximum of 15,000 pounds as compensation to which the owners of newspaper houses which were to be nationalized would be entitled.

The court held its session under the chairmanship of Counsellor Jalal 'Abd-al-Hamid, with Counsellors Ra'id al-Nafrawi and Muhammad 'Ali-al-Din Ibrahim as members and 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Amir as secretary.

At the outset, the court rejected the government attorney's defense that the administrative judiciary was not competent to review the case. The court stated that the suit was aimed not at getting a ruling abrogating the decree on Law 179 for 1963 but rather at the abrogation of the negative decree that the payment of compensation, setting the value of AKHBAR AL-YAWM at 15,000 pounds, was to be withheld. The objections that appeared in the petition of the plaintiff's suit and the memoranda on their argument on the decree on Law 179 for 1963 fell under the category of the argument that the provisions of this decree on the law should be thrown out for various reasons, among them the fact that it was marred by constitutional violations and that they had acquired a right to a form of compensation that was not limited to a maximum, of which they ought not to have been deprived, or else that would be considered confiscation by means other than those specified in the law.

The court reviewed the subject of the case and stated, "Although the committee formed by republican decree had performed its task on 28 March 1968 and had concluded that the assets of the Akhbar al-Yawm House companies exceeded their liabilities by 388,182.933 pounds, nonetheless payment of that sum in full to the owners had been blocked by the arbitration ruling on the decree on Law 179 for 1963 stating that the maximum that could be paid out in compensation was 15,000 pounds.

The court stated that this decree on the law meant the expropriation of a sum in excess of the 15,000 pounds in compensation to which the owners of newspaper houses whose nationalization had been decreed were entitled and that, in spite of the constitutional provisions that prohibit expropriation, this republican decree was still in effect and producing its effect by inhibiting the owners of the nationalized papers' right to full compensation.

#### The Constitution and Expropriation

The court added, in reference to the 1958 Constitution (the constitution under whose aegis the decree of the law was issued), that that did not contain any provision stating that it was permissible to carry out expropriations of any form although there were constitutional provisions that protected the right and inviolability of private ownership except in special exceptional cases, in exchange for just compensation. In addition, the current constitution, issued on 9 November, while permitting special expropriations, restricts those by the requirement that a judiciary decree be issued on them.

On that basis, the decree on the law, as regards the prior stipulation of a maximum sum to be paid out to the owners of nationalized papers as compensation, entails the stipulation of a special expropriation of the amount in excess of the sum of compensation, thereby violating the stipulated constitutional provisions.

The court concluded that another objection had to be added to the foregoing, namely that the decree of the law, with the stipulation it contained on the maximum to be paid out to the owners of nationalized papers, entailed a violation of the provisions of successive constitutions passed since the revolution, starting with the 1956 constitution and going up through the present one. These constitutions permit the stipulations of maximums only in the case of agricultural property. This in turn indicates that that decree on the law contained an infringement of private ownership that was in violation of the provisions of Articles 34, 35 and 36 of the existing constitution and corresponding articles with provisions in previous constitutions.

11887

CSO: 4504/130



INDUSTRIAL WORKERS' BONUSES, PROFIT SHARES TO BE DISBURSED

Cairo AL-HARAM in Arabic 4 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "Industrial Companies Disburse Workers' Profits Today; 611,000 Workers in 117 Companies to Benefit From 42.5 Million Pounds; Minister of Industry Announces in Press Conference: Maximum of 75 Pounds and Minimum of 19-Day Wages; Bonus of 100 Percent for Workers With July Pay; Profits of 75 Companies Decrease and 42 Companies Incur Losses Because of Increased Costs and Raised Wages"]

[Text] As of today, the distribution of 42.5 million pounds in profits and bonuses to 611,000 workers in 117 industrial companies will begin.

Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah, the minister of industry and mineral resources, has issued his instructions to all the sector's companies to distribute the profits at the rate of 75 pounds as a maximum and the equivalent of a 19-day salary as a minimum.

The instructions also call for disbursing 100 percent of the periodic bonuses to all the workers with next July's wages.

At the press conference he held yesterday, the minister of industry presented a complete picture of the profit and loss account in the industrial companies. For the first time, he spoke with utter frankness about the reasons for the losses which amounted to 159.8 million pounds in 42 companies, announcing that most of the reasons are beyond the companies' control and that the sector's companies shouldered last year additional burdens totaling 562.7 million pounds. He also said: While the losses rose in this manner, the profits made by 75 companies did not exceed 121.2 million pounds.

As for the sums to be distributed to the workers, the minister said that they include 8 million in profit [sharing] and the rest in bonuses for the workers of the companies that have incurred losses for reasons beyond their control.

Engineer Abu Zaghlah asserted that even though the losses exceed the profits by more than 37 million pounds, the sector's companies have succeeded in achieving their production, sales and export targets, considering that the value of the production amounted to 4,476,000,000 pounds, with an increase of nearly 100 million pounds [over 1981].

## Eleven Companies Lose One Half Their Capital

Regarding the losses in 42 companies, the minister said that the losses of 11 companies amounted to more than one half their capital and that the causes of these losses have been studied in order to formulate the proper solutions, to determine the responsibility and to bring to account those responsible for the losses if it is proven that there is any negligence in management. The study has produced important facts concentrated in the following:

Some of the losses occurred for reasons beyond the companies' control, including the increase in costs resulting from the additional burdens shouldered by the companies--burdens embodied in the flaw in the financing structures and the shortage of the companies' liquidity. This forced the companies to draw last year a sum of 696 million pounds from open bank accounts. As a result, the industry budget incurred interest costs amounting to 164.3 million pounds. This is in addition to:

Higher foreign currency prices which caused the industry budget to incur further costs amounting to 167 million pounds.

Raising the wages in implementation of the laws and decrees issued in May 1981 caused the industry budget to incur extra burdens amounting to 137.2 million pounds.

Power outages caused the electricity tension in the factories to drop and the industrial companies incurred [as a result] losses amounting to 94.2 million pounds in 1981-82. Thus, the [total] additional losses incurred by the companies in 1981-82 for reasons beyond their control amounted to 562.7 million pounds.

## Measures to Counter Negligence in Management

The minister also pointed out that some reasons for the losses are within the control of company management.

The minister of industry noted that regarding some of the losses that are within the management's control, the discussions taking place within the companies' general assemblies and the Central Accounting Agency's reports have proven that the losses of some companies are due to managerial failure and that insofar as these companies are concerned, high-level committees were formed immediately to study the companies' conditions and the real causes of the losses. These companies include, for example, the Idfina Preserved Foods Company, and al-Nasr Yarn and Textile Company in Port Sa'id. The boards of directors of these companies have been suspended and new boards have been appointed. The violations have also been referred to the judiciary authorities concerned.

### Increased Production for Citizens' Needs

The minister asserted that the industrial companies achieved in 1981-82 a production valued at 4,476,200,000 pounds at current prices compared to 3,977,900,000 pounds in the preceding year, with a growth rate of 13 percent. The growth includes an increase in the production volume of a large number of commodities that concern broad sectors of the citizenry, including 245,000 tons of cotton yarn, with a development [growth] rate of 103 percent over the preceding year, 36 billion cigarettes, with a growth rate of 108 percent, 21,500 tons of white cheese, with a growth rate of 124 percent, 153,000 tons of synthetic fat, with a growth rate of 107 percent, and 47,000 tons of industrial detergents, with a growth rate of 129 percent.

Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah added that insofar as sales are concerned, their value amounted to 3,992,000,000 pounds, compared to 3,557,800,000 pounds in the preceding year.

Regarding industrial exports, the minister said that the most important feature of the Ministry of Industry's policy is to focus on industrial exports to achieve two fundamental goals: Bolster the national economy and improve the balance of payments, in addition to opening new markets for the Egyptian products. Last year, the industrial companies actually exported products valued at 433.2 million pounds, with an increase of four percent over the preceding year.

Regarding labor and wages, the minister asserted that the average number of workers in the industrial companies rose from 601,000 workers in 1980-81 to 611,000 workers last year, meaning that the industrial companies provided nearly 10,000 new job opportunities. The industrial worker's average annual wage rose from 1,009 pounds in 1980-81 to 1,349 pounds in 1981-82, increasing by 340 pounds or 34 percent over last year.

Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah added that the ministry's training plan seeks to supply trained technical labor and second and third-level leaderships. The ministry seeks to achieve this through a plan with specific internal and external, theoretical and practical training programs. This plan is to be implemented through utilizing the aid programs offered by the U.N. agencies and through the aid and grants of the EEC, the African Development Organization, the Japanese Government and the U.S. aid agreement.

An agreement for the development of management has also been concluded with the U.S. Development Agency to provide training on conducting feasibility studies on industrial projects, to develop productive management and to apply the industrial technology. This is in addition to [the training provided by] the training centers of the major industrial companies and of the Production Efficiency and Vocational Training Agency.

8494

CSO: 4504/145

## GOVERNOR DEMANDS EVACUATION, REPLACEMENT OF OLD BUILDINGS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Dec 82 p 8

/Article by Muhammad Basha: "The Governor of Cairo before The Local Assembly: 45,000 Old Apartments Must Be Evacuated because of Their Dangerous Nature"/

/Text/ The Cairo local popular assembly has decided to hold a special session to study problems involving the collapse of old buildings, in light of the statement the governor, Sa'd Mamun, made before it yesterday, declaring that there were 45,000 residential units that had to be evacuated, because of their dangerous nature, and 150,000 units that needed repair. The governor requested that 150 million pounds in the form of easy loans be allocated for that purpose.

He said, "One of the most significant problems in monitoring engineering work in the various sections is the existence of a shortage of engineers that amounts to 62 percent of the number needed in the capital.

The assembly held the session yesterday under the chairmanship of Mr 'Abd-al-Latif Baltiyah. In it, the governor replied to the request for information presented by the assembly members from the al-Ma'adi section on the collapse of the al-Basatin building. The governor said that the office of the public prosecutor was continuing its investigation to determine the responsibility /for this/, that it had been decided to allocate apartments to the families that had suffered damages, and that immediate aid had been paid out to them.

Mr 'Izzat Muhammad 'Ali, the secretary general of the governorate, stated that a lottery for occupying new residences would be held this 28 December for citizens who did not win in the last one and that an opportunity would be provided for the submission of new applications for newlyweds in January for a lottery which would take place next March.

Mr Sa'd Ma'mun said that the instances of collapse among old buildings in the capital had increased recently, totalling 5,171 over a year and a half, or an average of 3,400 cases a year, while the number of cases of administrative eviction came to 8,834 in the same period, or an average of 6,000 cases a year.

Regarding the scope of the problem, the governor said, "A previous study carried

out in 1978 shows that the number of housing units that must be evacuated because of their hazardous nature totals 45,000 in 7,413 dwellings, alongside 90,000 dwelling units that must be demolished.

The governor said "There are a number of recommendations for coping with the problem which I will submit before your assembly. These are:

"The government has provided 203 million pounds for low-cost housing in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, and we have started on the housing projects, foremost among them Madinat al-Salam, on a basis where 1,500 units will be made available each month. However, participation by the private sector is essential, especially since we will be needing 80 million pounds to deal with cases of dwellings that are about to collapse.

"The repair and maintenance of buildings must occupy top priority, and the necessary loans must be arranged. These come to 150 million pounds, calculated on the basis of the allocation of 1,000 pounds to each apartment that requires repair and maintenance, in order that the old buildings may be protected. I requested the Ministry of Finance to allocate the funds, and the Higher Policy Committee of the Council of Ministers has actually given agreement to the allocation of 100 million pounds on the proviso that the Egyptian Real Estate Bank and the Arab Real Estate Banks provide these loans. However, we have been surprised to find that the sum was lowered to just 26 million pounds, and executive decrees on that have not yet been issued by the ministers of finance and housing.

"It is necessary to expand appropriation projects in old sections.

"There is the phenomenon of a rise in the water table. This affects existing buildings, and a study on that is now being done by the Academy of Scientific Research. I recommend that a committee be formed immediately, consisting of the Ministries of Housing and Irrigation, the academy, the governorate and the Institute of Groundwater Research, to complete this study."

The governor said, "Among the problems being followed up on in the sections is the shortage of engineers. Although this situation exists, it does not exempt the present engineers from their responsibilities according to the law."

The assembly decided to assign Counsellor 'Abd-al-'Aziz Jadd-al-Haqq to carry out a study on the point the member Husayn Badawi raised, to the effect that gas stations had been engaged in other activities. It also decided to form a committee to investigate and study the points raised by the two members Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Mansur and Ahmad Taha on the appropriation of plots of governorate land by some citizens.

11887

CSO: 4504/130

## SECOND ARMY CONDUCTS WINTER MANEUVERS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Dec 82 p 6

/Article by Husayn Fathallah: "Al-'Arish-Four: The Major Winter Tactical Maneuvers the Second Army Carried out Yesterday"

/Text/ The major tactical maneuvers titled "al-'Arish-Four" which the Second Field Army carried out yesterday with soldiers on both sides was a splendid model of joint forces combat. It was broken down into three stages.

In the first stage, each party operated in isolation from the other, since each party prepared its forces, with one segment in a defensive position and the other in an offensive one.

The second stage represented a confrontation between the two sides. This is the stage that took place yesterday.

During the third stage, each party operated in isolation, in order to finish performing the required lessons of the maneuver.

The task of defense in the maneuver was performed by an infantry brigade supported by personnel from chemical warfare, armor, artillery, armored vehicle and electronic warfare /units/, and forces on foot. The task of offense was performed by a mechanized infantry brigade supported by artillery, corps of engineers, chemical warfare, air defense elements.

Concurrently, auxiliary units took part in the maneuver on each side, along with the opposition forces representing the enemy, in addition to joint forces such as tactical airborne troops, electronic and chemical warfare units, civil defense and the air force.

The maneuvers were aimed at executing a number of training lessons; Maj Gen Salah 'Abd-al-Halim, the commander of the Second Field Army, made an announcement on these. Among them were the execution of the night movement of forces, the crossing of water obstacles, the provision of a defense so that the forces could skirmish from a position of attack or occupy a defense position, training in the exploitation of air and fire preparation for offense or destruction of the enemy before the defense, the performance of combat skirmishes, and pursuit of the enemy in retreat.

The maneuver also had the goal of achieving proficiency in mountain combat with tactical fire using live ammunition, moving the various types of force vehicles forward, training for a long, continuous period in order to drive home various lessons in situations resembling real operations representing the real atmosphere of combat in a manner similar to the actual sequence of combat events, and exercising daring and initiative in the execution of the tasks to which the forces were assigned.

However, the most important achievement the maneuver made as a result of the use of the elements of initiative and surprise was the failure to adopt routine decisions and the effort quickly to shift the fighting to the enemy's hinterland along the main axis in the course of combat, to confuse the planning of the defensive front line forces.

In the course of the maneuvers, a group of new training lessons stood out, most important of which were the use of the method of direct reconnaissance by helicopter and the immediate broadcast of information to friendly forces. In addition, helicopters were also used to direct artillery fire and strike out at enemy armor with antitank missiles. In addition, the air force was brought in to help the forces along with tactical airborne troops using French Gazelle-class helicopters and Soviet MI-8s.

The al-'Arish-Four maneuvers were truly the most massive maneuvers the joint forces have carried out this year. In the context of developed, constant training, the armed forces are continuing their sacred course to achieve a strategy of deterrence, and are awaiting bigger maneuvers next spring.

Attending the maneuvers were Lt Gen 'Abd Rabb-al-Nabi Hafiz, the chief of staff, Lt Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, commander of the air defense forces, Eng Mashhur Ahmad Mashhur, president of the Suez Canal Authority, Mr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Imarah, the governor of al-Isma'iliyah, and Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Uthman, president of the University of the Canal.

11887

CSO: 4504/130

PRESIDENT'S TWO SONS REPORTED TO BE INVOLVED IN CURIOUS INCIDENT

Details of Incident

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 3 Jan 83 p 10

[Article by Mahmud 'Awad]

[Text] Two university students went to the Air Egypt Company offices on 'Adli Street in Cairo to buy 2 tickets to go abroad. They stood in line in front of the employee concerned and their turn came shortly afterwards. Each took out his money, waiting for the employee to tell them the price.

But instead of doing so, the employee read the two names automatically and started to write each of the names on a new ticket in front of him. Suddenly, the employee reread the names, rose from his chair and went to the office manager who also rose from his seat and went to the 2 students to ask them for their names anew. As soon as he made sure, he returned to his office and picked up the telephone receiver. Within seconds, the news was traveling from manager to manager and finally to the chairman of the board of directors. Thus, it was decided by telephone to issue 2 free tickets to those 2 youths in particular.

But in the face of this unique insistence on being courteous to these 2 students, other contacts and counter contacts took place and were finally settled by President Husni Mubarak.

The president of the republic contacted the Air Egypt Company's Board of Directors chairman and told him: When these 2 students come to the company, stand in line like the rest of God's creatures, ask for a ticket and offer to pay for it in cash, then this means that they do actually want an ordinary ticket at the reduced student rate. If it were a matter of a free ticket, there would be no need for all this and it would have been easy for me to ask somebody here at the presidential office to get 2 tickets for them from the presidential budget without anybody knowing or seeing. So let the company get back their 2 free tickets and issue them 2 paid tickets for which I have paid from my salary. I hope this will be understood by all from now on.

So now in 1982 [sic] we know that the president of Egypt has a salary, that he wants to manage his life within the limits of this salary and that he wants everybody, beginning with the head of any company and ending with his own family, to be aware of this.



This is because these 2 students are the sons of Husni Mubarak. Whether we consider this simple and passing incident from the father's viewpoint, the 2 sons' viewpoint or the concerned company's viewpoint, the conclusion is ultimately the same, namely that the position of president of the republic in Egypt is not a license permitting its occupant to plunder and steal under the name of family stability, favors, gifts--under the pretext that even the Prophet accepted gifts--and so forth. The position of president of the republic is a public responsibility, a feeling of affiliation with a poor people striving hard to face the challenges of the age and a practical behavior which the people must see and feel--behavior that is not fabricated by the individual concerned before the television and photographer cameras and not trumped up by hypocritical pens on the frontpages of the newspapers. It is a behavior displayed because this is the basis of things. It is in the basis of things for man to be honest and not a thief, serious and not a clown, sincere and not a liar.

The basis of things is for the public position to be a public responsibility and not a public theft. It is a commitment before 45 million honorable citizens and not a commitment to a greedy and insatiable family, every member of which is competing to rob Egypt, and even to sell it at times, in the name of love, family stability and social peace--the peace of the Mafia.

The good news first. The Egypt of 1982 no longer raises its brows every 5 minutes for what it sees on the television newscast. There is no longer a person who surprises the people one morning with banning the eating of meat and then surprises them another morning by telling them he will mince them--mince the people and not the meats.

There is no longer a person boasting under the dome of the parliament that he can bring in the journalists and writers with a clean slate and no longer a person who claims in every speech he makes that the entire world "listens to me now." Carter, Menachem and the entire civilized world listens to me now."

The good news first. In 1982, Egypt began to return to the basis of things. The basis of things is for the president of the republic to be accessible to all. He receives Khalid Muhyi al-Din, consults with Ibrahim Shukri and reads Dr Hilmi Murad and yet the world does not come to an end. Fathi Radwan, the doyen of the opponents, shines in his articles and underlines openly his objection to some of the president's decisions and yet he does not end in jail and is not accused of having misled the Egyptian people for 60 years.

The opposition papers have returned to their readers and have resumed writing, complaining, criticizing and screaming, without the president of the republic usurping for himself the power of acting brutally against them. All that Husni Mubarak does is to complain in turn. He complains of the opposition press, and he is at times convincing and at others not so. But ultimately, he uses the feelings of the simple ordinary citizen and not a steamroller called the special laws.

Does this mean in any way that Egypt is well and that things could not be any better?

Of course not. The arsenal of oppressive laws imposed by the late President al-Sadat is still present. The brutal article 74 of the constitution is still there and the constitution itself still permits the president of the republic to be a king sitting on the throne for life. Those who "clamor and trumpet" are still there, continuing their malicious reports against the Arabs and Arabism and saying that Arabism is an "outdated slogan" and that the "scandals of Arabism are spread throughout the world, both east and west." The minister who believes that addressing advice to the president of the republic is an unclean act of the devil is still there.

There are still those who believe the press to be the art of singing the praises of the ruler's mistakes and sins and that reporting corruption is shameful and tantamount to revealing the state's supreme secrets!

All this, and more, is still present.

So what has changed in Egypt in 1982?

What has changed is the patient's psychological condition. Egypt has begun to regain its self-confidence after a long absence and to regain its confidence in its ability to face and tackle problems. Last month, for example, a main sewerage line burst in al-Jizah and drinking water supply was cut off from the entire city of al-Jizah. The available volume of bread decreased. It is a problem affecting the people's essential needs that see life through the day. Yet, nobody panicked and nobody rushed to Cairo Airport to demand emigration. People followed the live television reports on the repairs being carried out on the line and every citizen immediately realized that he can trust this time the truthfulness of the reports carried to him by the newscast.

I say that what has changed in Egypt in 1982 may be seen by the majority as less and slower than should have been and the minority may see it as more and quicker than should have been. This is not important. What is important is for us to realize the low point from which Egypt has regained its self-confidence: The low point in confronting Israel externally and confronting corruption internally.

Within such a framework, the patient certainly needs many things. He needs first to know the size and extent of the sickness and needs ultimately the decisive and regular cure leading to recovery.

On the path to recovery, the patient needs a convalescence period. What has happened in Egypt in 1982 is something close to this. 1982 has been the year of political convalescence in Egypt.

## Denial of Incident

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "Latest Curiosity: False Story About President's Sons"]

[Text] Can a journalist's or a writer's fertile imagination reach the extent of fabricating a totally imaginary story and attributing it to the president of the republic, citing in it incidents occurring with his 2 sons at the Air Egypt Company, a contact between the president of the republic and the company president and statements attributed to the president in this telephone conversation which, along with all the details contained in the story, have never happened?

AL-AHRAM regrets to carry this denial against AL-AHRAR which reported yesterday in an article by one of its writers that 2 young men went to buy tickets from one of the offices of Air Egypt to go abroad and that as soon as the office employee learned of their names and realized that they were the sons of President Husni Mubarak, he rushed to contact his bosses in the company and that the contacts ended up ultimately with a decision by the chairman of the company's Board of Directors to issue 2 free tickets to the youngmen as a favor, considering that they are the president's sons. The report went on to add that as soon as President Husni Mubarak became aware of this, he contacted the president of the Air Egypt Company's Board of Directors by telephone to tell him to stop the favor and to have 2 paid tickets issued for his sons like any other students. Moreover, the reporter recounted other details of the telephone conversation, building on them a long commentary.

AL-AHRAM repeats that it regrets to deny this story which was published by a sisterly paper and which it attributed to the president of the republic whose 2 sons last went abroad by themselves in 1981 and before he became president. Like every father, he arranged for their trip, without the Air Egypt Company trying to do him any favor or issuing any free tickets and without any contact taking place with the company president over such a favor which did not occur last year, the year before or at any time at all.

AL-AHRAM will add to this correction nothing other than the word "regret" for all that has happened. Rather, AL-AHRAM can hardly believe that a paper trying to establish trust with its readers or saying that it serves the causes of freedom and stability would fabricate such a story about the president's 2 sons who are preparing for their examinations at present and that it would attribute to the president himself a conversation that has never taken place, even if such a story is intended to be an example for every citizen, regardless of his position, to follow.

8494

CSO: 4504/145

## BRIEFS

RULES ON LOANING TEACHERS--AL-AHRAM's correspondent has learned that the Ministry of Education is now studying amendments to the stipulations and rules bearing on the loaning out of teachers to friendly Arab, African and Asian countries in the current academic year in light of the results of practical application in the field. In addition, the study includes a re-evaluation of the status of instructors on loan abroad whose loan period has been ended by their own wishes, so that they may be permitted to apply to be loaned out again within a specific period. The existing law requires that they be treated as persons who have completed their loan periods and are consequently not entitled to apply to be loaned out before 4 years have elapsed since the previous loan. The new amendment will retain the condition that at least 3 years be spent working in Egypt before one applies to go out on loan, in addition to the condition that one have received a rating of "excellent" in the past 2 years. It is worth pointing out that the number of Egyptian instructors on loan abroad this year totals 25,000, 200 of whom were loaned out to Algeria for the first time in 5 years. In another area, the Ministry is now making intensified contacts with the government of North Yemen to resolve the problem of the 12,000 Egyptian instructors on loan there. Their problem involves the method by which their stipulated "support allowance" and "experts' allowance" are calculated.. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 19 Dec 82 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/130

LIBYA

EXECUTIONS FOLLOW UNREPORTED COUP ATTEMPT

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 18 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by the Rome correspondent for AL-JUMHURIYAH: "Execution of Four Officers in the Libyan Army Who Attempted a Coup"]

[Text] Libyan president Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has executed four of the officers who staged an undisclosed coup attempt.

The executions took place in a villa belonging to Idris al-Sanusi, former king of Libya, at the Suwani bin Yadam cattle farm located 20 miles south of the city of Tripoli, which Libyan intelligence uses for interrogation and torture purposes. The failed coup attempt was headed by an officer named al-Ramah Bushaynah from the al-Zawiyah area and he is one of the officers who participated in the Libyan revolution of September 1969 which brought Col al-Qadhdhafi to power.

Al-Ramah Bushaynah had presided at a number of military tribunals trying men accused of attempting to overthrow the ruling regime; then he in turn wanted to stage a coup, but he failed.

CSO: 4504/168

PAPER SAYS ARAB PEACE SIGNALS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY

TA171537 Jerusalem AL-FAJR AL-'ARABI in Hebrew 11 Jan 83 p 8

[Editorial: "Peace Signals From the Arab Side"]

[Text] The declaration made by the Iraqi deputy prime minister on the fact that Iraq has no objection to peace talks being held between the PLO and the Arab countries marks no change in the Arab stance toward the solution of the Palestinian problem, but may be something new for all those people in Israel who have all along ignored the signals coming from the Palestinian side in particular and the Arab side in general on readiness to make a political compromise that would ultimately lead to a just, peaceful solution to the problem.

This process began as early as in the 1970's and was manifest, among other things, in the resolution adopted by the Palestine National Council in 1974 to set up a Palestinian national rule over any territory Israel would "evacuate" and in the readiness of the PLO, the sole and single representative of the Palestinian people, to participate along with Israel in a Geneva conference, provided that some sort of amendment is introduced into Resolution 242 so that the Palestinian problem is spoken of not as the problem of the refugees, as it appears in the original version of the resolution, but as a national problem. This readiness was expressed quite clearly in the 1970's following the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement and before the al-Sadat initiative and his visit to Israel, a visit that changed the course of all efforts to reach a just peace in the region.

This process was also endorsed by a pan-Arab forum at the 1978 Baghdad conference, when the leaders of the Arab countries that opposed the al-Sadat initiative convened to work out a plan outlining the opposition to al-Sadat's policy. It was decided then that no just peace would be possible "unless Israel withdraws from all the territories it conquered after 1967." And each observer in his right senses then raised the rhetorical question: What about the areas captured before 1967?

This process was reviewed by the media on various occasions and in various ways, but the official Israeli reaction has always been either ignorance or scorn. It is surprising to note on the Israeli side today that there are some people who argue that the readiness to accept a Palestinian state

alongside Israel, not instead of it, and the readiness to recognize Israel came precisely as an outcome of the Lebanon war. These Israelis take it one step further to contend "that if each time we strike them they give up more, then we should continue to strike them until they understand they have nothing to demand."

This arrogance is just that, and is moreover based on overlooking reality and even on an attempt to distort it.

Everyone knows that the Palestinian inclination to resolve the problem through peaceful means did not come after the war in Lebanon but was the result of a lengthy process which official Israel chose to overlook.

Tariq 'Aziz's statement came at a stage when the Palestinian leadership (that is to say, the PLO), decided to take the political opportunity it has to obtain the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establish an independent Palestinian state that would solve the Palestinian people, who have become the "latter-day Jewish people."

It is the duty of all the peace-loving forces in Israel to take all the signals of peace emanating from the Palestinian and Arab side seriously and to entertain no illusions about them and act so that these signals are similarly taken seriously by their government as well, which has both the power and the authority to adopt resolutions pertaining to the future of the Israeli people.

CSO: 4400/166

## HUSAYN'S POSITION ON PEACE QUESTIONED

JN161555 Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 1435 GMT 16 Jan 83

["Observation" by Ya'qub Khazmah]

[Text] King Husayn's position on the question of peace is still vague and conflicting despite the passage of time. Some people, especially U.S. officials, say that the king will join the peace talks. These people base their opinions on the Jordanian king's statements to certain international papers, statements which are more vague than clear. Had the king wanted to join the talks, he would have come out clearly rather than resort to vague, lukewarm expressions.

Joseph Sisco, former U.S. secretary of state for near eastern affairs, has said in an article in the NEW YORK TIMES that King Husayn's position is vague because he is still waiting for a clear green light from his Arab brothers. The Jordanian king, Sisco added, is facing a red light from his Arab brothers and this blocks the possibility of his negotiating with Israel. This is what Joseph Sisco has written in the NEW YORK TIMES. If this opinion is true, and it seems to be true, then this means that the Jordanian king still fears those Arab elements which are opposed to peace. Otherwise, how can we explain his present position?

If King Husayn wants to obtain the green light from those Arab elements, he may as well wait forever. The position of these elements on the question of peace in the region is well known. They do not want peace in any form. Their interest lies in keeping the situation as it is now, especially after they have failed in their attempts to persuade Egypt to go back on the peace treaty with Israel and the Camp David accords in general. Therefore, these elements hostile to peace will not agree to Jordan joining the talks with Israel. In other words, the Jordanian king will not be able to obtain what Joseph Sisco termed the green light.

We cannot but wonder: Where is King Husayn's renowned courage? Where is the wisdom in his present wavering position? The road to peace is open before King Husayn. His participating in the peace process will be in the interest of his country and the Palestinian people. King Husayn's participation in these talks and the peace process is bound to lead to an effective contribution toward solving the Palestine question. Waiting for the green light from those Arab elements which are opposed to peace and want to perpetuate the Palestine question will not lead to any progress toward reaching the desired solution; namely, that which will greatly serve Jordan--government and people--the Palestinian people and the cause of comprehensive peace in the region.

CSO: 4400/166



## GROUND ACTIONS AGAINST SYRIA SAID AVOIDABLE

TA111102 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Jan 83 pp 9-10

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Three Separate Wars"]

[Text] Three separate wars have in fact been conducted in Lebanon, which could have both separated from each other and their expansion prevented at the same time. The war against the PLO in the western sector was supposed to have been the main war for the defense of the Galilee settlements. The ground fighting against the Syrians, in the eastern and central sectors, was the second war. Many scores of IDF soldiers fell in that war, which could have been avoided, and thus the peace for Galilee campaign against the PLO could have come to an end with about half the losses. The third war was that of the Air Force against the Syrian missile batteries and in the dogfights.

It is my contention that the ground war against the Syrians could have been avoided. The Syrians would not have intervened in the IDF's military moves against the PLO in the western sector. At most we had to accept the presence of terrorists inside the Syrian deployment, near the al-Qir'awn Lake, as we accept the presence of terrorists today, with their artillery pieces, inside the Syrian deployment in the al-Biqa' region of Lebanon. Just as the Syrians curb the terrorists in the Golan Heights, so they would have curbed those who remained in their deployment near the al-Qir'awn Lake. What we are presenting as a great achievement, the deterrence of the Syrians, we could have achieved not by way of the unnecessary ground fighting, but through a combination of the first war against the PLO with the third war, the aerial one, that is, to restrict ourselves to destroying the missile system and the Syrian aircraft in dogfights. This was not done because it goes against Sharon's basic thinking and contradicts his great plan, one of whose goals was to expel the Syrians from Lebanon. Therefore it was impossible from the beginning to avoid a clash on land with the Syrian force in Lebanon, and because of this we found ourselves involved in a wasteful war.

Not only was al-Asad not prepared for war in 1982, and did not want it, the Syrians did everything to avoid a comprehensive clash in Lebanon during the peace for Galilee campaign. They were unable to do so because Israel pushed them into a corner. They were forced to react and so would any other

army in their position. Our objective was not only the terrorists who were inside the Syrian deployment in the al-Rayhan and al-'Ayshiyah regions within artillery range of Qiryat Shemona. We aimed at much more: The main Beirut-Damascus highway, which was regarded by the Syrians as most essential as it was the main highway in the country. We aimed at bypassing the Syrian Army in the al-Biqa' area, surrounding it and putting it in an unbearable position. This was the greater objective in the moves in the eastern and central sectors and so we got involved in the great land battles with the Syrian Army.

We managed to surprise the Syrians in that war. This was a strategic surprise because the Syrians had known for a long time that Israel was preparing something. They did not want such a war at such a stage and were vulnerable to being surprised. The surprise originated in the fact that they were thinking about a war of another type, more limited, like that aimed against the terrorists, not against them and not on such a scale. Before the war they repeatedly warned the terrorists to avoid provocations that would drag Israel into action against them.

More than 24 hours passed before the Syrian general staff realized that this was not a question of a small campaign similar to the Litani campaign, and it was not only against the terrorists. It was only after 24 hours that they understood that the IDF intended to go far, beyond southern Lebanon, to the main Beirut-Damascus highway and link up with the Christians. They understood too late that the battle was not over southern Lebanon, but all of Lebanon. It was already at the first stage that they noted that the Israeli Air Force was bombing and destroying their radar north of the Beirut-Damascus highway and that the artillery that was landed from the sea, near Nahr Al Awwali, was aimed at that highway and not at terrorist objectives. It was only when they grasped the broad significance of the Israeli campaign that the Syrians began to move forces from inside Syria to the al-Biqa' region. A public callup of reservists was only declared in Syria on 9 June, the day we destroyed their surface-to-air missile batteries in Lebanon. In one concise sentence we can say that one of the Syrians' repeated lessons in that war certainly was that if in the future they want to carry out any sort of military move against the IDF, either in Lebanon or on the Golan Heights, they must surprise us, taking advantage of their edge in the field.

There is no better proof of the Syrian hope, to the very last minute, of avoiding war, than the orders given to their forces on the front lines. One of the Syrian prisoners, a commander of an armored platoon, told about this in an interview with Ehud Ya'ari on Israeli television. He said that he had been forbidden to shoot at IDF forces unless they endangered him and actually approached his positions. Even when shells fell beside him he was told by his command headquarters not to shoot unless his unit was hit. And indeed anyone who analyzes the Syrians' behavior during the first days of the war will find that they avoided attacking our forces moving toward them (apart, perhaps, from one incident). They satisfied themselves with firing when we approached and that fire was not massive, as could have been expected. An IDF formation advancing along the central traffic artery

and getting mixed up with the Syrian forces tasted almost no Syrian artillery fire during the first stages of their advance. It was Syrian commandos who tried to contain the advance until it reached 'Ayn Zhalta, where it found itself confronting Syrian armor and commandos. The Syrian Air Force was also not used immediately against our advancing forces, until Damascus realized how broad the IDF objectives were.

The Syrians were in a situation of defense from the first moment, and had we wanted to, it would have been possible to avoid great land battles with them. It is true that the cabinet decision on the war stated that "the Syrian Army is not to be attacked unless it attacks our forces," but this positive decision contradicted the ultimatum we set al-Asad when we demanded that he force a 25 km northward retreat of the terrorists who were under his control and the supervision of the Syrian Army, as was explained in a letter to President Reagan. Anyone who knows the Syrian regime and presidency should have known in advance that there was no chance for such an ultimatum and that accepting it would mean a blow to its prestige. The ultimatum made a mockery of the orders not to fight the Syrian Army. There is no factual basis for the claim being made today that "we did not know that the Syrians would react like that." The intelligence assessments stated specifically that the Syrians would fight in Lebanon. We must not pretend to be surprised on this issue.

The Syrians fought and opened from a situation of defense. This is how any army would behave when attempts were being made to flank it, and in fact to surround it. This is how the IDF would behave, and even more so. In the large movement toward the Beirut-Damascus highway the IDF tried to outflank the Syrian Army. That was the order given to our forces, as the chief of staff fully admits now, and not as the prime minister told the Knesset on 12 August: "I have informed you (the representatives of the opposition, Z.S.) that the intention is that the army should take up a position on a line between 40-45 km from Israel's northern border. The cabinet did intend this. The cabinet fulfilled the decision, but the enemy rejected our proposals for a cease-fire." The chief of staff is right in his claim, because the order to advance to the main Beirut-Damascus highway and beyond the 40 km range was already given at the beginning, and long before the possibility of declaring a cease-fire was discussed with the Syrians.

It is worth noting that the Syrians put themselves out to prevent an expansion of the war and did not fire their missile batteries against our aircraft that worked in great numbers in Lebanon. Until that system was attacked on 9 June, not even one missile was fired at our aircraft. We presented the reinforcement of the Syrian system by five batteries as an aggressive act, but it can also be seen as a Syrian signal to Israel that it did not intend to expand the war. The government of Israel decided to approve Sharon's request to attack the missiles after he had explained to it that the advance by our forces who were in a movement to flank the Syrian Army in the al-Biqa' had been stuck on the way and were in need of rapid aerial support. And indeed, the IDF main column had got stuck and only then was the order given to the forces of Yanush [nickname for the commander of the northern command] to move north in the al-Biqa'. Air support was needed

to accelerate this advance and for this purpose it was first necessary to remove the missile batteries.

Perhaps there is military logic in all this, but it is logic connected with Sharon's great strategic plan aimed at expelling the Syrians from Lebanon, together with the PLO, and crowning Bashir al-Jumayyil king. This plan, by its very nature, demanded a clash with the Syrian Army in Lebanon, including ground fighting. The ministers were dreaming when they thought that through a "Hannibalistic" move we would cause the Syrian Army to retreat from the al-Biqa' without fighting, but the military personnel understood from the beginning that such a retreat could not be forced without a real clash with the Syrians in the field; and this would take place at our initiative. We all know the heavy price and whether we have really deterred the Syrians for a period of 10 years, as is being explained to the public, we will find out in the future.

CSO: 4400/167

LEBANON, SYRIAN FACTOR ASSESSED

TA140935 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Jan 83 p 18

[Commentary by Middle East affairs correspondent David Bernstein: "The Damascus Factor"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's expressed concern at a meeting of American Jewish leaders this week that Israel and Syria might have reached a "tacit understanding" to stay put in Lebanon has raised a timely questionmark over the relevance of the "peace talks" taking place in Khaldah and Qiryat Shemona.

Those talks have been taking place in a peculiar political vacuum, giving every appearance of ignoring a central fact: Any deal struck between the Israeli and Lebanese negotiators would have to receive the tacit approval of Syria before it could be implemented.

Thus, Israel's dogged insistence on a far-reaching "normalization" of relations with Lebanon has been presented as a realistic goal. But no one in Jerusalem has apparently bothered to address himself openly to the question of how such an arrangement could be squared with the withdrawal of 30,000 Syrian troops from Lebanon when Damascus has made it plain that it will not tolerate any agreement that would take Lebanon out of the general Arab orbit into a special relationship with Israel.

The ominous reports in the Israeli press earlier this month about the growing Syrian military threat did little to reassure anyone who would like to believe that Israel is not contemplating another confrontation with Syria in a bid to remove its "veto" over an Israeli-Lebanese normalization accord.

Forcibly evicting the Syrians from northern and eastern Lebanon would, of course, enable Israel to strike any deal it chose. Its Christian allies would have little trouble imposing their will over Lebanon's anti-Israel Muslim majority were they rendered impotent by the expulsion of their Syrian backers.

The cost of such a course would have to be carefully weighed against its political benefits, however important these might be to the Israeli Government. This country has already paid a huge--and still mounting--price in

lives, and the government is understandably perhaps anxious to justify this to the electorate.

Further casualties would be incurred in expelling the Syrians from Tripoli and al-Biqa', and it should not be forgotten that the bulk of Israeli casualties in the Lebanon war have been in clashes with the Syrians rather than with the PLO. There is also the inestimable cost in Israeli lives the government would have to mortgage to keep an Israeli-backed Christian-controlled Lebanon viable.

No one should be in doubt that such a Lebanon would be, for all intents and purposes, an Israeli protectorate, with Israel having to underwrite, indefinitely, that country's security against any threat from Syria. Any thought that the Lebanese Christians themselves would be able to protect their country against their far more powerful Arab neighbour to the east and north is just not realistic.

Thus, it will have come as something of a relief that Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon and Chief-of-Staff Refa'el Eytan have gone out of their way to play down the significance of the Syrian arms buildup in an apparent attempt to dispel any suspicion of sabre-rattling on Israel's part. For normalization, or even peace with Lebanon, would quite simply not be worth the cost of having indefinitely to neutralize Syria's interests in that country.

If, as one sincerely hopes, Israel has no intention of removing Syria's veto by force, the logical assumption is that Jerusalem is prepared--as Shultz suggested--to strike some form of tacit deal with Damascus.

There are, in theory, three main forms such a "deal" could take:

--Israel and Syria could agree to the need to normalize Israel's relations with Lebanon, but instead of seeking to remove Syria's veto by force, could seek to meet its political conditions for such an arrangement (this would presumably mean Israeli readiness to meet the conditions for peace laid down at last September's Arab summit in Fes, which would include an unconditional withdrawal not only from Lebanon, but also from the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights);

--Israel and Syria could agree to a mutual withdrawal of their forces from the al-Shuf mountains and the vicinities which the Syrians hold to the areas each insists to be strategically vital in the south and east, respectively;

--Israel and Syria could agree to a simultaneous withdrawal from the whole of Lebanon, in return for symmetrical security arrangements in their respective spheres of strategic interest.

The first of these three options need not detain us, as there is little probability that the present or any Israeli Government in the foreseeable future would willingly accept the terms laid down in Fes last September.

That would leave as the two most realistic options now open to Israel the prospect of a disengagement agreement with Syria, leaving the two sides more or less permanently in South Lebanon and the eastern al-Biqa' or a total withdrawal with symmetrical security arrangements in each of these two strategically important areas.

Washington, according to Shultz, is apparently fearful that Israel and Syria are edging toward the first of these two options--a prolonged and tacitly agreed stay in South Lebanon and the al-Biqa', amounting to a de facto territorial partition of Lebanon.

It is not altogether inconceivable that the Lebanese Christians would go along with this arrangement, for it would leave them in effective control of the relatively homogeneous Maronite-Druze mountainous heartland of Lebanon, all that they could realistically hope to control, anyway, without massive outside support.

There have been voices in Israel as well advocating this as the optimal solution for Israel, and its only guarantee that South Lebanon will never again become a staging ground for hostile attack.

There is, indeed, some merit to this argument. But there are also some very serious drawbacks, chief of these being the demography of South Lebanon, which is predominantly Shi'a Muslim with significant Christian and Sunni minorities.

In the past, Israel has closely allied itself with the Christians of the region, building up and supporting the militias of Major Sa'ad Haddad in a limited strip along the northern border. And the indications are that Israel would be tempted to give Haddad the major role in policing the vastly expanded 45 km security zone such a disengagement agreement would leave under Israeli control.

The problem with this is that Haddad and his men are viewed with deep suspicion, if not open hatred, not only by the large Palestinian refugee population living in the camps in this zone, but also by much of the Shi'a majority--despite Haddad's limited success in attracting some Shi'as to his overwhelmingly Christian militias.

Thus, it can be only a matter of time before dormant sectarian friction in the south erupts into open violence: South Lebanon is, after all, in many respects simply a microcosm of the volatile sectarian mosaic that is Lebanon, and the past 6 months should have gone some way to convincing Jerusalem that it is not a country one would choose to become bogged down in indefinitely.

That leaves the third option--a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, in return for adequate security arrangements safeguarding Israel's strategic interests in the south and Syria's strategic interests in the east.

It was apparent from the moment the present Israeli-Lebanese talks started that this is the solution preferred both by Lebanon and by the third participant in the talks, the U.S.

Indeed, Lebanon has shown itself extremely sensitive to Israel's legitimate security concerns in the south of the country, and has indicated a readiness to go some way toward meeting Israel's requirements in this regard, even to the point of enshrining these in some form of non-belligerency pact.

Syria has been relatively silent on the question of security arrangements for Israel in South Lebanon, expressing its opposition mainly to any political deal being struck in the current talks.

In the past, however, Damascus has displayed considerable understanding for Israel's security interest in South Lebanon--an understanding matched by Israel's recognition until relatively recently of Syria's parallel interest in the al-Biqa'. Thus, a system of "red lines" has emerged over the years in Lebanon, reflecting this mutual awareness.

There is reason to believe, then, based on Israel's past experience with Syria, that Damascus would go along with a system of security arrangements meeting Israel's basic requirements in South Lebanon, provided that these were not too obtrusive and were matched by a similar system meeting its requirements in the al-Biqa'.

Israel has so far spurned this as an adequate reward for the sacrifices it has made in Lebanon, holding out instead for a far-reaching political settlement which would appear to be unrealistic unless it is prepared forcibly to remove Syria's veto and permanently underwrite Lebanon's security with Israeli lives.

If it is not prepared to do this--and one hopes this to be the case--then it is time to drop the farce in Khaldah and Qiruat Shemona and get down to the business of achieving the achievable, even if this does leave some doubt in the minds of the government and the electorate as to the cost-effectiveness of what has turned out to be a singularly ill-conceived military adventure in Lebanon.

CSO: 4400/166



## 'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR SAYS SYRIA REAL ENEMY

TA091212 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Jan 83 p 7

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "Who Holds the Cards"]

[Text] Even those who are by nature extremely optimistic would understand today that in seeking to find some sort of solution for Lebanon, Israel has found itself in the middle of a labyrinth and cannot find its way out. Maybe ultimately the hope will be realized that the negotiations end in a way that will allow us to say that the war has not been totally in vain. At this stage it is undoubtedly clear that something very basic has gone wrong on the road to Khaldah and Qiryat Shemona.

The question of what went wrong has so far been sidetracked, making the true answer much more difficult to reach. In essence, the domestic situation in Lebanon is mentioned in this context, and no doubt it is an important element. In my opinion, less significance should be attributed to the murder of Bashir al-Jumayyil, for even if he was more sympathetic toward Israel than his brother Amin, it is questionable whether the dead president could have freed himself from the manacles binding his predecessor and heir. The analysis of the agreement the defense minister did or did not obtain contributes more towards understanding Ari'el Sharon's methods and personality than to understanding the difficulties that lie on the path of the negotiations.

It seems to me that it should be clear today that the key to resolving the Lebanese problem lies not in Beirut, Jerusalem, or Washington; it is in the hands of President al-Asad, and this is the main reason it has been difficult to impart to the negotiations any substantial impetus. As long as Syrian forces are stationed on Lebanese soil, its government would be hard put to formulate independent positions. One could thus safely say that the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the attainment of an agreement [heskem] with Lebanon are politically Siamese twins: Without the one, one cannot hope for the realization of the other.

The other side of the coin should be self-evident: If there had been no Syrian presence in Lebanon today, the agreement may already have been achieved. At any rate, it would have stood far better chances than it does at present. The fact is that things are not the result of the cabinet's short-sightedness or a result of a grave error in creating the link between the target and the foe who must be defeated in order to reach that goal.

As it was declared, the original objective of the war was to bring peace to the Galilee. The number one enemy in this context was the PLO. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in concentrating all of the IDF's force against this goal, as long as the target was peace for the Galilee. The longer the war took the more it became clear that its objectives were broadening and expanding: No longer peace for the Galilee alone, but peace between the two countries, or at least normal neighborly relations with security arrangements.

It is not clear when exactly this shift occurred, or whether it even took place at all. Did Sharon and Begin want from the start to get to the broader goal? Did the original goal expand in the course of the war? These are interesting questions in themselves, but they are irrelevant to our purposes and discussion of the issue.

What is however pertinent is the conclusion that derives from the fact that the objective has widened, but not the timing. Logically speaking, the moment the decision was made to pursue a broader goal, one should have stopped and done some thinking: Is the enemy of the original goal also the main enemy of the expanded goal? Is the PLO the main obstacle on the road to a political agreement [heskem] with Lebanon? Or is it that what held true for getting peace in the Galilee is not necessarily true when aspiring to reach peace with Lebanon? If these questions had been pondered, the Israeli leadership may have possibly reached the conclusion that it was Syria, not the PLO, that was the chief enemy and obstacle toward attaining the broader goal. Consequently, the main thrust of the air and ground forces should have been directed and focused to the forceful removal of the Syrians from Lebanon.

Up until a few months ago, when the matter was topical, this goal could have been achieved much more easily; the Soviet Union was in the twilight of the Brezhnev era; no aerial umbrella shielded the Syrians; and what is more important is that this objective was in some ways more easily-attainable than the expulsion of the PLO, since the Syrian Army did not fortify itself inside or behind a civilian population. This course of action, furthermore, would not have necessitated a concession of the goal of expelling the PLO. On the contrary, the Syrians were their chief defenders--actually the only ones who guarded the terrorists. It certainly stands to reason that without Syria's presence in Lebanon, the terrorists would have left it much faster, possibly even without need for the IDF to massively bomb West Beirut, which greatly damaged our world image.

Moreover, if the cabinet had followed this path, it would have been possible to expel the terrorists not only from West Beirut, but the remaining terrorists who found refuge behind the Syrian lines in Tripoli and al-Biqa' could also have been driven away.

This way it would have been possible to achieve both the primary and the related goals. Instead, the PLO was dealt a blow, and the stage of peace for the Galilee was reached, but Syria still remains, and it holds the political cards in its hand. There was certainly no need for such a bitter and prolonged war to achieve this. As the defense minister himself admitted, it would have taken no more than 2 or 3 days.

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## 'MA'ARIV' COMMENTS ON PLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

TA121619 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 12 Jan 83 p 5

[Commentary by Moshe Zaq: "Permission From Moscow"]

[Text] The communist summit convention, headed by Yiri Andropov, which convened in Prague, did not make do with a proposal for a nonbelligerence treaty between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. The communist convention also reached a decision regarding the Middle East, which did not receive as much attention in the West as did the proposal for a nonbelligerence treaty in Europe.

The heads of the communist bloc again brought up the demand to convene an international meeting "attended by all elements" for reaching a settlement in the Middle East and Israeli withdrawal from all the "territories."

This call means including the PLO in the meeting, and no doubt the inclusion of the Soviet Union in any arrangement in the Middle East.

The West did not react to this Soviet demand. However, the Soviet Union is not giving up. The invitation of Yasir 'Arafat to Moscow, which came in order to stress that the Soviets will not permit a "U.S. arrangement" in the area, should be viewed against this background. King Husayn heard this from Yuri Andropov during his visit in Moscow. And the Syrians heard it when they received a promise from the Soviets to send Soviet teams to man the SAM-5's in Syria. And now Yasir 'Arafat will also hear it.

UN Deputy Secretary General Urquhart who came to Jerusalem to discuss the extension of the UNIFIL mandate brought with him an impression from Damascus that the Syrians and the PLO will agree to evacuate Lebanon. Others think that the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon is the Soviet key to any U.S. arrangement.

Anyway, 'Arafat will try to convince Moscow that there is no "danger" of a U.S. arrangement, and all that he is looking for in his agreement with Husayn is to cause a rift between Jerusalem and Washington. Husayn will agree to open negotiations on the basis of the "Reagan plan" and the "Fes plan" on condition that Israel freeze the settlements. Husayn will not agree to be bound by the Camp David accord, and this maneuver will cause tension between Israel, which will refuse to give in to the Jordanian-PLO dictate, and the United States.

'Arafat is asking permission from Moscow for this maneuver.

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## HARIF ON U.S. MOTIVES BEHIND RECENT MOVES

TAl10920 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Jan 83 p 5

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "Washington's Last Card"]

[Text] The fact that the frequent contacts and meetings between King Husayn and terrorist leader Yasir 'Arafat have become a rather permanent institution could in itself be regarded as a very substantial achievement scored by the Washington foreign policymakers. If this process continues, it would appear that Israel will find itself in a serious catch-22 situation and then the real confrontation between itself and the United States would become inevitable.

Only very few people believed that the Reagan administration would succeed in bringing 'Arafat closer to the point where he would be prepared to hold a dialogue with Israel, even if this is conducted with the help of Judaea and Samaria mayors who are not official PLO activists. The fact is that 'Arafat is prepared for this. This means that the U.S. administration is slowly but surely making its way toward achieving its goal: To bring the PLO to recognize Israel, even if this is recognition with ifs and buts, if only Washington could revoke all its pre pledges and promises made to Israel--namely that it would never negotiate with the PLO.

In this respect, the Israeli policymakers would be well advised not to entertain illusions. If those who assess situations were asked whether 'Arafat was capable of getting that close to Husayn and Jordan, they would have right there and then found half a dozen reasons to argue against such a possibility and say that it is inconceivable. The first among the reasons they would cite would probably be that the PLO extremists would not permit him to do that and that 'Arafat for his part "would not dare." Well, he is daring.

The prevalent assessments in Jerusalem now, that is following King Husayn's visit to Washington and prior to another trip by the monarch later this month, have it that the Jordanians might come out with a declaration expressing support for the principle of dialogue as the means to resolve conflicts, even with Israel, but that things would not reach anything "operational."

Perhaps. But such a declaration would be enough for the United States to fall upon Israel and urge it not to pile obstacles on the road to peace by continuing the settlement activity, since everyone agrees that stopping it would be Husayn's main precondition for merely expressing readiness to enter into negotiations with Israel and with Egypt through U.S. mediation. If then Israel refuses to comply, as it is indeed expected to do, it would be condemned by the State Department as the sole obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

Anyone who has such blind faith in President Reagan as to believe that he would not permit George Shultz' State Department to harm Israel should draw an inference and learn the lesson from the experience gleaned in the last few years. Certainly Reagan is a friend of Israel--and to go by the frequent assessments made on him by Ambassador Arens, he is "the greatest" friend of Israel--but there is a world of a difference between this and Washington's practical policy.

After all, how does one assess the friendship of statesmen and administrations: By election time declarations or deeds?

We can still recall Ronald Reagan's declarations and lofty promises regarding all the outstanding disputes in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Before he was elected, Reagan told his Jewish voters that "during my administration there will be no more betrayals of friends and allies of the United States." This came in reference to the Carter administration's cold shouldering of Israel to the point of showing readiness to vote in the Security Council in favor of a resolution calling for the dismantlement of all the Israeli settlements in Judaea and Samaria, including whatever had been built in Jerusalem.

So has everything Reagan uttered before he was elected, or even afterwards, really come true?

Reagan did not hesitate to say that the U.S. administration must rescind its vote on the Security Council resolution, and moreover add an investigation should be carried out as to how it at all came about that a U.S. representative could have voted the way he did. As for the "West Bank," the arrangement there should be found through Israeli-Jordanian negotiations ("I will never lend a hand toward the dismantlement of settlements.")

Well then, does the Reagan plan leave any room for negotiations "between Israel and Jordan," and has the plan not already ruled what the future of the territories should be. Does it not say very explicitly that in return for peace Israel should withdraw from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District?

Regarding Jerusalem, Reagan says outright: "Sovereignty (over that city) is in Israel's hands...and the nonpartitioning of Jerusalem means Israeli sovereignty over the city." What was this directed at? At all the repeated declarations made by his presidential predecessors regarding "the nonrepartitioning of Jerusalem"? It was stated at the time that "nonrepartitioning" does not mean Israeli sovereignty, because the city can remain united and

still be handed over to international supervision. Then along came Reagan with the unequivocal declaration: "Nonrepartitioning" means only one thing: Israeli sovereignty. Yet what does the Reagan plan say? That Jerusalem's status should be determined through negotiations (with Jordan and the Palestinians). So here is Reagan's plan not flinching at all from making an a priori decision. Why did Reagan refrain from repeating his declared position regarding Jerusalem? Is it because he believes that as a broker he should leave all outstanding issues open for negotiations between the parties? If so, why did he rule that Israel should withdraw from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District in return for peace? Why did he not leave that for negotiations between the parties too?

It was convenient for someone in Jerusalem to argue that this plan bears the president's name. But in fact it is the masterpiece created by the U.S. State Department, led by Shultz. Supposing Shultz succeeded in "selling" the ideas included in the plan to the president and managed to talk him into admitting paternity to this creature--what difference does this make in practical terms?

Reagan did not hesitate to express his opinion on the State Department: "I do not have too much faith in this State Department. I believe that the State Department should represent the president's policy. Its staff is not in the business for themselves..."

But by agreeing to grace the plan with his name did the president not make it common knowledge that this indeed represents his policy?

The fact of the matter is that all of Reagan's conversations with Husayn are founded on the principles of the Reagan plan. Moreover, here is another piece of truth: There is a growing U.S. readiness to recognize the link between the Palestinians who will be on the Jordanian delegation and the PLO, despite all the attempts to cover this up and not call them PLO members but "mayors." As far as we know, Washington already agrees that no Palestinian representative who would not get the blessing of 'Arafat be included in the Jordanian delegation.

Anyone who seeks to hide behind the argument that after all this is "only" Shultz', not Reagan's plan is basking on his own unreasonable reality.

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NEW OBSERVATION TOWERS ERECTED ON EGYPT BORDER

TA131834 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1820 GMT 13 Jan 83

[Excerpt] Egyptian border, 13 Jan (ITIM)--"New observation towers have recently been erected on the Israeli-Egyptian border in order to make the IDF soldiers' stay in the area easier," senior army officers reported today in the course of a tour for NEGEV correspondents along the southern border.

They added that the observation towers are an Israeli development and substantially alleviate the boredom of routine for the soldiers stationed in distant points manned by the IDF along the Israeli-Egyptian border.

The new installations include an observation post, sleeping quarters and lavatories, so that the soldiers could function without leaving the tower even in bad weather conditions.

During the tour, the participants were also briefed on the 15 border demarcation stones the precise locations of which have not yet been determined since there is a dispute over the precise placement. Since the relations between Israel and Egypt have been frozen, the deliberations on the positioning of the disputed border marking stones has also been halted. Compared with the dispute in Tabah, which involves a distance of some km, it was clearly discernible during the tour that in most other places the dispute involves only a few meters.

A military source reported in this context that one of the explanations for the difference in surveying between the Egyptians and the Israelis lies in the fact that the original borderline was demarcated in 1906 by the English and the Turks, and the precision at that time cannot be equalled with today's sophisticated and accurate surveying equipment.

Regarding the infiltrations from the southern border into Israel, senior army officers explained that in addition to incursions on family background, because of criminal offenses or in search for jobs, there are also infiltrations for the sake of carrying out terrorist attacks.

Last year, dozens of handgrenades were captured in the hands of Sinai inhabitants and the fear exists that among the dozens of individuals who were not caught last year there were also hostile elements. Army members explained

that despite the efforts the IDF has been putting into preventing these penetrations from Egypt, no shots are fired at those crossing the southern border. "This is being taken advantage of by the infiltrators, who in some cases play a game of hide and seek with us," a senior military source emphasized, adding that one must remember that this is a border of peace, and that not one soldier of ours was hit in the area as a result of fire directed by the people who penetrated from across the border.

CSO: 4400/167



## HEBRON MAYOR ACCUSED OF CONSPIRING WITH PLO

### Qiryat Arba' Residents Charge Mayor

TA121723 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 12 Jan 83

[Text] The Qiryat Arba' local council is demanding that the defense minister sue the Hebron mayor on charges of conspiring with the PLO. They have threatened that unless this is done, the disturbances in Hebron would continue, as will the friction between that city and Qiryat Arba'. At any rate, the Qiryat Arba' inhabitants say, if the defense minister does not file a complaint against the Hebron mayor, they will appeal to the High Court of Justice.

Meanwhile, our correspondent reports, the Qiryat Arba' residents are disinclined to continue to tear down the electricity pylons that were reerected today. They said that they would give the military government a chance to clear things up, as they called it, with the Arab inhabitants of Hebron. They claim that the land over which the electricity line has been put up is state land, the ownership of which is being discussed by an appeals committee. They also accused the Hebron mayor of issuing building licenses, something which is not within his jurisdiction, and of laying water pipes and electricity lines as though the Qiryat Arba' people never existed.

### Mayor Becomes 'Hero' in Dispute

TA131448 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Jan 83 p 7

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Text] Hebron Mayor Mustafa al-Natshah, who until now had been almost unknown except as the deputy of expelled Fahd al-Qawasimi, has become a hero in the eyes of the area's Arabs because of the struggle he is now waging against the settlers of Qiryat Arba'.

The background of the struggle is that electricity pylons have been put up twice, torn down twice, and erected a third time near Qiryat Arba'. The mayor claims that the land they were set up on belongs to the Arabs, while the Qiryat Arba' settlers claim it was state land earmarked for the development of their settlement.

Yesterday, al-Natshah was visited by members of Peace Now, who came to encourage him in his struggle against the Qiryat Arba' settlers.

He welcomed them for doing so, and also took advantage of the opportunity to praise "the Israeli population's moderate faction which aspires to live in peace with the area's Arabs," and to condemn "those wanting to take over our lands and drive us from our homes."

The Hebron mayor received telephone calls of encouragement from Arab figures yesterday evening and, as expected, he was promised financial aid for his struggle against the Qiryat Arba' settlers.

CSO: 4400/166

LATEST FIGURES REPORTED FOR IDF DEPLOYMENT, LEBANON

TA181110 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] The costs of the IDF deployment in Lebanon, including the comprehensive cost of construction and soldiers' equipment, have to date reached 2.38 billion shekels. This was reported by the IDF spokesman in a special summing-up of the winter deployment campaign in Lebanon.

Among other things, the spokesman said that the provision of winter equipment and the deployment of the Israeli forces in the special winter installations prepared in Lebanon had been completed. The final work is now being completed in the camps, the positions and the traffic arteries.

This is a campaign which is unprecedented in scale, because of both the large number of soldiers and the very broad deployment, covering 1,500 km, the work being carried out according to a crowded timetable of about 4 months before the winter. In addition to this, it is a question of unknown and difficult terrain, some of which is densely populated, and the activity is in hostile territory with serious limitations of movement.

It has been pointed out that this work included, inter alia, the transfer of about 500 buildings brought from Israel, mainly from IDF camps in the Negev. In addition to this, another 200 local buildings have been adapted. This is in addition to the large installations established in Jabal al-Barukh and the Ansar prisoners' camp. The IDF has also prepared spatial field training bases and central installations for supplies in the regions of Marj 'Uyun and near the al-Zahrani River. Among the equipment that has been acquired there are also about 1,700 heaters with chimneys supplying central heat to camps and positions.

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COMMENTARY ON ARAB PRESS, JORDAN

TA181642 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Jan 83 p 5

[Commentary by Yosef Tzuri'el: "The Hashemite Turn"]

[Text] A trick played by a journalist from one of the East Jerusalem papers illustrated the shift that occurred in public opinion in the territories regarding the status of King Husayn in the area, the expectations from what is usually called the "Arab world" and what is by way of being the lesser of two evils for the PLO.

Two days after a stormy argument had been conducted among Arab journalists about everything involving the future of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, he took a bunch of editorials that had been recently published in the three daily papers published in East Jerusalem, mixed them up and then asked his colleagues to identify them. Which of them had appeared in AL-QUDS and which in AL-SHA'B and AL-FAJR.

In normal times there would have been nothing easier. But at such a time, with King Husayn going in and out of the White House and the PLO leader often appearing at the Amman airport, the differences in views are losing their definition and what was considered to be untouchable 2 years ago now appears reasonable and reflecting reality.

From this viewpoint, AL-QUDS congratulated itself on seeing what is emerging. The fact that it did not test reality in black and white drove away from it young people and the educated classes. They also called it insulting names and accused it of giving Israel indirect services in return for favors. But anyone who takes the trouble to leaf through that paper will find that its evaluations were generally correct, particularly when this pertains to King Husayn's involvement in any possible political solution in the area.

The fact that today there is not even a score of Arab public figures in the territories who continue to adhere to the belief that King Husayn is a catastrophe for the inhabitants of the area indicates that something basic has undermined the world views of Messrs al-Shak'ah-Khalifa-al-Tawil-al-Shawwa-(Sayyad)-(Hanayyah). And if matters have reached the point where the two expelled mayors, Muhammad Milhim and Fahd al-Qawasimi, are today on missions of goodwill for King Husayn, then we can see that nothing much is left for the Arabs to do but to wait for the Americans to help them.

King Husayn has won and his work is being done by others. The war in Lebanon and Israel's adherence to the mission of settling Judaea and Samaria have accelerated a process that was apparently to be expected in another few years and may be entitled "to save what can still be saved" and caused Arab public figures from the territories to get together, push the disputes among themselves to one side and try to see only the main point.

The recognition of the PLO's weakening as a result of the war in Lebanon is increasing in the territories. Both moderate and extremist Arab personalities today admit that they will not be able to pretend for much longer that the public and political frameworks of the PLO have not been undermined, not only in Beirut, but also in other places.

The destruction of those frameworks is causing people to abandon the thoughts of military solutions. For members of the rejectionist front in Ramallah, Nabulus and East Jerusalem, this is a blow that is hard to accept.

"A state of deadlock" is the common expression in the territories at present. It is expressed in editorials, heard in talks with Arab personalities and it seems that this situation is what is frightening Yasir 'Arafat. This is what has led to his rushed activity. And his faithful supporters in the towns of the West Bank know this and are today trying to act on his directives. "Because there is no other alternative."

And if there is no alternative, one must return to the old slogans. Several scornful remarks were aimed at Shaykh Ja'bari from Hebron, jeers were tossed at Hamdi Kin'an from Nabulus and rebukes were thrown at 'Aziz Shihadah from Ramallah. This took place not yesterday, but 15 years ago. And all this took place because of their claim that without Jordan there would be no political solution in the area.

Now the AL-FAJR paper supports what it calls coordination of positions with Jordan and the AL-SHA'B paper speaks about the "need of reality," that is, speaking with Husayn.

CSO: 4400/166

EVIDENCE SHOWS EYTAN ORDERED W. BANK HARASSMENT

TA200756 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Jan 83 p 1

[Report by David Richardson]

[Text] Two documents submitted to the central command military court here yesterday suggest that Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan gave orders to indiscriminately harass the Arab population in the West Bank to curb disturbances in the area last spring and instructed the military courts in the area to hand down stiffer sentences on wrong-doers.

If the military prosecutor's office decides to challenge the documents, the court will summon Eytan to testify.

The documents were submitted by one of the defence advocates at the trial of an IDF major and six soldiers accused of assaulting and maltreating Arab students detained at the Hebron Islamic University as well as other Arabs during several days of disturbances in the Hebron area last March.

The contents of the documents, which are the minutes of a staff meeting and the conclusions of the COS after a tour of the area, were not revealed in full during yesterday's proceedings.

First Lt 'Aqiva Saronvitz, operations officer in the Judaea District at the time, testified yesterday that on 15 March he heard the district commander, Lt Col Shalom Lugassi, issue orders to shoot at solar heaters, break watches and shoot in alleys to enforce a curfew imposed on the al-Duhayshah refugee camp south of Bethlehem.

Saronovitz, who was called by the defence, also testified that there were "preventive arrests" during which people were detained according to a list of names provided by the civil administration of the General Security Service, even if they were not suspected of any offence, to try and prevent unrest.

During another incident in the village of Si'ir where a bus had been stoned and was about to be set alight, the young officer, who has since been transferred at his own request out of the area, testified that Lugassi had

ordered him to round up several youths in the village. Loaded up on the bus at night and taken 15 kilometres from Si'ir, they were then released and had to walk back to their homes.

Saronovitz was asked how he understood the term "to deal with" the Arab students who had been detained during a riot in the Hebron University as it had been used by the military commander of the area, Col Ya'aqov Hartabi. Like the accused and other witnesses who have appeared, Saronovitz was in no doubt that Hartabi meant that they should be beaten.

The trial continues today and is due to end next Thursday.

CSO: 4400/166

'DAVAR' COMMENTATOR ON LEGAL TREATMENT OF GAZA STRIP

TA161522 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Jan 83 p 8

[Article by Dani Tzidqoni: "Half of the Working Gaza Wanders Northward and Eastward for Work in Israel"]

[Excerpt] Since Sharon was appointed defense minister and Brig Gen Yosi Lunz the commander of the Gaza Strip, the connection between the regional command of the "civilian administration" (forgive me for the quotation marks I put around "civilian administration" since we continue to rule the Gaza Strip by means of the military authorities, as we have done since 1967, and no semantics can change this) and the journalists in the region has been cut off. Since this is the case, every piece of information the command sources afford us is "a bargain."

This was not the case in the past but many things have changed in recent years, including the military authorities' ideas about the right of the public in whose name they are acting to know what they are doing.

The report on the 1980 work year (April 1980 to March 1981)--namely, the 14th year of the military authorities in the Gaza Strip--was an extraordinary opportunity to transmit official information about events in the Gaza Strip. Although a year has elapsed since then, it is worthwhile pointing out some findings.

For example, the data indicate the intensive activity of the military courts which in 1980 concluded hearing the cases of 3,770 inhabitants and where 3,853 new cases opened. These courts, as is known, judge inhabitants charged with hostile terrorist activity (as if such activity could be sympathetic, unless this refers to terrorist activity against Palestinian mayors). Sometimes these courts also hear criminal offenses with government implications [hashlakha memshaltit]. Drug dealers, for instance, are occasionally brought to the military court with the intention that this kind of court will hand out harsher sentences to them than the civilian courts, the workers of which are all Arabs.

The military courts, in the year of this report, made rulings regarding 3,458 cases, out of which only 180 cases were acquitted. The fines imposed on 2,800 of those convicted put 1,955,930 shekels at the rate of the shekel then into the country's coffers.



In addition, 232 people were not put in prison but were given conditional imprisonment, while 246 were sentenced to actual imprisonment; but only 4 of them were sentenced to 10 or more years in jail, 7 were sentenced to prison terms ranging between 2 to 5 years.

The report did not specify the nature of the offenses but it should be mentioned that, for example, people who refuse to pay value added tax in the Gaza Strip are tried in military courts and that it is difficult to know whether the refusal to pay the taxes is for political reasons or is a result of the offenders' greed. I ran into several Israeli patriots, fanatic admirers of Begin and Sharon, who were discovered to be big income tax evaders although this tax is intended, among other things, to guarantee our control over the territories, a policy which they zealously support. In the Gaza Strip there are no such problems--patriotism goes hand in hand with a refusal to pay taxes.

A ray of light in these detentions and prison terms is the fact that in 1980 the number of administrative detainees in the Gaza Strip was six and by the end of the year it had dropped to only three. The tendency, so the report states, is to reduce this number to the minimum. This is an example for a strict "military secret" which was not brought to the attention of the journalists although there is a foreign affairs liaison officer who is responsible for contacts with the press. I assume that the release of this fact at the time when it happened, when the Israeli authorities in the territories were fiercely attacked, would have aided, even if only a little, the unsuccessful Israeli public relations system. However, the people in charge of the territories, Defense Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eytan prefer to blame the communications media for all their inactions and failures.

The secret which has been kept so far about the small number of administrative detainees in the Gaza Strip is only one example of a huge system which sees the press as an enemy and not as a tool whose aim is, first and foremost, reporting. Governors in the Gaza Strip in the past understood this fact at least. Ari'el Sharon himself, when he was commander of the southern command, even used the communications media to aggrandize himself. It is a fact that some journalists sprang, thanks to him, to government positions, but what the rabbi is allowed to do is forbidden for others.

CSO: 4400/166

'MA'ARIV' ON WEST BANK ELECTRIC, WATER GRIDS

TA131737 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Jan 83 p 21

[Report by 'Amos Levav]

[Excerpt] The settlement of Elon More was hooked up to the Israeli electricity grid 2 weeks ago. This was the hallmark of the massive drive to "electrify" Judaea and Samaria which has been carried out with record speed.

Paul Shefer, the director of the Electric Company's Jerusalem District, said: "A few weeks ago we began to receive orders from the Housing Ministry. Until then we had received orders from the World Zionist Organization. We began in 1980, building three major axes. Up until that time there was nothing."

Question: A massive drive?

Shefer: "I would like to think so. In 2 years, 200 km of network, of which 180 are high-tension lines, were put up."

The axes along which the electricity lines were set up are: Tulkarm to Dayr Sharaf (the Shave Shomron junction); from there northward to Sannur and soon to Mevo Dotan; the Qalqilyah axis, through Qedumim, to Shave Shomron; and the axis from Kafr Qasim to Tappuah and from there to Shilo, continuing north to Elon More.

"This is a substantial infrastructure, one that could supply electricity to some 10 to 15,000 homes," Shefer says. "We are planning on the 100,000 scale, but it does not look like we would have 100,000 people there in the next 2 years."

In today's prices, the Electric Company has invested 360 million shekels in Samaria alone. "In terms of the Jerusalem District, this is unprecedentedly large-scale work. We have never undertaken anything on such a large scope before," the director of the district says, adding: "We did most of the work ourselves, but we also got help from the Dan District."

Question: By this rate and scope of work, do you believe that the infrastructure is planned to stay?

Answer: "I did not say that. I hope it is being done for good. It will serve whoever is there. This is no temporary job."

Question: Why did they wait until 1980?

Answer: "I could send you to some prime ministers to present that question to; they only started talking real business with us in 1979. Up to that time we were busy in the Jordan Rift Valley and in Gush 'Ezyon."

The Electric Company did not work at such "killing speed" in Judaea. In the 1970's, it connected Gush 'Ezyon to the grid, then Qiryat Arba'. Hebron, too, was hooked up and its consumption grew 16 times larger in those 10 years--a world record.

One line extends from Jerusalem, another from Hartuv. Like in Samaria, here too Arab villages were also connected.

"Now we are beginning to work in Judaea like we did in Samaria," Shefer says. "We are modifying the existing grid to high power. We are supplying electricity to the new settlements in the southern slopes of the Hebron hills too. The same for northern Samaria. We are planning to set She-an-Janin line. In a year we will hook northern Samaria, and in 2 years, the southern part of the Hebron hills."

Speaking of electricity, let us also mention water. The deputy director general of the Tahal Water Planning Company, who is in charge of the water department, says: "Most of the rainwater falling on the Samaria hills seeps into the soil and reaches the subterranean water reservoirs, west of the watershed. Previously, that is up until 30 years ago, the water flowed subterraneously, with two outlets: In the Rosh Ha'ayin springs and in the Tanninim River. All together, it accounted for 350 million cubic meters per annum (with the entire state water potential standing at 1,600 cubic meters a year)."

The Jews were pushed to the foot of the hill and "captured" these waters before they reached the Yaron River. According to Nisan Nevo: "These waters have been exploited since the 1950's."

Drilling is currently being done in Judaea and Samaria, producing small quantities of water, only for drinking. Next year the Meqorot Water Company will invest 90 million shekels drilling in Judaea and Samaria.

Question: How is the Judaea and Samaria water planning being carried out?

Answer: "Since there are only few settlements and, moreover, the number of inhabitants is small, we planned local drillings. But since this business is thriving, we are looking into incorporating it within the overall Israeli network. The Water Commission has commissioned the planning with us. When there are 100,000 Jews there, they will require about 10 million cubic meters. Today we are far from this figure, making perhaps 2 to 3 million cubic meters."

Question: Is Israel entitled to use the Judaea and Samaria water resources?

Answer: "We have long been using them, through their sources in Israel, and we are using them in the most legal way possible."

Question: Supposing the Jordanians had drilled in Judaea and Samaria?

Answer: "This would have come at our expense and would have been cause for war."

Question: What makes that water ours?

Answer: "It springs from here, from the springs of the Tanninim River and Rosh Ha'ayin, and we are using it. If it had flowed to the sea, namely if we had not used it, someone in Tulkarm could have drilled. In any arrangement whatsoever, it would be a must to agree that they are not entitled to use this water."

Question: But should we not have control over these sources?

Answer: "That is correct, but it can only appear in an agreement. However, there may be a problem of pollution, sewage, waste and the like. Therefore, there must also be an arrangement [hesder] for the prevention of pollution, which is why it is hard to control them through an agreement only."

One of the reasons why "the 100,000 dream" is still far from actually materializing is the poor state of the road system. Last year, the Public Works Department did not pave any road in Judaea and Samaria. The existing roads are terrible, narrow, with high shoulders, and extremely dangerous. The major road so far paved is the Trans-Samaria Highway.

Data obtained by MA'ARIV indicates that five state highways are in the planning stages: One from Hadera to Mehola; another on the ridge of the hills; the trans-Samaria road (from Morasha to Rosh Ha'ayin); from Ma'ale Addummim to 'Arad; and from Ben Shemen, through 'Atarot and 'Anatot to Mishor Adummim.

Similarly, six regional roads are also planned, stretching over approximately 270 km. Most of them have not yet progressed past the planning stage, except for one, the Kafr Qasim bypass road, for which the proper budget was found as part of the negotiations for the Tehiya's joining the coalition and the government. Four km of another road, from Levona to 'Ofarim in the planned regional road from Bet Arye to Modi'in, have been broken by the IDF. Work has likewise begun on paving a state road from Ma'ale Adummim to 'Arad, and so far a 10-km portion of it has been finished, stretching between Yattir and Susiyya.

CSO: 4400/167

PALESTINIAN PRESS UNDER SHADOW OF DETENTION

Ha'olam HAZE in Hebrew 12 Jan 83 pp 21-22, 38, 44

[Article by Ben-Tziyon (Zitrin): "Press Under the Shadow of Detention"]

[Excerpts] What is published in the Palestinian Press Center in Jerusalem reaches its readers outside the eastern part of the city in all sorts of ways. Palestinians come to the big city, buy papers for themselves and friends, and take them home. If they are caught on the way, they may be detained. Newspapers are also passed on in other ways, about which the publishers prefer not to talk.

Thus a paper, which in Israel is sold at every street corner, turns into a product difficult to obtain outside the old city of Jerusalem.

A paper that is published after scrupulous censorship is far more absorbing to read. The readers try to read between the lines, to hunt for meanings and hints of the most factual information. Every picture, announcement or advertisement is scrutinized sevenfold.

Several hundred people are employed in the press throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but there are no precise figures. Those settled in Jerusalem, like their professional colleagues spread throughout the conquered territories and even abroad, regard their work as a national mission of prime importance. Some of them have been working in the press for a long time, sometimes combining this with other work.

The Palestinian press is in principle closed to Israelis. But in AL-FAJR, in its English and Hebrew editions, there are personal columns by Israeli Jews.

Most of the Palestinian press has advertizing, some even in color. Nor is circulation small, considering the small reading public--about 1.5 million--and the difficulties of distribution.

The editor of AL-QUDS claims that he prints 20,000 editions a day. With the Arabic AL-FAJR they talk of about 10,000 copies, and a similar figure for AL-SHA'B. The number of copies of the weeklies and magazines is smaller.

But what is surprising is that AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASSI is printed in 20,000 copies. The literary paper, which is published by the same printers, is printed in 5,000 copies. A similar number of most of the weeklies and magazines is printed. AL-FAJR, in its English and Hebrew editions, is printed in several hundred copies, and according to the publishers very few copies are returned, if any. Some of these papers even find their way to the Arab man in the street in Israel, where there is a potential readership of about 70,000 people.

Why this thirst for papers? First, it should be recalled that the distribution of Arab papers from Arab countries is banned in the conquered territories. The educated Palestinian is not satisfied with listening to the radio stations and watching the news programs on television. He wants additional information in writing, just like the Israeli who swallows papers every day.

However, beyond this there is another reason, and perhaps it is the main one. The entire Palestinian press is pro-PLO. Despite the difficulties of censorship and distribution, and despite the grave restrictions imposed on the Palestinian press, anyone who manages to lay a hand on AL-QUDS, on the one hand, or on AL-TALI'AH on the other is reading press that supports the ideas of the Palestine Liberation Organization all along the line. Even the most extremist censorship cannot stop this.

CSO: 4400/167

NRP, PO'ALE AGUDA PLAN MERGER

TA130827 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Jan 83 p 2

[Report by political reporter Sarah Honig]

[Text] Tel Aviv--The National Religious Party [NRP] and Po'ale Agudat Yisra'el [Po'ale Aguda] have agreed in principle to form an alignment which would contest the next elections as a single bloc.

This would have no effect on the present strength of the NRP's Knesset faction since Po'ale Aguda failed to elect a single Mk to the 10th Knesset. The small party did not manage to pass over the minimal threshold that guarantees entry into the Knesset, though the number of votes it garnered could have awarded a party that was already over the threshold another Mk.

According to the tentative agreement, the parties would not merge but would form a united front. The details of the agreement are yet to be worked out, among them which slot Po'ale Aguda would get on the joint Knesset list. In the NRP the talk is that Po'ale Aguda would be relegated to the sixth or seventh slot. Prior to the 1981 elections, similar talks about a united front fell through when Po'ale Aguda demanded the third slot.

Po'ale Aguda has been courting Agudat Yisra'el for the past year, but the idea of a merger was finally rejected when it appeared that co-chairman of Aguda's Council of Torahsages, Rabbi Eli'ezer Shakh, is fiercely opposed to any cooperation with Po'ale Aguda.

A powerful force in Po'ale Aguda is the Habad Hassidic movement, whose head the Lubavicher Rebbe is known as a maximalist on all issues concerning Judaea and Samaria. Po'ale Aguda also has settlements beyond the Green Line and its youth movement 'Ezra is among the most extreme maximalists. Po'ale Aguda is said to have lost its Knesset representation when many of its younger members voted for Tehiya.

With this background, it is felt that a bloc with Po'ale Aguda should strengthen the more nationalistic elements in the NRP.

CSO: 4400/167

COMMENTARY ON IMPACT OF BEGIN'S HEALTH

TA071359 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Jan 83 p 4 Political Supplement

[Commentary by Arye Tzimuqi: "Begin Looked Sad and Introverted, But He Has Made All the Important Decisions"]

[Text] "I cannot wear a smile, I am in no mood for it and I cannot playact," Prime Minister Menahem Begin intimated in the talks he held with a person closely associated with him, who pointed out to him that there are many rumors and speculation on his gloomy mood.

This man emphasized to Begin that many of his friends, too, have recently been pointing out that Begin has lost his joie de vivre and appeared to be introverted, saying little and in general not being his old self.

Ministers have been known to say that in cabinet sessions he is not as active and lively as he used to be and does not actively participate in the deliberations, as he did before.

Knesset members have recently spotted him occupying his seat at the cabinet table without exchanging even one word with those seated next to him. He looks morose, and sometimes it appears as though he is indifferent to his surroundings.

In the last few months, Begin has granted very few interviews to the media and refrained from appearing in meetings, rallies or conferences, just as he has substantially reduced the number of his Knesset appearances--which is something he adored in the past, particularly the part of indulging in polemics with his adversaries.

His associates have advised him to again grant interviews and make public appearances in order to dispel the insistent rumors that are being spread about his mood, which, his opponents say, harms his functioning and fulfilling the role of premier.

Begin reacted by saying that he is not at all perturbed by the Israeli press reports on him, because there is no one more experienced with these reports, as he has been exposed to this for 35 years. At the same time, he never ceases to calm his friends, telling them: "Do not fret, it will pass."



No doubt the death of his wife, 'Aliza, has instilled a deep sadness in him. He was so close to her for so many years, that his friends say: "Small wonder. Begin comes back home, and 'Aliza is not there." His associates say that the fate of the prisoners and the missing-in-action bothers him a great deal. Can anyone not be disturbed and worried about it, they say, when one meets with their families and relatives and still cannot bring them good tidings? The prime minister is similarly worried about the casualties in Lebanon. Those close to him believe that the Commission of Inquiry investigating the massacre in the refugee camps is also a source of loss of sleep. One must not forget that Begin set up the commission following public pressure, whereas as far as he was concerned, he was convinced there was no real justification for it. It is therefore very much in line with what he said at the time: "Goyim kill Goyim, and yet it is the Jews who are on the defendant's bench."

There are also other reasons for him to be disturbed: The cabinet "mal-functions" persist; the Reagan plan is still the U.S. administration's plan; and the media throughout the Western world continues to conduct a campaign against Israel, and particularly against him personally.

The question, then, is whether there is any link between Begin's mood and his ability to function as prime minister, who sometimes needs to make decisions on crucial, even decisive, matters.

On the surface, one could get the impression that he has no public backing for his decisions. At the same time, one could very safely say that he is the one who ruled on most of the political and public issues with which the public was involved in the very weeks when he was gloomy.

Another question which would be perfectly legitimate to ask in this context is: Is it necessary to adopt resolutions and make political and public decisions accompanied by public appearances and by issuing declarations over the media?

Clearly it is better when the decisionmaking is followed also by general public support for the prime minister, but this is not a must.

Following are a number of examples to show how much the prime minister had a bearing on decisions recently adopted:

--It is true that the defense minister was an active factor in the secret contacts held with the family of Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil, but Begin approved them and decided on various issues having to do with that affair. Begin believes that had Bashir al-Jumayyil still been among the living, we would have witnessed a peace agreement signed within 3 to 4 months, and then the picture would have been much different than today. Hence one could understand his adherence to the efforts made to reach a signed agreement with Lebanon. But when he realized that this mission was unattainable, he gave this up while others still continued to believe in their old views.

--Begin was greatly influenced by the publication of the Reagan plan, which was a surprise to him, regarding it as some sort of "treason." This, too, had quite a negative influence on him, and he sometimes gives vent to these sentiments during cabinet sessions. Nevertheless, contrary to Sharon's uncompromising positions regarding the United States, Begin has demonstrated a more moderate stance on this subject. The defense minister has occasionally declared "war" on the United States, especially on the heads of the State Department or the Pentagon. Begin swallowed this, but under no circumstances permitted Sharon to "approach the White House lawn." He thus drew a clear borderline for Sharon in his "war" against the United States.

--Begin did not refrain from voicing criticism of various of Sharon's remarks about the United States. He pointed out to Sharon that he should not remind the Americans of Vietnam or Iran, because these are painful, tragic subjects for the American people. In the prime minister's opinion, it is unbecoming to rub it in to friends.

--Begin instructed Sharon not to sign any document with Lebanon before it had been brought before the cabinet. He was the one who countered Sharon as well as other ministers, but ruled to concede on the level of the heads of the delegations to the negotiations with Lebanon, just as earlier he demanded that the talks be held in Jerusalem and then revoked this demand.

--The defense minister wanted to appoint a certain senior official as the head of the Israeli delegation to the negotiations with Lebanon, but Begin--who was on the same wavelength as Foreign Minister Shamir--decided that it would be none other than Foreign Ministry Director General David Kimche. The prime minister apparently has not been disappointed by this appointment, and misses no opportunity to profusely compliment Mr Kimche.

--Begin was the one who decided to give up the use of the term "normalization" whereas others continued to demand that the word be used. The prime minister remarked that the use of the phrase "bilateral relations" accompanied by the elements it is comprised of, is certainly sufficient from the Israeli standpoint.

--Contrary to Sharon's opinion, Begin believes in the need to avoid any direct, active IDF involvement alongside any of the rival parties in the al-Shuf hills. He has obviously also made a decision in this spirit.

In addition to the above examples, one must also never forget Begin's involvement in giving the final word on all sorts of internal public matters. He was in favor of having the three "Herut" representatives in the Zionist Movement Executive continue to serve in their jobs despite the demand voiced by some party activists that new faces be introduced into the partisan representation. He also demanded that a Tami representative be added to this executive, and this was carried out.

Begin also ruled--in fact against the majority cabinet opinion--that the law on elections to the chief rabbinate also be amended so as to make it possible for the two chief rabbis, Shlomo Goren and 'Ovadya Yosef, to run for a third term. Clearly this position will win a government majority.

Some believe that it was Begin's personal involvement that led to signing the wage agreement for the public sector, thus putting an end to the strikes.

Evidently, then, what rules this cabinet is the personal authority Begin enjoys among his fellow cabinet members. Perhaps publicly it would have been better to have the decisions followed by public explanatory notes from the prime minister--which would have provided them with public backing. But there is still a very long distance between this and the contention that "he is not all there" or that he "has disappeared."

CSO: 4400/167

LEVI INTERVIEWED ON WEST BANK SETTLEMENT

TA141219 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 14 Jan 83 p 5 Weekend Supplement

[Interview with Housing Minister David Levi by Avi'ezer Golan at his East Jerusalem office; date not given]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister David Levi is angry. Recently, interviews have been published in which his cabinet and party colleagues have tried to "steal" for themselves and their ministries the glory of the settlements, while downplaying the role of the Housing Ministry.

At his office in the new government complex in East Jerusalem (where his ministry is the sole tenant presently) Levi said: "Various elements are indeed trying to claim exclusive credit for settling Judaea and Samaria. May they enjoy it. I do not know of a single settlement in Judaea and Samaria that was set up other than through my ministry."

What elements are involved in establishing the settlements?

"First of all, there is a decision by the Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs on the character and location of each new settlement. During the stage of establishing the temporary settlement, the World Zionist Federation's settlement division is involved, and the Defense Ministry if an army pre-settlement [he'ahzut] is at issue until its conversion to a civilian settlement. However, in what follows, during the stage of the conversion of the temporary settlement to a permanent one, the Housing Ministry is the 'main umbrella' for extensive activity which includes urban, communal and rural settlements. In the context of this activity so far, some 11,000 housing units and public institutions such as schools, kindergartens, synagogues and day-care centers have been set up, along with the infrastructure for continuing the momentum in future. To concentrate efforts and prevent duplication of work, I demanded --and my demand was accepted--that responsibility for the building of temporary and permanent settlements be imposed exclusively on the Housing Ministry, with the World Zionist Federation's settlement division participating in implementation, in coordination with my ministry."

And the private settlements, which have been extolled so much lately?

"Those are merely plans on paper, which do not stand on firm ground. Because of the importance and complexity of settlement building, it cannot be left to amateurs and headline chasers. Even when it is called 'private,' my ministry must ultimately be approached at all stages--establishing the infrastructure, building public institutions and giving assistance to the settler. Without these, not a single settlement could be established. I know that there exists an approach based on complying with every entrepreneur, even those lacking experience in construction and development, in order to accelerate the pace of building, as it were. But a single settlement has yet to be set up by this approach. Not one. Everything that has been set up, has been set up with the approval, supervision and aid of the Housing Ministry."

It has been claimed that no settlements have been set up by that approach because you are tightfisted.

"I do not adhere to the concept calling for the allocation of ample resources, from the limited amount at our disposal, for building near Kefar Sava or Petah Tiqwa. The building and the massive aid must be directed to areas deep in the West Bank and mountain slopes. There is no political or social wisdom in rewarding with state funds those wanting to build themselves villas near Kefar Sava in the name of Eretz Yisra'el, because this is at the expense of something more basic and important. I am the one who brought about the great though quiet revolution by involving entrepreneurs and private companies, and the investment of foreign capital, alongside that from the state budget. This approach has proven itself in Ma'ale Adummim, Ari'el, 'Immanu'el, Efrat, Qarne Shomron, Giv'at Ze'ev, Alfe Menashe and others. Thousands of homes are involved and I am proud of this activity."

Speaking of resources, what does it cost the state to settle a single family across the green line? The sum of 4.5 million shekels has been mentioned. "I will not mention amounts, for they are misleading and provocative. The case of someone setting up his home in an existing town within the green line is not the case of someone settling in Judaea and Samaria. An infrastructure has to be built there, a road, water, electricity and communications system. No one asked what portion of the cost to lay the national water carrier was debited to every citizen's account. National goals have a price."

There are those who ask, and it just so happens from among your friends: What happened to David Levi--has he become a "dove?"

"Whoever asks such a thing is being wicked. My deeds throughout Eretz Yisra'el are the answer. It was only 2 years ago that I was almost completely alone in the bitter debate concerning whether to freeze or spur construction in all of Eretz Yisra'el, while all those who call themselves hawks stood on the sidelines. When Yiga'el Horowitz thought that all building should be frozen, I opposed him on national and social grounds. Not only would this have widened the gap in our society, but would have spelled the end of settlement in Judaea and Samaria. Both closing the gap and settling must be carried out. For holding this position, I was condemned as the rascal behind inflation. I stood my ground and insisted that the building must continue--in Qatzrin, Migdal Ha'emeq, Bet El, Qiryat Shemona, Qiryat Arba', Dimona, Ari'el, Bet She'an, and all of Eretz Yisra'el. And I am proud of that too."

GAZANS TOLD TO REVEAL THEIR CAPITAL HOLDINGS

TA190821 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Jan 83 p 3

[Report by David Richardson]

[Text] The civil administration in Gaza for the first time has sent demands for capital declarations to local residents, local sources reported yesterday.

The capital declaration, which is a common tax procedure in Israel, has not been introduced into the territories before and the military government has passed a special regulation to apply it to a representative sample of the population to assess their income.

The demand has already caused widespread resentment among local businessmen, who struck 18 months ago for several weeks to protest the introduction of value added tax along the lines of the Israeli tax laws.

Observers of Israeli policy in the territories have noticed the steady pace and increasing efficiency of financial legislation which is not only cementing the already well-established links between the economies of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, but is also shifting the cost of the occupation onto the local population.

In Jerusalem the High Court of Justice granted 29 residents of the Gaza Strip village of Bayt Lahiyah an interim injunction barring the Israeli authorities from razing their homes. The petitioners claim that their homes were built with licences, that they paid taxes on them, and that in most cases, they own the land or have lived on it for a sufficient period to claim tenure. The authorities are claiming that the land is state land.

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## INCREASE IN STATE LAND REGISTRATION IN TERRITORIES SEEN

TA141143 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jan 83 p 14

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "Quasi Faits Accomplis"]

[Text] When King Husayn announced this week that the Arabs have only 7 weeks left to decide about entering into the negotiating process, from fear that the West Bank will be lost because of the accelerated speed of Israeli settlement, he was not exaggerating. There are those who think that he may be too late. One of the shocking facts which has not to date been published is that of the number of dunams in the West Bank that have been declared "state lands" over the last few years, in a way permitting the establishment of settlements on them. Since this process began (declaring land as state property, with the local inhabitants being able to appeal against this only to the civilian administration's committees, not to the High Court of Justice, a fact that lessens the chance of the appeal succeeding, at the end of the 1970's) the state has, in this way, got its hands on about 150,000 dunams throughout the West Bank.

Government elements dealing with this issue say that, in comparison with this figure, the land taken and registered in Tabu [the Israeli land registration authority] by various Israeli bodies has no importance. According to them, only a few thousand dunams have been acquired to date, less than 10,000. Purchase, these elements say, does not change the territory's face. What is important is the process of declaring the land to be state property.

According to them, the settlement effort in the West Bank is now mainly concentrated on the region south of the Hebron hills, where "scores of thousands" of dunams of land have recently been declared state property. There are 5.5 million dunams of land in the West Bank, of which 1.5 million dunams are land considered in this or another way to be state land. Of this land, only 0.5 million dunams are land that is institutionalized and registered in Tabu as state land. The effort though, these elements explain, is to turn the remaining million dunams (most of it barren) into institutionalized land, registered in Tabu in the name of Israel. Of these million dunams, as stated, 150,000 dunams have already been declared state land, and this is within 4-5 years.

The West Bank has changed its appearance beyond recognition, government elements say, by the very fact that we have parcelled out the West Bank. There are 100 Jewish settlements beside 400 Arab villages, and they have an infrastructure of their own: roads, electricity, lateral roads. And more is still wanted. Now on the agenda is handing over 4,000 dunams in the Husan area, in the southwest of the West Bank, for the purpose of establishing a town called Betar. The Nofim Company, for example, has received from the government 3,000 dunams of state land at a minimal cost, and 700-800 housing units will be built on it (in the center of the West Bank, east of the Petah Tiqva area).

State land that cannot be settled at present because of budgetary and other pressures, is being given, according to the government elements, to local (Jewish) councils on lease. This is with the aim of preventing Arab elements from settling on it.

Therefore, King Husayn, and not only him, has reason for concern.

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## POPULATION AGING FASTER THAN OTHER COUNTRIES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Dec 82 p 8

[Article by Avraham Peleg: "Israel 'Aging' Faster Than Other Developed Countries"]

[Text] The rise in number of old people in Israel is greater than in any other developed country in the world. In 1970 Israel had 50,000 people over the age of 65. In 1980 it had 100,000 and by 1990 it will have 171,000.

This data was submitted by the Israeli Gerontological Association at a press conference yesterday at Sokolov House in Tel Aviv, on the eve of the Fourth National Gerontology Convention, to take place on 12 December at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot.

The association's chairman, Prof Ya'akov Mentchel, the secretary general, Dr Jaques Habib have reported that the convention will be attended by 800 physicians, biologists, social and behavioral scientists, social workers and other professionals who work with the aging. Some 7000 professionals work with the aging in Israel in direct services. The aging now occupy 50 percent of the beds in certain units in Israeli hospitals.

Prof Mentchel has pointed out that thanks to our advanced health services our life expectancy is relatively high, 75 years for women and 73 years for men. Some 10 percent of the population are over 65. This has economic implications. In the future we will need additional 4000 welfare beds and 3000 additional gerontology staff. "I am not sure Israel is prepared for this," the gerontologist said.

He added that the age of 65 is too young for retirement for Israel. It has been proven that productivity goes beyond that age. Dr Habib has pointed out that Israelis are not sufficiently aware of the problems of the aging (over the age of 75) or their work potential. Some 40 percent of the 65-75-year olds still work for pay in the Israeli economy. About a third are supported by their children, while another third supports its own children.

Medically and socially it is possible today to prevent the problems of aging. In the medical area, for instance, it is possible to treat blood pressure which causes stroke and partial paralysis and hip fracture which cost the

state a fortune. Socially, better relations between the elderly person and his family can prevent difficult emotional problems.

The UN has proclaimed 1982 the Year of the Elderly. The convention at the Weizmann Institute is the first event observing the year in Israel.

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W. BANK JEWISH POPULATION ANALYZED

TA101242 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Jan 83 pp 1, 7

[Report by 'Amos Levav]

[Text] No more than 20,000 Jews reside currently in Judaea and Samaria, and it is doubtful that 100,000 Jews would live there by 1987. Gush Emunim has exhausted itself: Out of the 20,000 Jews in Judaea and Samaria, no more than 10,000 belong to Gush Emunim and this is the maximum it will be able to accomplish; it cannot recruit any more people. These are some of the findings of an inquiry conducted by MA'ARIV.

Following are additional findings:

--The attempt to populate the southern Mount Hebron, northern Samaria and the area east of the mountain slopes has so far not been very successful; the "big rush" to Judaea and Samaria encouraged by government elements--as it is being portrayed in the media--is not that big and is limited to 30-minutes driving distance from Tel Aviv and aimed at the center of Samaria, an area scarce in state-owned land. There is also a response to the incentives offered to people settling 10 minutes driving distance from Jerusalem.

--The areas of Judaea and Samaria stretch over 5 million dunams, of which 2.5 million dunams are privately owned. The government has to date succeeded in purchasing less than 10,000 dunams through private businessmen. Some 200,000 dunams have been seized to date for the establishment of Jewish settlements (including the Jordan Rift Valley settlements). In practice, the Jewish settlements occupy approximately one third of this territory.

These are the main findings of a special inquiry conducted by MA'ARIV about what is happening in Judaea and Samaria, following meetings and interviews with representatives of all the elements operating in the area: The Defense Ministry, the Housing and Construction Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the Agriculture Ministry, the Trade and Industry Ministry, the Communications Ministry, the Israeli Water Planning Agency, the Water Company, the Electricity Company, the World Zionist Organization's settlement department, the Jewish National Fund and Gush Emunim.

In Judaea, Samaria and the Jordan Rift Valley there are at present 1 town (Ari'el), 5 urban settlements (qrayot), 10 dormitory settlements [toshavot] (a type of expanded moshava), 34 communal settlements, 15 villages and 7 kibbutzim; 119 settlements in total.

In these settlements there are currently 5,000 inhabited housing units. If one calculates four people in an average family (most of the settlers are young married couples) then one arrives at 20,000 persons.

There are some 2,300 inhabited housing units in the urban settlements. In all the settlements there are about 1,000 empty apartments or apartments in mid-construction, and another 300 housing units are being constructed within the framework of the "build your own house" plan.

The 119 settlements include several nahal outposts that the Defense Ministry established in sparsely Jewish-populated areas.

This data contradicts the remarks of Deputy Agriculture Minister for Settlement Affairs Mikha'el Deqel, who told the Knesset Economic Committee that 29,000 Jewish settlers reside in Judaea and Samaria. Beni Qtazover, the head of the Samaria Regional Council and a prominent Gush Emunim leader, confirmed that some 20,000 people live in Judaea and Samaria today, and between 2,000 to 3,000 in the Jordan Rift Valley. Dr Hayim Tzaban, the head of the Land Development Authority of the Jewish National Fund and the deputy director general of the World Zionist Organization's settlement department, says: "Next spring there will be 25,000 settlers there, and in 1984 there will be 60,000 people."

The defense minister's aide on settlement affairs, Uri Bar-on, confirms: "The government is now pressing more for the development of sparsely-populated areas in the southern Mount Hebron, in northern Samaria and east of the mountain slopes." He does not agree that Gush Emunim has exhausted itself. "The national religious youth goes to the sparsely-populated areas and it is true that it will be more difficult to populate them," Bar-on pointed out.

When the various elements, including Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, realized that this way they were only succeeding in settling areas near Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, they "hitched a ride" on the wave of "private initiative." At the same time, a map was being passed from hand to hand depicting "circles in demand." According to this map, the most popular area is a narrow strip east of the Green Line that begins near Kfar Sava and ends slightly south of Jerusalem. The "line of demand" in the east crosses through Qarne Shomron in the north, Ari'el in the center and Gilo in the south (between Ari'el and Bet El there is an area with hardly any Jewish settlements).

The circle of demand has expanded in the last 2 years, mainly in the central area which includes very little state-owned land--'Immanu'el, Yaqir, Elqana and Ari'el. Prices in that area have gone up almost every month, and this is also the current situation.

It is hard to find Jews who would agree to settle east of Qarne Shomron and Qedumim "without harboring the ideology" of Gush Emunim. Recruits have run out, and this is why Gush Emunim has recently been orienting itself abroad through the expedition of emissaries overseas, and its activities to set up an absorption center in Samaria.

The "elements" decided to hand out land almost gratis to attract private entrepreneurs to the area. They distributed land at 5 percent of actual value, while in the areas within the Green Line land is allotted to builders for 80 to 90 percent of value.

"If I were allowed to do in the Galilee what we have done in Judaea and Samaria, there would be 1,000 times as many Jews there," Uri Bar-on says. "Why should we not give a builder arid land for 5 percent of its value so that he may develop it? That way, people would stand in line there just as they do in Judaea and Samaria," Bar-on added.

Builders are waiting in line for land in the demand area "A," namely, at "spitting distance" from the central part of Israel. They are not enthusiastic about Elon More (where no apartments are in construction except for 36 housing units within the "build your own house" plan) or Mizpe Yeriho. They are standing in line in Ari'el (516 units in construction), Giv'on (1,200 units in construction) and Ma'ale Edumim (1,700 units in construction).

Uri Bar-on foresees 500,000 Jewish settlers in Judaea and Samaria in the year 2000. The head of the settlement department, Matityahu Drobles, foresees 1.5 million Jews in the year 2010. All the operators are planning their activities according to 100,000 Jews. "According to forecasts, the number of Jews in Israel will reach 5 million and they will have to live somewhere. I do not say that they will not go to the Galilee or the Negev, but 500,000 will ultimately live in Judaea and Samaria," Bar-on predicts.

Referring to the notion of private initiative, the defense minister's aide says: "We realized that the Israeli people would go there. The places are so nice, the air is good, there is a good quality of life and it is close to the center. However, the dominant factor is Israel's security, that is what pushed us there. Would Americans who want to emigrate go to Tel Aviv? Look here, an entire Jewish community in the United States is now settling in Efrat. This is also a Jewish instinct to advance, to find new places and to look for challenges.

"There is red tape in the Galilee, the channels are blocked. What are all these enrollment committees good for? The graphologists and the psychologists? Who needs all that?"

Question: "Uri Bar-on, are you a realist?"

Answer: "There is no realism in Eretz Yisra'el. One should not be a realist, one should have a dream and believe."

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LOW JEWISH POPULATION SOUTH OF BET SHE'AN VALLEY CITED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Nov 82 Weekend Supplement pp 10-11

[Article by Mordekhay Barqay: "Peace for the Valley; There Are Now 500 Jewish Families in the Consensus Area of the Jordan Valley, Same As My Development in Maoz Aviv; The Peace of the Valley Is Not Good, Since the Likud Government's Policy Gives the Area Low Priority; The Alignment Government Did Not Give It High Priority Either, and Now, in the Opposition, the Alignment Does Not Seem Determined to Hold on to this Area"]

[Text] Does Israel have life after Lebanon? Sometimes one wonders.

The day I began to gather facts for this article, the Knesset was discussing the Galilee. Gad Ya'aqovi disclosed the Jews had become a minority in the Galilee and their ratio compared to the Arabs was declining. But this was told to an empty room. I wonder whether anyone besides the speaker and a few people in Natzrat Ilit and Karmiel take this fact too seriously. I know of one journalist who took it seriously and devoted his entire column to his bad impression of the empty Knesset, rather than the Galilee empty of Jews.

So how can I complain about the Jordan Valley?

The peace of the Valley is not good. After all, of all the territories--the administrated, the liberated, the occupied, whatever you choose--the Jordan Valley is the one both major political blocs have agreed since Israel's presence there began 15 years ago is not to be returned. Even before the political change in 1977 and even before the 1973 War, when bitter debates took place within the Labor Party mainly between the views of Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, the Jordan Valley was an area of agreement, as could be seen in the settlement map of Judea and Samaria that coincided with the Allon Plan. If there is any national consensus, the Jordan Valley is a clear and rare example.

And yet in this consensus area there are 500 families, only 2500 Jews, no more than my own development, Maoz Aviv, on the right bank of the Yarqon. The entire area east of the hills of Samaria down to Jericho in the south, 15 years after the first settlement was established, totals 500 Jewish families.

Not Strategic?

If Jordan joins the peace talks tomorrow and we start talking about returning territory, including the Jordan Valley, those 500 families will be the human wall of resistance. They do not make for a very convincing argument.

In deciding to whom to turn, I choose the Likud government because it is the present government and because it did establish 205 settlements in all parts of Israel since it came to power 5 years ago. This is a large number, even if the settlements, like nostalgia, "are not what they used to be." Not in every case can one compare it to the effort done during the first 2 years of the state, when 261 settlements were established between 1948 and 1950.

"The areas where most of the settlement effort took place since 1977 are the Galilee, Judea and Samaria," a report of the settlement division of the Jewish states, and adds: "The location of the settlements is determined according to the strategic position of the settlement in relation to the area or to central routes." This means that since the Likud came to power the Jordan Valley has not been mentioned. Since it is facing the central--hence the main--sector, it is not in "a strategic position."

In the past 5 years according to that report, 17 settlements were established in the Jordan Valley, compared to 62 in Judea and Samaria. I dare say that the figure is inflated, since not all 17 are in the Valley itself, while the 62 are a deliberately modest figure, not including civilian settlements. The jurisdiction of the regional council of the Jordan Valley--the most reliable zoning--today includes 22 existing settlements and 5 planned (3 in the north and 2 in the south), a total of 27 (not 31!) compared to 72 in Judea and Samaria. In effect, the areas available for Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria are not much larger than the area of the Jordan Valley.

Seen differently, in all the territory beyond the green line there are today 26,000 Jews, with only one-tenth of this number in the Valley, which is no less of a consensus area than the Golan Heights. The Jewish population of Judea and Samaria is 8 times larger than that of the Valley.

It is well known that the Valley and the Bank are not the same. The Valley is a purely agriculture area (and I might add, pioneering). The settlers of the Valley live off the land, while the Judea and Samaria population is mainly urban. It has a home there, while its livelihood is in Jerusalem or on the coast. But inasmuch as this may be true, it does not erase the disproportion between the Jewish population of the two areas.

The Likud government settles Jews in Judea and Samaria in order to prepare for any future bargaining over the border in this region. There is nothing new here. This was the case once in the Galilee, in the Negev, and so it is in Bet She'an Valley. Anyone who believes Judea and Samaria are ours, can accept this policy. But the fact that the official effort in the Valley is minimal despite the Labor and Likud consensus of the need to settle that area, leads to the inescapable conclusion that by hastily and inadequately settling Judea

and Samaria the government is confronting not the Arabs and Jordan and the U.S., but rather the Labor movement who seeks territorial compromise.

I have pointed out the foregoing in order to show why, for one thing, the peace of the Valley is not good. It is because the government gives low priority to settling the Valley, despite the fact that it is a consensus area.

This is only part of the truth. When the Alignment was in power it did not give the Valley the necessary impetus and encouragement either. Worse yet, being now in the opposition, the Alignment does not behave as though it is determined not to return to this area.

#### Europe's Vegetable Hot House

The main reason for settling the Valley is not political but rather economical. It reflects long-range expectations. The initial settling immediately after the Six Day War was based on the assumption that it is possible and desirable to develop production of winter vegetables (and perhaps even flowers), to take first place in this field in Israel and in the world, and to be the first to reach the markets of Europe. It required several years of trial and error, experimentation and failure for the Valley farmer to get acquainted with the land and its salt content and learn how to take advantage of the climatic conditions and the geographical characteristics of the area, in order to obtain good crops of peppers and watermelons, cantaloup and flowers, grapes and tomatoes. The Valley farmers now start the season of exporting watermelons and grapes. Their watermelons now represent 50 percent of the total national exports. One cannot deny the fact that significant results have been achieved. The farmers have learned how to solve the problems of production. The biggest problem has been the export. For a while the level of export was acceptable, and then the crisis began. It was caused by the fluctuations of European currency in relation to the U.S. dollar. This problem was exacerbated by the try of warm-climate Spain and Portugal into the Common Market. This has adversely affected Israeli agriculture in General. Thus the Jordan Valley did not become the vegetable green house of Europe.

A third reason can be found by looking at the map. The Valley is hot and arid because of the fact that it is located 270 meters under sea level. This is the most difficult settlement area in Israel and can only be compared to 'Arava, south of the Dead Sea, where the climate is less cruel but the isolation is greater. It is not logical or fair to ask a Valley settler why he thinks his lot is more difficult than, say, that of a settler in the northern Golan Heights. The latter has a very cold winter, but "his winter only lasts 4 months, while our summer lasts 8 months." This is the difference.

#### Camp David Syndrome

The almost total lack of encouragement from above, worsening economic problems, a harsh climate and the distance from the population centers, are the kind of difficulties which can harm the settlement effort, each one separately, and, being intertwined, the whole is worse than the parts.



I have heard the most serious indictment from Rafi, the man in charge of security in the Jordan Valley regional council. Camp David, he says, was a death blow to the settlers. Many consider Camp David the reason for the slowing down of the settlement effort in the area. The council head, Israel, agrees. He generally looks for solutions, not excuses. Eli, of kibbutz Gilgal goes further and mentions the Reagan Plan and the attitude of the Labor movement--his own movement--to the plan. The near-general opinion is that the Camp David accords and the evacuation of Yamit deterred those who wanted to settle in the Valley. The impossible did happen, which means that it can happen again. The true believers no longer believe. And yet the Camp David is spoken of as a potential danger and is applied only to those who would not come in the first place. There was no mass defection because of Camp David. No one said after the destruction of Yamit, I have nothing more to do here, I am leaving.

The Jordan Valley is harsh land, extremely hot, salty soil. Meir, of the local agricultural experiments center says this kind of land is generally considered unfit for agriculture. I image that in Arizona or Nevada such areas are not cultivated, even if the Colorado River is a hundred times stronger than the Jordan. Nevertheless, agricultural settlement did start in this area.

One should also bear in mind that Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel has taken place in the past in places abandoned by the Arabs--in the Valley of Jezreel, in the swamp land of Kabra, in the Negev, but not in the Jordan Valley. Here the picture is different. Arab agricultural population has existed here and continues to exist. In the north, in the Jewish area of Mehola, are the villages of Bardala and 'Ayn al-Bayda'; in the Argaman area, on the Valley road, are Marj Naja and Zuwayda. In the center, near Fatzel, is Arab al-Fasayil. Further south, near Yitav, is 'Awja'.

#### Successes of Arab Farming

It is true that these settlements are near the wadis where there is water in the winter and good erosion land. But the location alone is not the reason for the Arab farming success. The Arab farmers make use of Israeli expertise provided to them by the government. They use Israeli techniques and equipment. They have no need for hired hands, since they have their own manpower. They are not governed by the Israeli law and are not bound by Israeli planning and production quotas imposed on Israeli agriculture in the Valley. Until a few years ago they sent most of their produce over the Jordan bridges to the east, to the Hashemite Kingdom, Iraq and Kuwait. Now, for several reasons, this market is closed to them and they have entered the Israeli market (some say flooded). Last year the Arab farmers in the Valley grew 4000 tons of tomatoes compared to 300 tons grown by the Israelis. This year they produce 7000 tons of eggplants compared to 700 Israeli tons, and they compete in the same markets with lower prices. This is the situation on the Israeli side of the Jordan. What about the other side?

Looking across the Jordan, even without binoculars, one can see a green cultivated area, crisscrossed with irrigation lines and lined with plastic covered furrows and plastic hot houses (much of this equipment, we are told, was provided by an Israeli company at the explicit and urgent order of the other

side). This is a typical sight of an Israeli cultivated area, not necessarily in an arid area. For several years the land in the area near the river has been cultivated, irrigated by the 'Ur water works.

This is the only example of rehabilitation of refugees by the Jordanian government since 1948. Some say the purpose of the Jordanian authorities is to organize the local farmers into a civilian guard, not unlike the armed rural population settled by the Syrians before 1967 on the western slopes of the Golan Heights, in order to open occasional fire against the Jewish settlements in the Hula Valley. More observers, however, maintain that this shows the peace intentions of the Jordanians. My colleague, Dani Rubinstein, who has been following developments in the area for 15 years, told me that because of their concern for this project the Jordanians did not join Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War and only sent a force to the Syrian front.

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SERIOUS COMPETITION WITH AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO EUROPE CITED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Nov 82 p 21

[Article by Aharon Pri'el: "Agricultural 'Spy Network' Will Report to Israel on Competitors in Europe; Spanish Farmers Buy Cantaloup Hybrid Seeds in Israel and Sell Them in Europe under Their Commercially Protected Name; Fresh Produce Exports Are Failing; Agriculture Ministry Senior Official: 'The Government Overlooks the Crisis;' 'The Agriculture Ministry Has Lost its Economic and Professional Independence--Any Planning or Implementation Is Dependent on the Treasury']

[Text] European markets are not full of high quality fruits and vegetables in attractive colors and packaging--peppers, cantaloups, avocados, tomatoes, strawberries, citric fruit, none too expensive. The produce comes from Greece, Spain, southern Italy, Turkey, Cyprus, and North Africa, mainly Morocco.

Once, not so long ago, Israel was the one who offered Europe special produce early in the winter, of a quality that has made our agriculture famous.

The quality gap between Israeli produce and the produce of other Mediterranean countries, which gave Israel the lead for many years, is narrowing. Moroccan tomatoes are no longer different from the Israeli. Our competitors in Spain, Greece and other countries are not standing still either.

The gap between us and our competitors has narrowed because the government and the agricultural establishment did not take into account the geographical and political advantages of Spain, Italy or Greece in exporting to the European market; the capability of those countries, with the great manpower resources (not always cheap, but willing to work) and the available water and land. Nor did they take into account the willingness of those countries to adopt and apply new cultivation and growing methods, at times those developed by Israel.

According to Treasury and Agriculture Ministry economists, in order to export by air one ton of tomatoes from the Shalom Salient to Europe, the Israeli farmer has to receive at least an additional \$1000 in cash in order to pay for production.

Fresh agricultural exports, which make it possible for the modern sophisticated Israeli agriculture to exist, has become a losing proposition. The reasons are many: The countries of the Mediterranean can now compete with us (to a large extent with the help of Israeli experts). Europe is going through an economic crisis, its currency is devaluated while the U.S. dollar is going up. If the Israeli farmer gets the same amount in German marks in 1982 which he received in 1981, he will have lost 20-25 percent in dollars. Since production and taxation are based on the dollar, the gap in the rates of exchange causes at least 20 percent loss.

#### Fights, Lack of Communications and Damages

There are other reasons. The farmers point out that since the present government came to power there has been no discussion of the crisis in agriculture.

Says a senior official of the Agriculture Ministry: "Not only does the government disregard the crisis, it does not have a policy to deal with the subject, as do other countries. The ministry has lost its economical and professional independence. Any planning or implementation is dependent on the Treasury."

The Agriculture Ministry has discussed several times a proposal to bring the situation to the attention of the government for consideration. It was decided not to bring it up since "it won't do any good." In addition, it was observed that "the government is aware of the crisis in agriculture and in agricultural exports," according to the ministry's senior official.

That same official points out a paradoxal situation in the area of agricultural research. Many years ago a joint Israel-U.S. research fund for agriculture was established. The fund's considerable resources--some \$80 million, made it self-sufficient and "in many instances the personal scientific interest of the individual scientist was satisfied, while our national needs, which clearly are more important than the personal curiosity of an individual scientist, are not met."

To prove his point, the official mentions the fact that agricultural research has not been able to come up with new hybrids of fruits and vegetables that can help Israel's agricultural exports. "The administrative system responsible for transporting and marketing our produce abroad has not found ways to use our advantages in order to stay ahead of our competitors. The fights in Agrexco, as well as the personal rivalries and the lack of communication with the senior representatives in Europe, cause enormous damages to our agricultural exports."

Agricultural Ministry and Jewish Agency economists argue that the government has to deal with agriculture not on the basis of its income but its unique place in the Israeli economy. Agriculture contributes 6 percent of the GNP, while electricity only represents 2 percent. In every country there is special sensitivity toward agriculture in disproportion to other sectors of the economy. Who cares if the price of iron goes up? But when the price of

wheat goes up it affects everyone. In Israel agriculture has an added significance. Working the land means fulfilling the Zionist ideal.

#### Ten Years Too Late

In addition, agriculture creates jobs. Each person engaged in agriculture creates additional 1.3 jobs. A total of 70,000 farmers create jobs for an additional 91,000 people, in production, services and other areas.

Prof Shmuel Pohorilis, who heads the agricultural planning and development authority, believes that the future limitations of Israeli agriculture which lacks natural production resources like soil and water are "not necessarily the lack of such natural resources, but the inability to meet the needs and demands of the market in the targeted countries."

During the past 5 years the Spaniards, Cypriots, Moroccans, Sicilians, and recently the Egyptians as well, have been able to use original Israeli research for irrigation and fertilization, as well as cultivation under plastic and sophisticated agricultural machinery.

Spanish and Cypriot farmers come regularly to Israel and buy here hybrid seeds, including Galia cantaloups (which are restricted for export), developed in Israel, and grow them and then market them in Europe under their commercially protected brand name. Members of an Israeli delegation which recently visited Spain incognito, have presented a report stating that soon Israel winter agriculture, which is based on special growing zones, like the B'sor Region and the Shalom Salient, will lose its edge. Spain has a region called Almeria which has climactic conditions similar to B'sor and Shalom. Currently U.S. and Saudi funds are being used for developing in that region a major agricultural project which can seriously affect our entire agricultural export. Since Spain belongs to the European market, it will be able to flood Europe with produce and enjoy all the advantages of the market while using, among other things, knowhow and technology developed in Israel.

About a month ago, for the first time in decades, the leaders of the agricultural establishment of Israel did what they should have done regularly, each year, since 1968, when agricultural exports to Europe began. They sent convert agents to competing countries to take a close look at what they are doing that can be of interest to us.

In other words, an intelligence network was established that will help Israel reach decisions and plan export crops. Until now such decisions were made under pressure of interest groups.

"The eyes of those who decide our agricultural policy have opened 10 years too late. We have rested on our laurels after our early successes and we fell asleep," says a senior official in the settlement division of the Jewish Agency, who has been following agricultural development for a long time.

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# IDF KATYUSHA UNIT DESCRIBES EXPERIENCES

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Nov 82, Weekend Magazine, pp 28-29

[Article by Eli Tabor: "The IDF Katyusha Orchestra; No One in the IDF Had Any Idea How to Work the Katyushas, But Raful Gave an Order to Make the Captured Russian Katyushas Operational within 48 Hours"]

[Text] "Why aren't the Katyushas used against the terrorists in Beirut?" Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan asked.

"Because we do not have any unit which knows how to use them" the artillery officer replied.

"What's the problem?" Raful retorted. "Establish such a unit."

It was during the height of the Peace for Galilee campaign, on 13 July. At that point the loot gathering units of the IDF had gathered several dozen new Katyusha launchers. Some were completely destroyed by air and artillery attacks. Others were partially damaged. But some were new and shiny and looked as if they just came out of the factory.

But what was particularly impressive was the huge supply of Katyusha rockets discovered in terrorist caches in southern Lebanon. Quite a number was found in underground storage, displaying the pride of the Soviet weapons industry. Each one of these rockets can demolish a several story building.

Nahariya, Kiryat Shmone and other places in the Galilee have tasted Katyusha fire. Although there have not been direct hits, the damage was serious, especially to morale. Anyone who was in an area hit by Katyusha fire lost his peace of mind for quite a while. It is not a pleasant experience. Indirectly it was a cause for the Peace for Galilee campaign.

Now, having captured large quantities of new Katyushas, the chief of staff wanted to make use of the devastating psychological power of the weapon against the terrorists encircled in West Beirut.

It was easier said than done. No one in the IDF knew how to work the Katyushas.

The truth is, and it can now be told, the IDF has had a Katyusha unit for the past 11 years. It was formed in 1971 and fought in the Yom Kippur War, both on the Egyptian front and on the Syrian, in the Golan Heights.

The Katyushas were used by the Soviets back in World War Two, and entered the Middle East battleground during the Six Day War in 1967. The old launchers, which carried 240mm rockets, were supplied by the USSR to the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Some were captured by the IDF during the Sinai occupation. But the supply of rockets captured was not sufficient. When one salvo of Katyusha weighs 24 tons, even several thousands of tons are not a significant number. There is no point in forming a Katyusha unit which would operate only a few days.

It therefore took 4 years from the time the Katyusha launchers were captured to the time the first Katyusha unit of the artillery was formed. This time was used to study this weapon, learn its methods of operation, and most important, produce enough rockets to feed the dozens of barrels of each launcher for a long time.

But even this was not enough. Despite the accumulated supply, the Katyusha unit of the IDF had to leave the battlefield early on during the Yom Kippur War because it ran out of ammunition.

It was not possible to get Katyushas through the air lift from the U.S.

No One Knew How to Work It

The IDF's experience of using the Katyushas proved useless when the chief of staff ordered to use the Katyushas captured during the Lebanese campaign.

This was a different operation. The launchers captured during the Six Day War were World War Two vintage. They were mounted on Soviet trucks and fired 12 240mm rockets.

The rocket launchers taken from the terrorists were the newest of their kind. They were Soviet designed, but were made in North Korea and China, and mounted on Japanese Subaru trucks. Each launcher could fire 30 rockets at half a second intervals, totalling 2 tons, within 15 seconds.

No one in the IDF had any idea how to operate this weapon. Handbooks were found along with the hardware, but they were written in Korean.

But Rafel gave an order. In the IDF an order is an order, especially when the chief of staff did not hide his intention to form a Katyusha unit. He was not thinking of the end of days, but of the present conflict. In fact, he specified "within 48 hours, please."

The next day the order travelled down the ranks of the artillery to establish a Katyusha unit from scratch. No one had a clear idea how many launchers had been captured. The rockets were being checked by the munitions corps. But that same evening a nucleus of a Katyusha unit was formed, made up of several

launchers, a few reserve soldiers, and an artillery officer who had never seen a Katyusha rocket launcher in his life.

Exactly a week later, the new Katyusha unit was positioned on the outskirts of Beirut and began to shower hellish fire on military targets, both terrorist and Syrian, inside West Beirut.

This might have been one of the great successes of absorbing new weapons by the IDF and learning how to operate it during battle. "The results," the artillery commanders said proudly, "were much better than those obtained by the terrorists who had trained in Korea and China and spent years learning how to use this weapon."

#### Form a New Unit in 48 Hours

On the morning of 14 July 1982, Dr Mordekhay was busy with a scientific conference at the Technion in Haifa. Brought to Israel at age 4 from Romania and raised in Kiryat Ono and Tel Aviv, he dreamed as a child of learning aeronautic engineering. After being drafted he began to study this subject at the Technion. He got his B.S. and M.S. before he began his military service, and to his great disappointment he was sent to the artillery instead of the air force.

It was Major General Shlomo (Chich) Lahat, head of manpower division at the general staff at the time, who had reached this special decision in order to improve the human quality of the artillery corps. Mordekhay was given the usual training of the corps, was sent to artillery officers' course, was a battery officer and an artillery post officer, before he was sent to the corps' research unit.

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War he was about to be discharged. He had received his reserve emergency assignment--a rocket launcher unit fire management officer. This was the name of the IDF Katyusha unit. He had known the unit during the war. He was assigned to it while in the reserves, and for a while during the seventies he was a commander in a rocket launcher unit.

After his discharge Mordekhay devoted his time to further his studies. He went to the U.S. to study for his doctorate in engineering and became a senior machine engineer.

When he was pulled out of the scientific conference on 14 July he did not have any assignment in the reserves. He had just returned from the U.S. and had not yet been given an assignment.

"You are going to be a commander," he was told.

"A commander of what?" he wondered.

"Of a new Katyusha unit."



"Katyusha?" he did not hide his surprise, "where do you have such a unit?"

"This is the problem," they told him. "You have to start it."

"How much time do I get?"

"About 48 hours." He was not allowed to disagree.

When he arrived at the assembly point of the new unit put under his command he found a rabble. Most of the men were reservists. About half were artillery veterans. Most were discharged only a few weeks earlier from regular service. The others were taken out of several units to do a variety of jobs--driving, services, administration. Their common denominator was the fact that none of them had seen a Katyusha before, except in movies.

This did not stop the unit from being deployed 2 days later near Damour, south of Beirut, ready to do battle.

Only a few minor technical details stopped the unit from entering the battle. They did not have the rocket launchers. They had no ammunition. And even if they did, they did not know how to use it.

#### The Soviet Sight Is the Opposite of the Western

Mordekhai tells how he turned the rabble under his command into a rocket launching unit: "On Saturday morning, when the first weapons arrived, we began to study them. I had to teach people how to operate a weapon I myself did not know how to operate. I happened to have old material on the subject which I had brought with me. Meanwhile, the Korean material was being translated.

"I was given several artillery officers, who did not know anything about Katyusha rockets either. We began to train. There was a cease-fire at that time and we were not allowed to fire. We had to train without fire.

"The main problem was the ranging, how to aim the launcher in such a way that it would hit the target. It was a difficult problem. This is basically a Soviet weapon. Its sight is Soviet and all the optic means for launching the rocket are Soviet. None of my men had ever seen a Soviet sight before. They were all used to the Western sights. The Soviet sight is the exact opposite of the Western sight.

"The aiming of the Katyusha is the work of single individuals. Most of the members of the Katyusha unit are carriers. They have to load the rockets into the launchers. This is strenuous and complicated work. At least two men have to carry the rocket. Each launcher is loaded with 30 rockets. This is the difference between a Katyusha battery and a gun battery. The guns fire shells, while the Katyushas fire salvos. The loading is a complex organizational job. You have to load the launchers quickly after firing. Yet after each salvo there are crates around that have to be removed. You get hundreds of wooden crates in which the rockets are kept and you have to get them out of the way.

"In order to prepare your men for this action you have to train them. We had excellent people in our unit. Many were students. But their previous military training was of no use. We had to start from the beginning.

"When we began to learn how to operate the weapon we found out that the Soviet operation system was not applicable to us. They use Katyushas in massive numbers. We only had a few. Thus, while training, we had to invent a fighting doctrine."

Mainly a Shock Effect

Exactly one week after it was formed, the IDF Katyusha unit was given its first assignment: firing on an artillery battery, probably of the Syrian Army, which had been positioned on the shore of West Beirut.

The Syrians must have been hit. But so were those who operated the weapon. It turns out that operating the Katyushas is no less scary than being hit by them. The tremendous blast of the rockets, the billows of smoke and soot around the launchers, shocked the young soldiers who had never experienced anything like it. It took them a long time to overcome the trauma of firing the multiple-missile Katyusha batteries.

Contrary to the common notion about the Katyusha rocket as being fearful but inaccurate, it turns out that a proper operation of the launchers can give excellent results. "The launcher is of course a surface weapon," Mordekhay explains. "It is not designed to hit someone in the eye. This is why it does not fire a single shot. One fires 4 to 12 launchers at once. When a number of rockets hits a relatively small area, it is nothing to be taken lightly. This is why we fired mainly on such targets as the stadium in the sports village in West Beirut, and on the artillery positions in open areas. We did not fire on dense populations areas indiscriminately. We found out that the accuracy of the Katyusha launcher is the same as any other artillery piece.

"The effect of the Katyusha barrage is mainly shock." When Mordekhay came to the Katyusha unit after several barrages, he could not hide his feelings. "One of your salvos has kept them quiet for half a day," he said.

The Katyusha battery is the one that hit the terrorists' fuel depot on the outskirts of Beirut, which burned for several days and which was mistakenly described in the media as the action of the Air Force.

During the two days of intense battle in West Beirut, 25 and 28 July, the new IDF Katyusha unit was in full operation. Thousands of rockets were fired during that time against targets in West Beirut.

Thousands of tons of Katyusha rockets which the terrorists had prepared for attack on the communities of the Galilee ended up landing on them. After being X-rayed by the munitions corps and found operational, they were fired at surface objectives in West Beirut.

Says Mordekhay: "Despite the scary and deafening noise, despite the huge flames emitted by the rockets, despite the strenuous work of carrying and loading them, you may laugh, but they fell in love with the Katyusha."

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## CONSTRUCTION, FACILITIES AT RIMON AIRBASE DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew No 10, 10 Nov 82 pp 18-20, 64

[Article by Yoram Inspector: "Rimon: Wings in the Desert"]

[Text] In Rimon the past meets the future. Second Lieutenant M planted a tree in his squadron's yard in this airbase planned for the 21st century which yielded crops in this sun scorched desert 2000 years ago.

In Rimon modern technology meets creation. A sleek, elegant, sophisticated aircraft takes off from the new runways; a computer stores data about each of the 200,000 items of equipment in the automated storage; electronic labs are prepared to meet the needs of the new generation of combat aircraft. Even the kitchen has a machine that slices in 30 seconds 30 kilos of onion into small even cubes. Yet all around you—a silent wilderness of yellow soil untouched since the day of creation, and at night you feel the cold wind that sweeps the two canyons—the Small and the Large Makhtesh.

In Rimon war meets peace--the peace with Egypt.

The children in the base's kindergarten are a little confused about war and peace. There is war in the north, but they have recently left their homes--Itam and Etzion--because of the peace. They ask Sara, their teacher, "Is it true we still have peace with Egypt?" The teacher assures them there is still peace, and says the Egyptians are far away and won't attack. One evening when a sonic boom is heard Sara wonders what the children may think, what are they afraid of. Their parents have told them that they won't live near the sea any longer because peace is more important, and now there is war. Only a month and a half after Rimon was pronounced an operational base it had to prove it in the Peace for Galilee War.

On 17 May 1982 the new Air Force bases in the Negev, Rimon and 'Uvda were pronounced operational, and on the morning of 11 July 1982 we heard First Lieutenant N of the command of one of the squadrons say: "We patrolled the area and we discovered enemy aircraft. We discovered them behind us and this was not a good beginning. We changed our position and each one of us took on his own aircraft. I took on one, and since this was my first air battle, unlike experienced pilots I hesitated at first. When I was sure it was enemy aircraft I hit it. It happened very quickly."

N's first battle and Rimon's first war, during which it bombed many objectives with high precision and downed many MiGs, was also the baptism of fire of the technical and maintenance system. "We had less than a year during which to become operational," says First Lieutenant Z, the technical officer of one of the squadrons that was organized on this base. "It was only natural for us to have doubts about entering into massive action, what with these sophisticated airplanes, the labs and the spare parts here on this base not yet tested. The number of sorties of the squadron was far greater than anything we had expected as a new squadron." The Air Force commander said on Air Force Day that "the bases of Rimon and 'Uvda did extremely well during the war. The logistics and maintenance people ought to be congratulated."

### The Best Operational Airbase

The construction of Rimon and 'Uvda was one of the most complex logistic projects the Air Force has undertaken since its inception, and its success was summed up by General David Ivry in one sentence: "A place which 3 years ago was arid desert where even nomads did not pitch their tents became the best operational base we could have built, perhaps the best in the world."

What makes Rimon the best operational airbase we could have built? We asked the base commander. "Rimon is the result of extremely innovative and original planning, and meets the requirements of dealing with air threats against Israel from Saudi Arabia and Jordan," Colonel G replies. "A great deal of thought went into it in order to enable it to perform swiftly and effectively, and service the various aircraft and installation, since we are quite close to both the eastern and the western borders."

Another special feature of the base is the separation between the operational and maintenance area and the residential area, which spares the families the noise of the aircraft which has disturbed families in the old bases where the residences were close to the runways. The base was planned with an eye to the future. This can be seen in its size, which allows for future expansion, its infrastructure, the newest and most sophisticated in the world. The \$400 million invested in it during the past 2 years helped make it the kind of base which takes years to build elsewhere.

Both bases are built in a uniform style. When I look at them from the air I see a more clear cut design than the original blueprint. Very clean, straight lines, almost mathematical. No cluttering or piles of waste material, or patchwork, like the old bases. It is not bulky like an American car, or eccentric like an English car, but rather compact and durable like a Japanese car.

### Substitute for Home

Colonel G: Has spent 20 years in the Air Force, flown all types of aircraft. The main psychological problem of the base he singles out is isolation, the feeling of physical remoteness. "Our intention is to create an atmosphere and a social life that will serve as a substitute for home for 3 years, during the term of service. We are not an armor unit that goes from place to

place, but rather a stationary base with few leaves because of the distance, and the lower ranks only go home once a month. The dozens of families who live on the base need a communal life similar to an urban community. Beer Sheva is more than an hour away by car, and Mitzpe Ramon half an hour, and the road is dark and windy, not too easy a ride."

A road is being built to shorten the ride to Mitzpe Ramon and a library was opened. The books are new, like in a bookstore. I saw a woman soldier touching and smelling a new book and saying to her friend, "Look, such new books." The swimming pool was used during the summer and is now being closed for the winter after the men on the base have made good use of it.

There is a sports center with basketball, tennis and handball courts, and a soccer field. Each night there is a movie in the improvised movie theater, and soon the base will have a cultural center with 1000 seats. In the meantime the skeleton of the building is standing there, painted with pictures of white elephants (for obvious reasons) by the Portugese workers who built it. The base commander says it will not remain a white elephant for long, and in a few months the Portugese workers will be invited to see they were wrong.

The base now has classes in English and math for high school graduation and a lecturer from Beer Sheva University will be brought for a college course. Anyone who does not study in the evening goes to one of the clubs the soldiers have built with the leftovers of the constructions, where nightly one can hear music and other sounds.

A residential section, the pride of the base, is completed. There is a small supermarket ("we finally got vegetables"), a post office, barber shop, elegant family club, and the bulletin board reads: "On Friday we start folk dance class," "At the Sde Boqer Academy there is a flute class," "Singalong Night," "Modern and Aerobic dance" (it has gotten this far), "On Thursday a drama class will begin," "Anyone who wants theater subscriptions in nearby communities call...", "At the community center in Mitzpe Ramon there will be a series of lectures of people who have toured the world. The first on Brazil."

#### To Grow with the Place

Life is bustling in the desert, but still, "there are those," says Second Lieutenant Michal, service conditions officer at the base, "who come here and ask to be transferred the day they arrive. A soldier who comes here from Haifa, or Kiryat Shmone, or from an open base may become depressed and say he cannot serve here. I try to share with them my own enthusiasm for this place, and sometimes it works. I have served in the NAHAL and chose to come to Rimom. I wanted to be in a growing place, and sometimes I feel like I am on a kibbutz. It feels good to grow with the place. When I came in February there were no lanes and no paved road to the base. It was cold and muddy. But the difficulties tie you to the place. You go home, and when you come back there is another lane, another plant, another building. You really feel like a pioneer..."

Lieutenant Colonel B, squadron commander, calls it the "joy of creating." "In 2 months we absorbed 1000 people and made one homogeneous body out of them." Captain A, commander of the air control tower of the base says that "anyone who serves here helps build this country." He came here with his family from an Air Force base in central Israel. His wife is a psychologist, "and now she makes the wilderness flourish. She has a feeling for the land and spends a lot of time working on our garden."

"Isolation has its advantages," Colonel G explains. "Unlike urban families, we do not run out on weekends, to the sea, to relatives or friends. Here we spend more time with the family, the children. If you want to take a trip on the weekend you go to 'En Avdat, to a nearby wadi, and show the children the squills. Soon the Negev iris will blossom. You read more books, you have more time to talk. Two pilots have brought their mares, and children have more space to ride their bicycles, without being afraid, as I was in Los Angeles, that they go down to the street. But of course," he concludes, "at first not everything was rosy."

"When we came here in early September 1981," Sara says, "it was difficult. Our apartment was not ready, all the furniture were in Itam. We lived for almost 2 months in temporary dwellings. We cooked on portable gas ranges and we had many difficulties. But we fully accepted the decision to come here. My husband is a technical officer on the base and we were one of the first families that built Itam. When we first got there I told my husband that the landscape reminded me of the Bible--the palm trees, the camels, the Bedouins, it was exotic, and we were enchanted. I am a kindergarten teacher. I worked as a kindergarten teacher in Sadot. A week before the signing of the Camp David accords we put the foundations for the family club at Itam..."

#### Identifying with the New Place

It was hard to leave, as you can see in the picture book before us--photos from Itam, the sea, the Bedouin and his camels near the fence of the base, captions, a goodbye poem by her daughter. There is still nostalgia, but no sentimentalism. "Despite the regrets, I still consider it a great privilege to establish the kindergarten here in Rimon. Here we live through the building process of the place. The sand box in the school is a scale model of the base. We bought toy bulldozers and trucks for the kids, resembling the machines used by the Americans and the Portuguese for the construction, and the children we learned a few English words used them during the construction game. When the first squadron arrived here we added airplanes to the sand box and the games became more exciting. The period during which the base was built was a dynamic and exciting period for the kids. When the first tree was planted on the base, we danced around it and sang to it. This helped the children develop a sense of attachment to the new place. They don't miss Itam and Etzion so much any more. Here too we take nature walks and see the animals of this area, such as the rams."

Sara's two daughters study at nearby Sde Boqer Academy, as do many of the children of the base. Other study at the high school in Mitzpe Ramon or Beer Sheva. Sometimes, when there is a storm or a flood and the school bus

is delayed, the parents worry. But most of the initial problems have been resolved. The grass around the homes is turning green, and some families have even brought their flower pots over from Itam, and are the leaders of the invisible competition among the gardeners. Some of the families live in the housing project in Mitzpe Ramon, and they have increased the town's population by 40 percent.

Israel M, the nutrition officer of the base, only misses the sea at Yamit. "Where can we find such a sea?" he asks. But, on the other hand, Itam did not have such a modern kitchen with an oven that can bake 1200 rolls all at once, cook a juicy roast and bread the veal, and a washing machine that washes the milk and meat dishes separately. Only Rimon and 'Uvda have such advanced installations.

The two airbases also have automated warehouses with supplies that can be ordered by computer. The computer terminal shows how much supply of each item is available and when a mechanic comes to order a part the computer prints the order and the electric crane pulls out the item out of an array of over 200,000 different items in the warehouse and brings it over. This system saves manpower and makes the process extremely efficient, especially when it comes to counting the stock, which used to take days and weeks, and can be done now in a few hours. Until now such an automated warehouse could only be found in the main supply warehouse of the Air Force. Now it is found in Rimon and 'Uvda, and the Air Force plans to computerize all the supplies in the various bases. Captain N who took part in writing the programs in the United States and his team were assigned the applying of the same to the base, and the successful implementation of the program at the base makes N feel he is doing pioneering work.

The air controllers feel the same way, Ayala and Yossi the redhead (the first Georgian Russian Jew air controller) sit alone in the control tower and spend most of their time there. We have also met meteorologists Ronit and Avi. Ronit does the observation at all hours, like 2 o'clock in the morning, and Avi does the forecast. Rimon gets snow at times. Ronit loves the desert. She is a native of Beer Sheva.

The day we visited Rimon the sky was blue and everyone praised the dry hot weather. "Great weather," the administrative squadron commander said. "It is hot in the summer but you don't sweat." Kubi, the discipline officer, says, "This weather is good for my asthma." It was leaked to us that the first thing the base commander's wife said when she landed at the base was, "What beautiful weather, I couldn't take the humidity in Tel Aviv any longer."

The atmosphere at Rimon is similar to the weather.

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## BRIEFS

WEST BANK SETTLEMENT IMPETUS--Over the past year an impetus in settlement and land purchasing has been felt, some of it by private entrepreneurs in Judaea and Samaria. In addition to Jewish construction, there is also Arab building. According to Ze'ev Ben-Yosef, the aide to the head of the Zionist Federation's settlement department, over the last year the Jewish Agency has invested 590 million shekels in Judaea and Samaria, and not billions as is being said. Most attention is today concentrated on the area south of the Hebron hills and northern Samaria. There are 9,000 housing units now being built and 3,000 of them are in the final stages. Within 2-3 years there will be 100,000 Jews in Judaea and Samaria. "Neither Reagan nor anyone else can stop this. Dynamics are working," Ze'ev Ben-Yosef said. [Text] [TA111307 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Jan 83 p 1]

SINAI PALESTINIANS TO RETURN--Rafah (ITIM)--Hundreds of local residents left by the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on the Egyptian side of the border will apparently move into a new neighbourhood in Israel. Some 700 plots are being prepared for construction on the Israeli side of the border for Palestinians currently residing in Egypt. The date and manner of their move to the Gaza Strip side will be coordinated by the Israel-Egypt Joint Military Committee. [Text] [TA161107 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 16 Jan 83 p 3]

W. BANK PROMOTION APPROVED--Television public service broadcasts promoting settlement in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District will be screened despite opposition from an Alignment board member, the broadcasting authority's board of directors decided last night. By a 4-1 vote, the directors overruled an objection by the Alignment member, Dr Yisra'el Peleg. Peleg appealed against an earlier decision to prepare the broadcasts, saying that it contravened Clause 3b of the regulations governing service broadcasts. The clause bars the production of service broadcasts dealing with subjects of public controversy. Peleg said yesterday the board's decision means the authority is acting as "a propaganda arm of the government." In another matter, the directors ruled that an interview with King Husayn of Jordan would not be a breach of the guidelines forbidding TV interviews with persons actively supporting the PLO. Authority Chairman Re'uven Yaron said the ban applied only to those who proclaim that the PLO is the "exclusive" representative of the Palestinian people. [Text] [TA180930 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Jan 83 p 3]

ATTEMPT TO FOIL PLO FUNDS FAILS--The attempt to prevent PLO funds from getting into the occupied territories, by means of issuing a decree forbidding the transfer of more than 1,000 dinars without license from the Israeli administration, has met with utter failure. An investigation carried out by the security forces on the Allenby and Adam bridges last year revealed that both the PLO as well as Arab individuals and institutions in the occupied territories found a simple way to bypass that ban. Earlier, some of them used to return from Jordan with large sums of money, whereas today these sums are distributed and being held by many--thousands per month. It is estimated that throughout the occupied territories there are people who undertake the jobs of couriers in return for the financing of their travel, and possibly further benefits as well. Another method to circumvent the decree is to transfer funds through the Israeli banks from the United States and Europe to their branches in East Jerusalem and the various towns in Judaea and Samaria. The law on bank confidentiality precludes any supervision over funds entering the occupied territories. [Text] [TA171126 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Jan 83 p 3]

RESTRICTIONS ON SETTLEMENT INFORMATION--The Foreign Ministry recently asked various government ministries to refrain from releasing information about the settlements to foreign journalists. The reason is that this subject is given wide publicity abroad, and Yitzhaq Shamir fears that too much publicity will create pressure to freeze the settlements. [Text] [TA191437 Tel Aviv HA'OLAM HAZE in Hebrew 19 Jan 83 p 4]

W. BANKERS KEPT FROM CULTIVATING FIELDS--Knesset members Muhammad Watad and Hamad Khalaylah, both of the Alignment, sent a letter to Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon yesterday in which they demanded that he refrain from seizing pasture land in the triangle and turning it into training grounds. In areas where this has already been done, shepherds should be permitted to graze their flocks during the agricultural season. The two Arab Mk's told Sharon that for 8 months the residents of the villages near areas 105 and 109 have been prevented from freely cultivating their lands despite a high court ruling. The two Mk's said that the Israel police station in 'Iron received instructions from the Defense Ministry not to issue entry permits for those areas. The Defense Ministry recognized the decision of December 1972 entitling the inhabitants of the neighboring villages to freely graze their flocks. The high court also ruled that the inhabitants are entitled to cultivate their lands. Watad and Khalaylah are asking that the IDF plan its exercises in these areas for seasons in which the fields lie fallow. At a later stage, they will ask that the IDF gradually give up these training grounds because of the large number of animals there belonging to Jews and Arabs. There is also a danger to human beings from dud shells and stray bullets. [Text] [TA191939 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Jan 83 p 8]

GROUPS FORMED FOR ARAB-JEWISH TIES--Nazareth--Ten new societies for fostering relations between Jews and Arabs were set up in 1982, according to a source in the office of the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs. The source said yesterday there are now 25 societies which have several thousand members, including clergymen, chairmen of Arab local councils, teachers and workers representatives. One of the new groups is an institute for fostering

programmes in Arab schools. It is supported by the Education Ministry, the prime minister's office and Hans Seidel Foundation of West Germany. An Arab Histadrut employee from Lod, who remembers better relations between Jews and Arabs from his childhood before 1948, has founded Ofeq (Horizon), a Jewish-Arab friendship group which held its charter meeting at the farm workers' house in Beit Dagan yesterday. Damen Younes said 3,100 members have already joined from all strata of society. The group's honorary president is former Supreme Court Justice Hayim Kohan. Younes stressed that the group is nonpartisan and is not connected with the Histadrut or any other organization. [Text] [TA191217 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Jan 83 p 3]

DECEMBER CONSUMER PRICE INDEX--The consumer price index rose last month by 5.5 percent. Last year the index rose by 131.5 percent. From the Central Bureau of Statistics' data, it turns out that prices last month were roughly 2.25 times as high as the same month last year. Particularly great price rises were noted during the year in subsidized products and services. [Text] [TA141152 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 14 Jan 83]

COMMITTEE ON W. BANK LAND ALLOCATION--A special government committee is going to decide soon the criteria for allocating lands in Judaea and Samaria to private entrepreneurs who want to set up settlements there. The decision on establishing the committee was made at the initiative of Agriculture Minister Simha Ehrlich after it transpired that due to the building and development momentum in Judaea and Samaria, some land was allocated to elements unfit for settlement. These elements transfer the land to various contractors for building projects and thus cause the price of building and development to go up. The fact that there are no clear criteria for allocating land causes numerous problems and gives rise to pressures on the Israeli land administration. [Text] [TA161246 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 16 Jan 83 p 8]

COMMITTEE ON ARAB SECTOR EDUCATION--Education Minister Zvulun Hammer has set up an experts' committee which will examine the curricula of schools in the Israeli Arab sector in an attempt to curb nationalistic radicalization among the Arab youths. The committee will examine, for the first time in many years, the curricula and educational techniques customary in the Arab sector. The committee will also examine the psychological and sociological aspects of this problem. [Text] [TA161212 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 16 Jan 83 p 4]

REACTION TO IRAQI STATEMENT--The head of the Alignment Knesset faction, Mk Moshe Shahal, attaches great importance to Deputy Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz' announcement in Paris, finding it to contain recognition of Israel which is a farreaching change compared with the Arabs' refusal to recognize Israel to date. The change necessitates that the government not miss the opportunity of progressing toward peace, as Shahal put it, but the government pretends to be deaf to an uncomprehending of the processes taking place in the Arab world. Alignment Mk Shevah Weiss also views the Iraqi stateman's remarks in Paris as an important diplomatic turning point. Tariq 'Aziz called on the PLO to open negotiations with Israel together

with Jordan. He emphasized that Iraq is not opposed to a political solution of the Palestinian problem. [Text] [TA081113 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 8 Jan 83]

DELEGATION VISITS ETHIOPIAN FALASHAS--Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh has just reported from the Knesset that at the founding session of the Public Council for Ethiopian Jewry this evening, Minister without portfolio Mordekhay Ben-Porat revealed that an Israeli working delegation recently visited Ethiopia and has already returned. Ben-Porat said that he met this morning with the members of the delegation, which visited Ethiopia on behalf of the Israeli branch of the World Zionist Congress. The Ethiopian Government's position is clear from the delegation's impressions, and we now know where to pressure it on behalf of the Falashas. Ben-Porat said that the efforts over recent years in this matter have borne fruit and that it can now be seen in various places in Israel. [Text] [TA101814 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1710 GMT 10 Jan 83]

TOTALS FOR IDF CASUALTIES--By totalling the IDF spokesman's announcements, it emerges that up to 1 January 1983, 456 IDF soldiers were killed in operations and 2,460 were wounded. Up to the last total, issued on 12 October, 368 soldiers had been killed. After that, 12 soldiers were killed in operations and 76 in the collapse of the military administration building in Tyre. Up to 12 October 1982, 2,383 soldiers had been wounded, and after that another 50 soldiers were wounded in operations and 27 were wounded in the collapse of the building in Tyre. These figures do not include the numbers of wounded and killed in road accidents and training accidents in Lebanon. [Text] [TA121522 Tel Aviv HA'OLAM HAZE in Hebrew 12 Jan 83 p 4]

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR ON LOCAL LEADERSHIP--Qalqilyah, 12 Jan (ITIM)--The head of the Judaea and Samaria civilian administration, Brig Gen Shlomo Ilia, said this evening that great importance is attached to organizing people from among the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria who are prepared to shoulder responsibility, in order to improve their predicament, while political elements from outside this region debate how this population should be represented. The head of the civilian administration was addressing thousands of people in Qalqilyah in a ceremony inaugurating a new local highschool. He noted that the civilian administration will pursue the policy of aiding mayors and village heads who could promote the interests of the inhabitants of their towns and villages. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria notes that all the Qalqilyah and Tulkarm region notables participated in the ceremony, including representatives of some 76 regional villages. The head of the civilian administration commended the area village leagues, as well as Qalqilyah Mayor ('Abd al-Rahman Abu Sunayni), who has only recently been appointed to his post by the civilian administration. [Text] [TA121953 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1935 GMT 12 Jan 83]

CULTURE, SCIENCE AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE--A science and culture agreement was signed today between Israel and France in Jerusalem. The agreement includes exchanges of information and projects on the subjects of art, culture and technology. As part of this there will also be exchanges of scientists and artists between the two countries. In the Foreign Ministry it is noted that this agreement is more extensive and comprehensive than the previous agreements. [Text] [TA131503 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1455 GMT 13 Jan 83]

UNIONS IN W. BANK WORRIED--There is concern among the workers' unions in the West Bank because of steps taken against them by the military administration. Following the closure of the Workers' Union Club in al-Birah for 60 days and the detaining of the club's Secretary Bassam Barghuti, the authorities also prevented a meeting of activists in protest of the unemployment rise especially among the hotel workers. As known the workers' unions in the territories were forbidden to accept workers from East Jerusalem. From the circles of the workers' unions in East Jerusalem it was reported that harassing steps are taken against them. Some of the leaders are confined to their city and there are restrictions on activity in the union claiming that it is a facade for "nationalistic activity." In its struggle against the workers' union, the military administration uses the 1965 Jordanian work law. Some of the clauses in this law were amended by the military administration in order to tighten the supervision over the unions. [Text] [TA121157 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 12 Jan 83 p 2]

BEDOUIN POPULATION GROWTH--The Bedouin population of the Negev has the highest population growth increase in the world: 5.5 percent a year. Within less than 30 years there is expected to be a Bedouin majority in the Negev. These details were reported to the Knesset Committee for State Control by the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, who added that there were 11,000 Bedouin in the Negev at the time of the establishment of Israel and today there are 60,000. He also stated that if the current growth increase rate continues, the Bedouin population in the Negev will double every 4 years. [TA101832 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 Jan 83]

EMIGRATION STATISTICS--[It is reported that] 303,000 persons have left the country since it was established. This data is revealed from calculations made by the Research Department of the Bank of Israel, and does not include the children of those emigrants who were born overseas. Our correspondent Gid'on Zelinger says that 7,400 people emigrated from the country last year, as compared to more than 25,000 2 years ago. This was the first year in which a negative immigration balance was registered, along with a peak in the number of emigrants. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 7 Jan 83]

DECEMBER UNEMPLOYMENT DROP--According to data issued by the Employment Service Department of Research and Information, 33,586 people appealed to employment offices in December, compared with 38,996 in November; that is, a drop of 5,410. [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Jan 83 p 6]

IMMIGRANTS STATISTICS--According to figures published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, 90 percent of all immigrants to Israel have a permanent place of residence within 3 years of their arrival in Israel. The figures also show that 11 percent of all immigrants eventually leave Israel, but most of those who leave did not have serious intentions of staying when they arrived. In addition, 14 percent of immigrants to Israel are still looking for work 3 years after their arrival. [TA112027 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 11 Jan 83]

MANY JEWS LEAVE GALILEE--Seven thousand Jews leave the Galilee every year, and it is only natural increase and immigration that keeps the absolute number of Jews in the region from decreasing. These figures, cited by 'Afula Mayor 'Ovadya Eli, were among data that yesterday led the Knesset Economic Committee to call on the government to implement plans for the development of the Galilee. The committee's chairman, Mk Gad Ya'aqobi (Alignment), promised that it would closely follow the government's performance in this matter. The Knesset members voted 2 months ago that the Galilee should be given priority in development. Economic Affairs Minister Ya'aqov Meridor, chairman of the Ministerial Committee for the Galilee, welcomed the committee's call and said he would, within a month, present it to the recommendations of his committee. [Text] [TA120832 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Jan 83 p 3]

ETHNIC INTEGRATION--Children of ethnically mixed couples are more accepted socially among their peers than children of Sefardic parents and less acceptable than children of Ashkenazic parents; mixed couples with an Ashkenazic husband and Sefardic wife are more accepted socially and have a higher self-image than mixed couples with a Sefardic husband and an Ashkenazic wife. These are some of the finds of a new study conducted by the school of education of Tel Aviv University. The study which encompassed 852 eighth graders shows that the social status is often determined not by ethnic origin but by the educational level of the father and the scholastic achievements of the student. But the most important factor in determining the student's status is affiliation or non-affiliation in youth movements, which are considered the center of the social elite. It was found out that students of mixed parentage belong to a youth movement in greater numbers than students of Sefardix origin and less than students of Ashkenazic origin. The study was conducted by Haya Jamshi as part of her master thesis. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Nov 82 p 37] 9565

INCREASED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES--Defense expenditures will be increased following the Peace for Galilee campaign by 14.3 billion shekels. This is only part of the amount necessary for defense after the campaign, estimated at more than \$1 billion (over 30 billion shekels). The Treasury has reached an agreement with the Defense Ministry according to which the expenditures will be spread over 3 years, leaving 14.3 billion shekels to be spent this year. The government has decided to allocate 3.7 billion shekels of this sum from the budget of other ministries, and the subsidy budget and 1.3 billion shekels will be absorbed by the Defense Ministry itself. Most of the amount--9.3 billion shekels--the Treasury will ask the Knesset to approve as an additional budget for this year. The Treasury will ask to increase the budget by 7.2 billion shekels in order to transfer funds to the national insurance institute. The Treasury will ask for a total of an additional budget allocation of 16.5 billion shekels. The approved annual budget will grow from 475 billion to 491.5 billion shekels. Additional budget is treated like a proposed legislation, and was approved yesterday by the government. Since the Treasury has introduced new taxes--the Peace for Galilee loan, added value tax and travel tax--the new budget will be funded with this income and the deficit will not be increased. Before the end of the fiscal year the Knesset will be asked to approve additional funds since the government expenditures will exceed the original budget because of the inflation. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Nov 82 p 10] 9565

MINISTER OF SUPPLIES ON FOOD SECURITY

Amman AL-FAJR AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 128, 13-19 Oct 82 pp 14-17

[Interview with Minister of Supplies Ibrahim Ayyub, conducted by Salamah Muhasinah: "What Has the Ministry of Supplies Done to Implement the Food Security Policy?"; date and place not given]

[Text] When the word "supply" is mentioned, the first thing that comes to mind is the daily morsel of bread which provides people with sustenance. Our people in Jordan do not live to eat but rather eat to live. The errand deep into the Ministry of Supplies began at 0900. AL-FAJR sounded the depths of Minister of Supplies Ibrahim Ayyub and talked with him about a wide variety of topics. He opened his heart to AL-FAJR. He wanted AL-FAJR to report through its pages the rights and duties of the Ministry of Supplies toward and on behalf of the Jordanian citizen. The dialogue went as follows:

[Question] Based on the realities of the food security policy sanctioned in the current development plan, can you put the Jordanian citizen into the picture as it really is?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to remind everyone of the main goals of the Ministry of Supplies, which are as follows:

1. Supplying the Kingdom's needs for essential supply items in sufficient quantities, with adequate levels of quality, and at reasonable or moderate prices.
2. Providing a strategic reserve of supply items for the Kingdom.
3. Setting and monitoring prices and helping to monitor quality. Other agencies such as the Ministry of Health, the capital secretariat, and the municipalities help monitor the quality of goods. This means that we as the Ministry of Supplies have a large share of the responsibility for achieving the aims of food security.

## The Ministry and the Achievement of Goals

[Question] What has the Ministry of Supplies done to help achieve these goals?

[Answer] In order to provide essential foodstuffs and maintain a strategic food reserve, the ministry's efforts have been concentrated on building the main foundations for this goal. Thus, it has constructed warehouses, silos, refrigeration units, and refrigerated warehouses. With regard to regular warehouses, we have erected modern facilities of this kind in all areas of the Kingdom, increasing our storage capacity from 8,000 to 135,000 tons. All these warehouses have been constructed for the storage of sacked goods in order to provide good and hygienic protection for these goods. The quality and food value of the goods will be preserved and they will be prevented from spoiling.

With regard to silos--by which I mean warehouses set up to store loose commodities (grains)--the storage capacity of these facilities has increased from 4,000 tons--which amounted to some small silos in the al-Zarqa' area--to 115,000 tons at present. This capacity will increase further to 315,000 tons by the end of 1982 with the completion of silos in al-Juwaydah, and al-'Aqabah. Total capacity will rise to 370,000 tons by mid-1983 after work on grain silos in the governorate of Irbid is complete.

### Refrigerated Warehouses

[Question] What about refrigerated warehouses?

[Answer] The Ministry of Supplies has erected 1,500-ton refrigerated units in al-'Aqabah and al-Juwaydah. It is also currently constructing a 6,000-ton refrigerated warehouse in al-Juwaydah. Work on this project will be completed within the next two months and the warehouse will begin serving the Jordanian citizen. The ministry has also initiated construction of a 2,000-ton refrigerated unit in the governorate of Irbid. We hope that this unit will be ready to receive commodities in mid-1983.

These refrigerated warehouses will be used to store all kinds of meats and other items such as eggs, cheese, milk products, and some fruits and vegetables.

[Question] We would like to go back to the subject of silos for a minute since they have far-reaching importance for the implementation of a food security policy on a larger scale. What could you add to what you have already said on this subject?

[Answer] I would like to add that the silos in al-'Aqabah are linked to automated equipment for loading and unloading ships with a capacity of 480 tons per hour. One of the main benefits of building the silos and unloading equipment has been the savings in the time required to unload a ship carrying a cargo of, say, 25,000 tons of wheat. Where it formerly took 40 days to unload such a ship, it now takes only 4 days. This is a big savings of time and effort and all of it works to the benefit of the citizen in our country. I would like to give an example of this. This project has saved us around \$6 per ton on the price of grains. It also saved the cost of the sacks that were



once used, amounting to an average of \$7 per ton. In addition, it has prevented spoilage and loss, which was estimated at three percent. Therefore, I can be certain that the mechanization of loading and unloading has resulted in a total savings of 10 to 15 percent of the purchase price.

The silos now allow the sifting, cleaning, weighing, and determination of grains as well as inspection of the grains in the silos to detect any type of defect.

I should mention here that the silos in the 'Amman area automatically supply the flour mill in al-Juwaydah with wheat.

#### Production Projects

[Question] How far has the role of the Ministry of Supplies in the field of production projects progressed?

[Answer] In this field, the ministry has built the al-Juwaydah mill which was dedicated by King Hussein along with other of the ministry's projects in the area. These other projects included silos, refrigerated warehouses, regular warehouses, laboratories, and technical workshops. In addition, the cornerstone was laid for a big automated bakery in that area. The mill has a capacity of 400 tons per day. With this capacity, we will be able to supply the country's needs for flour and will no longer have to import it. Thus, we will save the cost difference between imported flour and flour produced domestically. We will use the surplus milling capacity to benefit friendly states. We will also have an ample milling capacity to export flour in the future.

#### The Loaf Is the Continuing Issue

[Question] The loaf of bread is one of the most important and persistent problems facing the citizen. No citizen can do without this. What is the situation regarding the loaf and its production, by which I am referring to the automated bakeries and their requirements?

[Answer] The ministry has given the private sector ample opportunity to build or establish automated bakeries to meet the country's bread needs. The ministry made contacts with many municipality heads and administrative leaders in order to establish these projects. But unfortunately, the ministry did not get sufficient response to meet the need and was forced to begin constructing these projects in highly populated areas in Irbid, al-Zarqa', and 'Amman. I should also mention here that the ministry took responsibility for running the old automatic bakery in 'Amman. This bakery had been run by an old public corporation which was unsuccessful in bringing it up to the appropriate standard.

We hope that the three bakeries will be operating by the middle of next year and the country's so-called "bread crisis" will come to an end.

I would like to point out that the Ministry of Supplies is focusing the major part of its attention on improving the quality of the bread loaf. It has taken a number of measures in this connection.

## Food Security Policy

[Question] With regard to the food security policy, what projects has the ministry prepared and what has it devoted to achieving this objective?

[Answer] The ministry has distributed its projects among three main complexes. The first is in al-Juwaydah in the central part of the country, the second is in al-'Aqabah in the southern part of the country, and the third is in the area of Irbid in the north.

This is naturally aimed at ensuring the citizen's needs for supplies wherever he may live. In this context, I can say that the ministry has now ensured a storage capacity that will supply the country for six months. After the current five-year plan is completed, this storage capacity will be one year. I don't think that we need more than that for many reasons, most of which are self-evident economic reasons.

## The Ministry and the Role of the Businessman

[Question] The citizen says that the Ministry of Supplies has assumed the role of the merchant in the country. What is your comment on this and what items does the ministry deal in?

[Answer] First we will specify the items that the ministry deals in and then move on to the first part of your question. In the field of supply items and their importation, the ministry has restricted itself to four main items: wheat, sugar, rice, and imported meats of all types. All of this has taken place in accordance with a decision of the Council of Ministers. This brings us to the first part of your question. I would like to explain that the ministry deals in some other items along with the private sector with the aim of making these items available in the local markets and keeping their prices from rising. These include powdered milk, feed corn, olive oil, and the like. We at the Ministry of Supplies do not resort to importing any or all of these goods unless we see an urgent need for such a move and feel that it would serve the consumer and the citizen.

The ministry has never assumed the role of the merchant, even with regard to the four restricted items I mentioned earlier: sugar, rice, wheat, and meat. The ministry buys these goods through local tenders which the importer or businessman in the private sector can take part in. In this way, he can obtain reasonable profits through legal and honorable means. Moreover, when the ministry sells these goods, it allocates a certain sum for the wholesaler and the retailer. Let's take an example. The ministry sells a ton of rice for 170 dinars to the merchant at wholesale or retail but the consumer buys it for 185 dinars per ton. Here we have provided the merchant with a reasonable, honorable, and legal profit of 15 dinars per ton of this product. This clearly indicates that we have not taken over the role of either the big merchant or the little merchant. However, we have eliminated the exorbitant and unlawful profits that some merchants once sought through illegal means. Their unlawful profits at that time were completely dependent on some merchants who held monopolies and I thank God that we have completely eliminated this problem.

I would also like to point out here that the ministry strives earnestly to buy these goods at the lowest prices and best qualities through honorable competition. The ministry is not faced with any difficulties in this area because it proceeds with absolute correctness in the service of the citizen.

#### Setting and Monitoring Prices

[Question] Mr Minister, what would you like to tell us about the subject of setting and monitoring prices, a subject which is a constant topic of conversation among the citizens?

[Answer] The ministry has set the prices of some 40 goods. It has also set the profit margin on some types of goods, one of the most important of which is automobile parts. The ministry has requested that all merchants indicate their prices on all displayed articles to enable the citizen to see and compare these prices and buy the products that best suit him. I would like to point out here that the ministry has nothing to do with the indicated price. This is left up to the merchant, who puts on whatever price he feels is appropriate. This applies only to those goods for which the ministry has requested that prices be indicated.

The role of the ministry in this particular area is performed by its inspectors who ensure that the merchant is selling at the specified prices and that the prices are made public in the case of products that are not price-controlled. Everyone who does not adhere to these instructions is in violation of the law.

Because there aren't enough inspectors available in the country to do this job, I implore my fellow citizens to help the ministry in two ways:

1. By providing information about anyone who violates the price schedule, and
2. By refusing to buy from merchants at prices higher than the set prices.

I say this because the set prices have been determined after long study and the formulation of a fair proportion of profit for the merchant. For this reason, we also implore the merchants to adhere to the price schedule on their parts. As for the schedule of prices for fruits and vegetables--that is, the schedule that appears in the newspapers every day--this is based on supply and demand and on the quantities appearing in the country's central markets. The prices of these goods are set by a committee composed of representatives of a number of agencies: the capital secretariat, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Supplies and Agricultural Marketing. Beyond this, our role lies in monitoring the prices and punishing violators.

[Question] Is there a final comment you would like to add, Mr Minister of Supplies?

[Answer] I would like to say in closing that as of the beginning of 1982, everything that can be called subsidies for supply goods out of the general budget of the state was halted and the Ministry of Supplies was asked to "manage itself by itself." The only exception to this is bread loaves, which

continue to be subsidized out of the general budget. Therefore, we now have an obligation to act rationally to manage ourselves by ourselves in order to provide supply goods at moderate prices. Thus, we realize a profit from sugar, for example, but we use this profit to subsidize some other goods that need our subsidies for the welfare of the citizen.

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CSO: 4404/137

## PRIVATE SECTOR'S INVESTMENT POLICIES CRITICIZED

Amman AL-FAJR AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 129, 20-26 Oct 82 p 33

[Editorial by Muhammad Da'ud: "Examining the Reasons"]

[Text] From the beginning, the private sector has played an important role in the economic revival of Jordan, especially in the field of industry and trade. This has led the government to rely on the participation of this sector in the processes of development and it has offered the private sector a full range of incentives and support so that it can carry its share in this field.

However, it is evident that during recent periods and in particular during the past two years, the contribution of the private sector has moved toward investment in the services sector or the conversion industries rather than concentrating on industrial or development projects that require a long time to yield a material return.

Thus, a large share of the national capital has been concentrated in a limited number of fields and has not made an effective contribution in the field of economic development. The companies and organizations that have been established recently strive for quick profit. They are interested in investing in securities and consumer-oriented conversion industries and have no interest in development-oriented projects that require long-term financial investment--thus demanding some time before yielding a material return--or that are perhaps appropriate for the aspirations and assets of the investors.

This means that private sector investment is no longer patient as it once was. In contrast, investors even at the individual level used to adopt the plants and carry out the industrial projects despite the risk and these are accomplishments that have remained at the peak of munificence.

It also appears that turning a quick profit, which has become a watchword among investors in the private sector, has caused existing local industries to be exposed to near fatal competition. The pharmaceuticals industry has been exposed to competition along with chemical cleaners and other consumer products such that the Jordanian market has become crammed with the same basic product in a variety of different types and forms.

There may be some justifications and reasons for what has afflicted the private sector and made it less enthusiastic toward bolstering the industrial environment, a matter which has placed the entire burden of development on the government. The major industrial projects, the agricultural projects, or the development projects now depend on participation by the government which in turn must attract contributions from individuals or certain organizations. Without government participation, large projects would almost cease to exist. In other words, government participation is a guarantee of the success of a project, encouraging others to invest in varying amounts in projects that are long range or demand large amounts of capital.

Fortunately, government participation in these projects has given the Jordanian economy a distinctive character. For despite the fact that the economic system in Jordan is a free system, it is at the same time subject to government supervision by virtue of the fact that the government participates in most vital projects.

However, this distinctiveness cannot make up for the important role of the private sector in building the economic and industrial revival or fill the vacuum left by the reluctance of investors to invest in agricultural projects or agricultural industries.

Therefore, we must examine the reasons that have diminished the role of the private sector in industrial, economic, and agricultural development so that we will be able to remove all the obstacles that stand in the way of the private sector, which is one of the main ingredients in Jordan's revival and the building of its national economy.

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CSO: 4404/137

GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS DISCUSSED

Premier's Interpretation Of Amendments

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 5 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Throughout Two Hours of Detailed Presentation to Chief Editors of Dailies, His Highness Crown Prince Addresses Kuwaiti Public Opinion Directly: Let All Hear True Nature of Constitutional Amendments as We Project Them, Not as Some People Depict Them; We Have Not Presented to Deputies Other Than That Which Constitution Guarantees Them: Approval of Principle of Amendment and Then Assembly's Right to Reject; Accept or Amend; All Constitutions in World Are Subject to Amendment After Period of Trial; Our Constitution Is More Than 20 Years Old and This Is Sufficient Period to Consider Amendment and to Formulate Constitution That Absorbs Rapidly-Developing Kuwaiti Society for Many Years to Come; Where Is Pouncing on Liberties and Where Is Usurpation of National Assembly's Freedom in Procedural Amendments We Are Presenting to Deputies; I Don't Understand Real Reason Behind Rejection of Principle of Amendment Even Before Embarking on Details; As Assembly Has Freedom to Follow up on Kuwaiti Homeland's Issues, Government Has Honor of Understanding and Tending Homeland's and Citizens' Interests; Let Us Sit Together and Discuss Details as Long as Deputies Ultimately Have Absolute Right to Amend, Approve or Reject; I Personally Contacted Deputies Before Presentation of Bill and Some Merely Said That They Oppose While Others Said They Are Already Committed to Election Programs But What We Ask Is: Why All This Uproar Over Constitutional Principle by Which All Advanced Countries of World Abide"]

[Text] His Highness Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah, the crown prince and the prime minister, met yesterday with the chief editors of 5 daily newspapers within the traditional frameworks of the democratic life. In his highness' view, authority does not so much mean domination, the haphazardly imposition of laws or the issuance of orders as it means discussion through the various channels of communication. As it is the right of the National Assembly's deputies to turn to their voters to present their views and as it is the right of the press to discuss, object, state its opinion and create a counter public opinion on any issue, it is also the right of the government, his highness the crown prince believes, to explain and to present what it believes to be in the interest of its public and its citizens, especially since the government has a realistic and practical visualization by virtue of the fact that the non-spectator player

and the government are concerned with implementing the state laws and with watching the proper implementation of these laws. Therefore, when these laws encounter some difficulties or run into unreasonable obstacles, the government alone, in the view of his highness the crown prince, is the party that will suffer as a result.

This is why his highness the crown prince sat very calmly yesterday for 2 hours with the chief editors of the daily newspapers to explain to them the issue of amending the constitution article by article.

His highness said: Let us begin with article 50 of the constitution which is brought up for amendment. This article was transplanted from the explanatory memorandum to become a constitutional article. It is present in the memorandum and is in force. Therefore, there is nothing new in this regard to deserve the uproar.

As for article 174 which empowers the head of the state, his highness the amir, to request amendment of the constitution and gives the same right to one third the National Assembly members, his highness the crown prince pointed out that 20 years or more have passed so far on the application of the constitution. Therefore, the principle of amendment is a normal principle after the passage of an entire generation. This is a tradition followed in all countries and peoples of the world and cannot be understood to be aimed at undermining the public liberties. To us, it doesn't seek to strengthen the government influence within the rules of the parliamentary game. We here are not fans of this kind of political tricks to which rival parties in other countries may resort. Therefore, his highness added, this amendment process is a very natural process and is intended to reaffirm already existing articles or to improve other articles so that the relationship between the legislative and executive authorities may continue to be a flexible relationship free of any tension or even anything unreasonable.

As for article 65, after reading it in full, his highness the crown prince said that it requires the prime minister designated by his highness the amir to submit to the elected assembly the names of his cabinet members within 2 weeks of his designation in the new legislative season. The 2-week period, according to his highness, is a very short period in a country like Kuwait. I have personally suffered from the shortage of this period when forming the cabinet. In my view, the consultations require a full month at least. This is the part we have demanded be amended in this article. Instead of the 2-week period, we have requested one month. We don't believe that such an amendment undermines freedom or usurps the assembly's powers. All that there is to the matter is that we have requested enough time for the prime minister to choose and to give the individuals offered a cabinet position time to think and make the right decision instead of just saying yes or no quickly. Our request for the amendment of article 65 does not mean diminishing the freedom of the constitution, usurping the assembly's powers or any of the things projected to the domestic public opinion to depict the government as wishing to assume powers which it knows belong to the assembly.



Moving on to article 66, his highness said: This article concerns his highness the amir's power to return any law to the assembly, detailing the reasons for the return. We have decided to postpone the debate on this returned law [sic] to the next session instead of the same session, with the provision that the amendment be required to get the same proposed amendment other than our postponing the debate on the bill to the next session. The reason of this, his highness the crown prince added, is that when some sensitive and important laws are involved, there is a sort of tension between the executive and legislative authorities. As we don't undermine the legislative authority's right to tend the people's and the homeland's interests, we, as an executive authority, give ourselves the same honor. We also know the interest of the Kuwaiti homeland and Kuwaiti people as well as the deputy and the assembly as a whole knows it. Therefore, when we request postponing the debate till the next session, we only do so to give ourselves as two authorities the chance for discussion, for attaining better solutions and for an arrangement that may be convincing to both sides: The executive side embodied in the government and the legislative side embodied in the assembly. Moreover, during this period [of postponement] numerous developments crop up usually and such developments may be in favor of the assembly's bill or in favor of the government's idea. This is why time in this case is one of the factors that can help to solve the disagreement on the projected issue, especially since we are, as I have said, the executive side. The assembly may represent numerous wishes that may not be easy to fulfill and may not be proper to include in a bill that becomes difficult to implement. This is why we have requested the postponement so that we may give ourselves the opportunity to discuss the matter with each other and to attain that which serves the public interest. Here again and as I have asked in connection with the previous article, I ask regarding this article: Where is the usurpation of the constitutional freedom and where is the undermining of the assembly's powers? Moreover, where is this new domination in which the government wants to engage? It is no more than the desire to make the assembly's task, and our task with the assembly, easier, nothing else.

So why all this uproar?

Meanwhile, his highness the crown prince was asked: Then why all this clamor and this opposition?

[Answer] I am looking with you for the answer to this question. Really, why the opposition? When we presented the bill for amendment of the constitution, we said that the articles presented for amendment can be rejected, approved or amended. The deputy has the absolute freedom to amend, approve or even reject. This is what we said while presenting the bill. But to oppose the principle of amendment, attributing to it misplaced characteristics, is nothing but a process of misleading the public opinion--a process from which nobody will benefit, with the only loser being the dynamic cooperation for the better between the government and the assembly. As I have already said, article 174 empowers his highness the amir to request the amendment as it empowers one third the assembly members to do the same. Therefore, we have brought nothing new, especially since this constitution has been in existence for more than 20 years. Moreover, all the constitutions of the world have been subjected and are still subjected to amendment after a period of implementation. This means that we have not come up with an innovation. I ask with you the same question: Why this opposition?

His highness the crown prince then proceeded to deal with the other articles presented for amendment. Regarding article 69, his highness pointed out that this article is already in existence. All that is new in it is extension of the martial law period from 3 to 6 months, should a decree be issued by the amir for it. The assembly is also entitled to reject this period if it deems it fit to do so. We as government believe that should the need arise, and we hope it will not, the 3-month period may not be adequate. This is why we have proposed the 6-month period.

[Question] Your highness, there is an article on which a long debate has taken place in the Kuwaiti public opinion circles and it seems that it is the most important article to be amended. We mean by this article 71 which empowers the government to issue decrees in the absence of the assembly and to notify the assembly afterwards, i.e. after the assembly is reconvened. This article needs to be explained. Does the amendment actually mean diminishing the assembly's role in its absence?

[Answer] Regarding article 71, the proposed idea is that in case there is a need to issue emergency decrees, then we have to summon the assembly to hold a session that may last no more than one or 2 hours. Therefore, we believe that such decrees should be enacted and when the assembly is reconvened it should be notified and should have the right to reject the decrees, provided that the rejection is not retroactive.

His highness added: When we explained this article, some legists told us that there is no need for an amendment and that the constitution empowers the government to issue decrees in the absence of the assembly and then to present them to the assembly when it reconvenes and that presentation here means just that and not asking for approval. But we declined this opinion because we have established a tradition and it did so happen once that we actually summoned the assembly to reconvene during its adjournment to discuss a law issued by a previous assembly. Moreover, we have had our doubts on the opinion of these legists because other legists have had a different opinion interpreting the word "presentation" to mean asking for approval. This is why our final view is to eliminate doubt with certainty. While the assembly is on vacation, important issues requiring decrees develop at times. At other times, issues not of utmost importance, but of an urgent nature--such as the mere amendment of an article in the traffic, municipal or cooperatives law or something else--also develop. This is why we have requested that we be content with presenting such decrees to the assembly instead of summoning it to discuss such an article. We faced this problem while discussing the Kuwaiti bonds law when we were compelled to advance the date of the parliamentary session's convocation so that there may not be two sessions: One to discuss the bonds issue and probably lasting one day and another ordinary session. All these procedures take time from the state.

Here, his highness the crown prince was told that the issuance of such decrees in the assembly's absence may lead to issuing unacceptable decrees that may harm the people's interests and that may actually have the quality of usurping the legislative authority in a manner that gives the government extra flexibility at the assembly's expense.

[Crown Prince] I have read in a local paper the opinion of some legists saying that the issuance of decrees in the assembly's absence is a normal procedure. What is important is that no tax laws or laws suppressing the liberties be issued. This will not happen in our country. Moreover, the assembly has the right to amend this article in accordance with the arrangements it deems fit. What is important is that in all countries of the world, the government issues the decrees and laws it deems necessary in the absence of the parliamentary assembly. The decrees and laws are then presented to the assembly to express its opinion on them and ratify them, even though this is done in some countries just for the sake of [the assembly's] information. We are bringing no innovation and nothing new in this regard. As I have already said, the purpose is not to summon the assembly to convene during its vacation to examine some laws that may be completely ordinary, including some that are urgent for running the state affairs. We are now in the process of amending some articles of a constitution that may be in force for long years to come. Therefore, this constitution must be complete and must face the changes undergone by a rapidly-developing country like Kuwait. This is a demand that does not at all swerve from the rules of the international constitutions in the advanced countries. As we have already said, the assembly has the full right to abolish these decrees when it reconvenes, if it deems it fit to do so. But the abolition cannot have a retroactive effect because in accordance with these laws, the ordinary citizen will have gained positions and rights of which we cannot deprive him again, especially if they affect his daily life or the method of his dealing with others.

The discussion then turned to the constitutional article stating that the legislative season may be extended and his highness said: We have decided on this because the country may suddenly find itself facing a war, a crisis or a certain catastrophe or it may find itself facing a serious situation with which it is too preoccupied to hold new elections. This is why we have deemed it necessary to extend the legislative season. We have also said that such extension would take place on the force of a decree ratified by the amir, meaning that without the amir's approval there can be no [such] decree. In this respect, the decree does not follow the procedures for other laws which are usually sent by the assembly to his highness the amir and if the amir expresses no reservations, the laws go into effect. We have said that the amir must approve it [extension] and it must receive the approval of two thirds the assembly members. Even this article is subject to debate and we have no objection to the assembly's approval or rejection of the article. Let us just get together and discuss and let the assembly hear this viewpoint that we have projected.

His highness then touched on other articles concerning extension of the period for formation of the National Assembly's committees. His highness' opinion is that instead of the assembly presidency finding itself compelled to elect the assembly committees all at once within one week, the proposed amendment provides for 2 weeks instead of one. This article concerns the assembly itself, not the government. The government has felt that selecting the committees within the one-week period is exhausting for the assembly and its presidency and thus proposed this amendment.

As for the article proposing that the number of assembly members be increased to 60 members instead of the 50 members at present, his highness the crown prince once again stressed that the assembly is entitled to approve this increase if it deems it fit to do so. As for the government, it deems the increase necessary to keep up with the population expansion and with the increase in the number of districts. Though the government has proposed that the assembly membership be raised to 60, there is another opinion calling for raising the number to 70. Ultimately, the deputies decide on the final opinion through discussion.

As for article 95 concerning election appeals, confining the power of determining the validity or invalidity of an appeal to the assembly itself was, according to his highness, acceptable before creation of the constitutional court with the jurisdiction over appeals. But with the creation of this court, dealing with the appeals has become its right. Else, why have the constitutional court!

The discussion then dealt with other articles in which amendment is more of a rearrangement than an amendment. The amir's address has been classified as an address to welcome the assembly, with the government program considered the official address on whose basis the action program will be discussed.

As for article 100, the government has requested extending the period for questioning a minister from 8 days to 2 weeks so as to give the minister concerned the opportunity to prepare for such a case.

Concluding his article-by-article review of the articles presented for amendment, his highness said: We have never sought what some people have been spreading among the Kuwaiti public opinion circles. On the contrary, the purpose of the amendment is to create a better means of cooperation between the government and the assembly. As we respect the assembly's feelings concerning the public interest, we feel that we, as government, bear the same feelings. I am optimistic that if we sit together, we will reach a common formula instead of closing the door on the strength of the argument that the principle of discussing the amendment is out of the question.

[Question] Your highness, usually the government makes contacts with the assembly members behind the scenes to explain its view on some important laws in order to develop the flexibility to make things easier. Was any advance contact made with the deputies prior to presenting the amendment bill?

[Answer] Yes, I have made these contacts personally. But as I have already said, some deputies seem to be committed to election programs. Others have rejected the idea out of hand, even before embarking on a detailed explanation of the issue. The answer of some deputies was: I am opposed, just like that. This is why I am proceeding here through the same channels used by these deputies to put the details, spirit and reasons for the amendment before the Kuwaiti public opinion may not have a distorted picture and so that some people may not go on saying that the amendment seeks pouncing on the liberties and usurping the assembly's powers.

## Editorial on Amendments

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 5 Dec 82 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah]

[Text] In a democratic climate, there are well-known channels to address the public opinion. It is usually difficult for the authority [government] to attract all the people at the same time. This fact, it is evident, is well known to the crown prince and prime minister. The man realizes that in all countries of the world, it is difficult for the government to address the people in the same manner in which the press or the parliament addresses them. This is normal and, evidently, understood by Shaykh Sa'd who has addressed the people through the same channels used by others to address them. The amendment of the constitution, as explained by the prime minister and the crown prince, is not as tragic as some people have depicted it, especially since what is sought is approval of the principle of discussion of the amendment of some articles of the constitution while leaving approval of the amended articles up to the assembly, meaning that the assembly has the ability, through debate, to reject what it doesn't want and to approve or modify the articles brought up for discussion.

It is a fact that some of the articles explained logically by his highness the crown prince and the prime minister to the chief editors of the local dailies must be amended so that the channels of action between the assembly and the government may proceed according to reasonable movements.

Insofar as formation of the cabinet is concerned, for example, the constitution requires the crown prince and prime minister to have his cabinet ready within 15 days of the election of the National Assembly. This is a short period in a country where capable people are inclined to engage in private enterprise. Moreover, the conditions of ministerial work require certain sacrifices that make it necessary for any individual chosen for a ministerial portfolio to think for a while before making his decision.

Through his press meeting with the chief editors of the dailies yesterday, the prime minister followed the same channels used by these papers when they presented to the Kuwaiti public opinion a picture different from the real philosophy behind the [request for] amendment of some articles of the constitution in the manner sought by the state. By speaking so openly, Shaykh Sa'd does not, it seems, seek so much to mobilize approval for the concept of amendment as he seeks something more important, namely to stress that the executive authority in Kuwait, which respects the constitution and the law and gives each agency its right to perform its role, believes that it is an authority and not a dominating power and that the steps it takes should not evoke the same sensitivity as measures taken by other governments. If authority means civilization in the advanced countries, then authority in Kuwait means the same thing to Shaykh Sa'd who spent yesterday more than 2 hours with the chief editors of the local papers to explain to them the real meanings of amendment of some articles of the constitution--an amendment that means better dynamic cooperation between the legislative and executive authorities in the interest of Kuwait's supreme causes.

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SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FIGURE INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT, FUTURE CONDITIONS

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 1 Jan 83 p 19

[Interview with Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din; date and place not specified]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, vice president of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council, called for the deployment of the multinational force in the south to assist the Lebanese Army in expanding Lebanese rule and linking the fate of Lebanon to the fate of the South. His Eminence believes that the United States can work for Lebanon and that the Arabs will continue to play a role in the Lebanese case. These views are contained in an interview with AL-RA'Y. Here is the text:

"Numerous Factors"

[AL-RA'Y] How do you assess the current situation in Lebanon?

[Shams al-Din] Two factors dominate the current situation in Lebanon. The first is the Israeli occupation and its effects and plans, which aim at dividing Lebanon into regions and sects, at nullifying its existence, and distorting its identity against the will of the Lebanese, which was expressed on more than one occasion in the rebuilding of Lebanon as a homeland for all of its inhabitants under the protection of a just and strong government. This, they say, is what the will of the international community is working for.

The second factor is the problems facing the Lebanese, especially the top leadership of the state and the community, in the task of rebuilding Lebanon as a single homeland with a united people within recognized international borders.

Moreover, there is a desire for unity and a desire for division. The former is embodied in the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, not to mention the active force in the international community. The latter is embodied in Israel which benefits from some of the complex internal and regional problems to carry out its criminal plans in Lebanon. This portends an absolute disaster for the fate of Lebanon and for the stability and development of the Arab world.

With the National Conference

[AL-RA'Y] There is a call to hold a national conference sponsored by the president of the republic to reestablish Lebanon. What is your reaction to this idea?

[Shams al-Din] We favor any national effort, especially if it is initiated by the president of the republic, to crystallize the national Lebanese will for rebuilding Lebanon on the basis of a just government, although up to now we have not been told about such a call.

Israel Behind the Mountain War

[AL-RA'Y] The mountain war, what do you think of it?

[Shams al-Din] One of the greatest dangers that now confront the will to unity and national construction in Lebanon and neutralize its influence is the sad and painful struggle in the mountains whose purely Lebanese causes we believe to be limited and of little importance. It can be managed with mutual patriotic, peaceful understanding between the Lebanese in the mountains who in the past lived as cooperative neighbors. Their relations were governed by the values, morality, and spirit of common citizenship that always helped to overcome occasional disputes, however sharp they may have been. However, the presence of Israel, its intrigues and methods of fragmentation nourish this bitter dispute, cause fear, and frustrate sincere efforts to put an end to this dissension which threatens the course of construction, stability, and freedom from the occupation of all Lebanon.

We are confident that the pure national will in the mountains will ultimately prevail over all the methods of dissension to the benefit of Lebanon. We are trying our best to help in the reconstruction and prevent the continuation and spread of this dispute because it concerns not the Lebanese mountaineers alone but all the sincere people in Lebanon.

The Armistice Agreement

[AL-RA'Y] The shape of the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, how do you see it in the light of the recent Israeli intransigence?

[Shams al-Din] Israel is an aggressor against Lebanon and its land and people and it threatens its fate as a homeland. The only document that governs relations between Lebanon and Israel is the armistice agreement signed in 1948. Israel cannot claim any rights in Lebanon. They are an object of negotiation.

Consequently, it is incumbent upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon without any qualification or condition in conformity with U.S. Security Council resolutions relating to Israeli aggression against Lebanon, specifically resolutions 508 and 509.

Israeli intransigence is natural and always to be expected and what we must expect from an enemy occupier who wants to use his occupation to achieve

favorable political results. It is up to the Lebanese negotiator to confront this Israeli intransigence, which is based on oppression and aggression and which aims at legitimizing its oppression and aggression by negotiations.

I told the Lebanese negotiator to confront this intransigence with counter-intransigence resting on right and justice in the Lebanese stand to preserve Lebanon's absolute right to its sovereignty, freedom, and nonsubmission to hostile Israeli conditions.

#### Southern Lebanon in Danger

[AL-RA'Y] Is there any fear for the future of southern Lebanon in light of the existing proposals? What is your opinion?

[Shams al-Din] Yes, there is a genuine fear for the fate of southern Lebanon due to the aggressive, expansionist intentions of Israel and the partition plan to which we have already referred. This fear for the South cannot be overcome by surrender to the Israeli plan or by indifference. It must be countered by the national Lebanese will determined to preserve Lebanon within its international borders and without any concessions to Israeli in any part of the country. And it must be countered by resistance to the Israeli plan to break off the South or any part of it by one means or another and by using all methods to stir up resistance if international efforts are unsuccessful in halting this continuing Israeli aggression that shows up in various ways and manifestations.

That is why we insist on the need for the multinational force to expand its area of deployment so as to embrace all Lebanese territory in the South and to cooperate with the Lebanese Army in extending the authority of the Lebanese government through its institutions and official agencies.

This fear for the fate of the South is also a fear for the future of Lebanon as a single homeland because the fate of Lebanon as a homeland is bound up with the fate of the South. We have always said the key and solution to the Lebanese crisis is in the South.

#### Betting on America

[AL-RA'Y] Betting on America to solve the Lebanese crisis, to what extent can the hope be realized?

[Shams al-Din] The Lebanese have their special plan for their country, which is to unite it--land, people, institutions--and build a strong and just centralized state. The Lebanese will cooperate with any international effort that serves this plan.

The plan is doubtably facing a danger from Israel, which is aiming at and working for the partition of Lebanon, seizure of the South, and production of a new focus of confusion in the Middle East in order to frustrate effective international or Arab attempts at finding a just solution to the Palestine problem.



There is no doubt that in this respect the United States is capable of doing a great deal for Lebanon and for regional stability. As a superpower it bears great moral and political responsibility for this.

[AL-RA'Y] Do Europe and the Soviet Union have any role to play in the region?

[Shams al-Din] As for the Soviet role, we pay attention to everything that the other powers do to determine the effectiveness of their efforts to block the Israeli plan in Lebanon and in the region. This is also true of the European role.

#### The Arab Role Will Continue

[AL-RA'Y] Do the Arabs have a role to play in the current Lebanese situation?

[Shams al-Din] The Arabs certainly have a continuing role to play in Lebanon in keeping it aloof from the problems created by the Arab struggles and in helping it to rebuild itself and maintain stability for the sake of the Arab world and the region.

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# QUESTION OF SUBSIDY MAINTENANCE DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 304, 18 Dec 82 pp 61, 63

/Article: "Sooner or later, Bread and Gasoline for the Lebanese People Will Be High-Priced!"

/Text/ The Lebanese finance minister, Eng 'Adil Hamiyah, raised the issue of the abrogation of subsidies on fuel last week, after a meeting he held with the minister of industry and oil, Mr Georges Ifram.

The statement Hamiyah made was the first of its kind to be issued by a finance minister on the abrogation of subsidies on fuel. For the first time, a finance minister has been discussing this thorny issue frankly, which many ministers of finance and other ministries had been avoiding.

One thing Hamiyah said is that he has urged the Ministry of Finance employees involved to hasten to complete settling the independent fuel fund accounts in order to ascertain their true status. He declared that there was an inclination to eliminate subsidies on fuel, which incur losses, and that greater attention was being given to people with limited incomes and the savings the government can provide for them, as well as to the condition and the maintenance of roads and the easing of traffic, to make up for losses in gasoline and deficiencies in the improvement of roads, which are causing congestion and fuel consumption for no valid reason.

A statement which was issued by the minister of economy and trade, Mr Ibrahim Hallawi, preceded that by the minister of finance by a few days. In it he declared that the ministry had taken broad steps in the direction of eliminating subsidies on wheat, which imposes a burden of about 140 million pounds a year on the treasury, since the benefits hoped for from those subsidies have not been realized. Hallawi accompanied the elimination of subsidies with the development of the cooperative center project, which has been under discussion for a while; it would be upgraded to import foodstuffs and basic commodities directly and distribute them to cooperatives at low prices, slightly above cost.

It is apparent that the statements by the ministers of finance and economy came together on two points:

First, the conviction that it is not feasible to subsidize fuel and wheat, because the money that is drained off into these two areas goes for purposes other than those that had been envisioned.

Second, the ministers' conviction that it is necessary to compensate for this consumer subsidization with vital projects that will bring benefits to everyone, among them road improvement, subsidization of certain other basic food commodities, and all other projects on which money will be spent as part of an overall economic and social policy.

The justifications for eliminating subsidies in the case of wheat and fuel are numerous, apart from the scope for unlawful enrichment they have offered some people.

In the context of wheat, for instance, the justifications for eliminating the subsidies manifest themselves as follows:

1. The weight of flour costs now accounts for just 30 percent of the total cost of bread, in view of the high costs of flour, wages and general expenses. Consequently, eliminating subsidies on flour no longer has a great effect on the price of the bread that reaches the consumer.
2. The weight of the bread budget does not exceed 3 percent of family expenditures, in spite of the vital nature of this commodity as far as the poor classes and people with limited incomes are concerned. A review of the weights of different elements of family spending will show that other vital categories require subsidization, because they drain off individuals' incomes more than bread does. There are many examples of this, most conspicuously the transport, communications, meat and perhaps also energy (electricity) categories.
3. Existing subsidies on wheat offer mills broad scope to tamper with authorized production rates, smuggle wheat, and sell it as fodder for animals or sell it at high prices to the citizens. The subsidies themselves offer broad scope for distributors to tamper with the amounts of flour distributed, along with the bakeries, which for some time have been gradually charging inflated bread prices which are actually expressive of the actual conditions of the cost of this commodity.
4. It has been established, through experience over a number of years, that management, no matter how capably, competently and impartially it might function, is unable to control the subsidization process, especially since milling, distributing and processing operations are in the hands of the private sector and a dominant minority which has been and still is the group most enthusiastic about maintaining subsidies, since the elimination of subsidies would restore the well-known competitive game which is aimed at improving quality.

There are numerous well-known justifications for eliminating subsidies on fuel which do not require discussion, considering the extreme chaos that prevails in the fuel market, where the government has been unable, up to now, to unify gasoline price in all areas of Lebanon. Armed groups and non-legitimate forces impose levies on gasoline and other fuels in all filling and distribution centers in Tripoli, Sidan and al-Dawrah. In addition, some influential forces are importing

fuel through certain ports and deliberately distributing it at high prices, having purposely contrived crises to obstruct the process of distribution through legitimate centers.

In addition to that, the ongoing subsidies on fuel impose a burden of no less than 800 millions pounds a year (after the current drop in the value of the dollar), while the two refineries in the north and the south of the country have become obsolete and in need of radical improvement. The costs of the obsolete installations have risen and are no longer in keeping with the technical level modern refineries in the world have reached. Gasoline imported into Lebanon has become cheaper in cost than that produced locally, because of the high refining costs resulting from the age of the equipment and the incompetence of the personnel.

On top of these realistic considerations, people who endorse relinquishment of the subsidization policy point out that subsidization policy must have essentially productive goals, not consumer ones. There must be a policy, for example, to subsidize wheat farming, sugar beet farming, poultry farming, and so forth, but there should not be any policies for subsidizing gasoline, which is used for consumer purposes that do not yield a return.

Although the positions of the finance and economy ministers with respect to the need to abrogate subsidies are similar, the question that arises is whether the two ministers' positions express those of the regime as a whole on this issue and whether the government will be able to stop the subsidies at the present time.

The information available to AL-MUSTAQBAL indicates that the president, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, asked the minister of economy and trade, Mr Ibrahim Hallawi, to postpone the subject of the subsidization of wheat to another time, and asked him to bury the matter at present, for considerations he did not disclose. However, one can infer from informed sources that the president is looking at the subject in terms of timing and political considerations, in spite of his conviction that subsidies must be eliminated, from the economic and fiscal standpoints.

While informed sources have confirmed al-Jumayyil's position on the subject of bread subsidies, they deduce that he takes the same position on fuel subsidies, because other considerations are the same in the case of both issues.

It is clear that the present regime, like the previous one, dreads the issue of the elimination of subsidies, and seeks to avoid its social repercussions on the ordinary classes and the political auctioneering that is stirred up in such cases. That consideration has been repeated more than once, to the point where the regime, in particular the politicians, have become the prisoners of this consideration, fearing that attacks that have broad popular support will be launched against them. The former minister of industry and oil, Mr Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, was a proponent of the total elimination of subsidies on fuel, and in the fall of 1981 he drew up a draft in this regard which was shelved by the Council of Ministers but later adopted in part with a partial abrogation of subsidies that reduced the burden on the treasury to about 800 million pounds. However, that sum is slated to be changed, following a change in the conditions of world oil markets.

The Council of Ministers was also anxious at that time to declare the allocation of 500 million pounds to housing issues before proceeding to raise fuel prices.

However, informed circles assert that the regime is capable of handling the social repercussions that might arise from the elimination of subsidies by consulting with international and popular-based bodies involved and by making them understand that subsidization does not benefit people with limited incomes--rather, it goes into the pockets of a handful of beneficiaries.

The circles point out that the basic reason for the desire to postpone the issue can be ascribed to the regime's desire to operate in accordance with specific priorities and to avoid opening the economic and social file in full before closing the political and security file guaranteeing the withdrawal of all Western armies and restoring government sovereignty to all Lebanese territory.

11887

CSO: 4404/158

RECENT MONETARY REFORM MEASURES REVIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 304, 18 Dec 82 p 43

/Article: "In Figures: The Triumph of the Drive for a Quiet Drop in the Interest Rate in Lebanon"/

/Text/ It has become obvious that Lebanese fiscal and monetary authorities are still adhering to a policy of a gradual drop in interest rates, starting by setting the rate on short-term (3-month) treasury notes that the Ministry of Finance issues each week.

The recent Ministry of Finance decree reducing the interest on the notes from 12 to 11.5 percent underlines this approach, although a number of bankers are demanding that a major drop be made in interest on the pound, to eliminate the current margin between that and the interest on the dollar.

The gradual drop in interest from late last September to today, which the Ministry of Finance has approved, has lowered the interest from 15 to 13.5 , then from 13 to 12.5, then 12, and finally to 11.5 percent. It appears that the drop is occurring at the rate of half a percent every 3 weeks.

The demand to reduce the interest on the pound on the part of a substantial number of bankers may be attributed to the following reasons:

The current monetary situation in Lebanon is totally different from the situation that existed before September. The exchange rate of the pound is constantly improving as a result of political relaxation. The flow of money into the pound has exceeded the volume that is needed and desired, whereas a shift from the pound into other currencies prevailed during the period of strife.

The high interest burdened the treasury heavily and compelled it to offer treasury bonds at high rates.

The high interest heavily burdened the productive sectors, which started complaining not only of the high cost of money but also of the high exchange rate of the pound.

The high interest rate /on the pound/ in comparison with that on other currencies encourages money to gravitate toward bank deposits, at a time when the banks cannot

now create sound investment opportunities in view of the state of paralysis and hesitation that dominates all sectors.

Conversely, it appears that the adherence by financial and monetary authorities to a gradual decline in interest rates is concentrated on the following considerations:

A sharp drop in interest rates would create a disruption in the money market, and the exchange market specifically, and would pave the way for severe fluctuations which it would be best to avoid.

The current level of foreign interest is not final, and one cannot depend on it in setting a low interest rate for the pound. Consequently, it is necessary to wait awhile in order to learn what monetary policy the American authorities will follow in treating the phenomenon of recession and widespread unemployment.

The narrow scope for lending in Lebanon up to the present, and the absence of a favorable climate for new investments, makes it mandatory that the monetary authorities continue to reduce liquidity for periods of time, out of fear of two things: a return to real estate speculation and speculation in foreign currency, or the creation of basic problems in the banking sector resulting from their access to liquid sums which it is difficult to invest at the present time.

In recent years, Lebanon suffered from high inflation rates and still needs to have them drop to a reasonable level, by keeping a high interest rate, even if the government has to bear some of the burdens of that by means of treasury notes. When the inflation settles down to a reasonable level, it will be possible to adjust the interest to the available possibilities of growth.

The high rate of the Lebanese pound is currently meeting with substantial repercussions in the context of the costs of living and the low prices of imported goods. It is not certain that this positive feature is negated by industry's inability to compete in foreign markets.

11887

CSO: 4404/158

NEW TRADE COOPERATION WITH EAST GERMANY INAUGURATED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 304, 18 Dec 82 p 51

/Article: "Commercial Cooperation between the Chambers of Beirut and East Germany:"/

/Text/ The Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut has recently taken a new turn in its activities, in the foreign context especially, which is based on the conclusion of cooperation agreements with chambers in other countries.

This series of agreements was inaugurated last week with an agreement with the Chamber of Foreign Trade in the German Democratic Republic, which was signed, on behalf of the latter, by its chairman, Dr Otto (Maritichs), and, on behalf of the chamber of Beirut, by its chairman, 'Adnan al-Qassar.

The agreement contains sections which call for the strengthening of trade between the two countries and the establishment of departments that are concerned with the other country's affairs, giving the Beirut chamber a chance to start establishing special marketing departments that will make it possible for exporters to learn about any markets they might wish to enter.

The most conspicuous contents of the agreement are the following:

Both parties will set up a special section, under its jurisdiction, which will be concerned with economic and trade cooperation affairs involving the other party, provided that organizations and companies that are concerned with Arab-German relations are invited to join these two sections.

The two parties will encourage and develop initiatives which will have the effect of hastening the development of relations between Lebanon and East Germany and will seek to eliminate obstacles that might stand in the way of that.

There will be an exchange of information on economic developments and information related to foreign trade statutes and laws, and this information will be provided in publications put out by both parties.

Each of the two parties will invite the organizations and companies involved in relevant fields to take part in general and specialized exhibits held in Lebanon



and East Germany, and each will assume charge of publishing information bearing on these exhibitions and urging people to visit them.

They will encourage the exchange of visits between businessmen and economic, scientific and technical delegations.

They will organize joint lectures and conferences with the objective of increasing the exchange of economic information between the two countries.

The most important commodities imported from East Germany are rubber, textile and metal manufactures, ships and boats. The most important commodities exported are oil grains and fruit, citrus, fruit juices and uncarded cotton.

Germany's exports to Lebanon rose from 8.7 million in 1971 to 13.9 million in 1972, 16 million in 1973, and 67 million in 1974, then dropped to 65 million in 1975, 21 million in 1976, 42 million in 1977, 42 million in 1978 and 50 million in 1979.

Lebanese exports to West Germany rose from 6 million in 1971 to 7.8 million in 1972 and 7 million in 1973, and remained at that level until reaching 10 million starting in 1977.

The first trade agreement between Lebanon and East Germany was on 14 December 1951; it then was amended in 1955, 1958 and 1959.

The second agreement was made in 1961. That was based on the clearing principle. This agreement was then cancelled by trade units based on free payments in 1975.

11887

CSO: 4404/158

EMIGRATION OF PROMINENT NATIONAL FIGURES DEPLORED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 304, 18 Dec 82 p 9

/Article: "500 Lebanese Figures Have Left, Not To Return!"

/Text/ Lebanese embassies abroad recently provided officials in Beirut with the names of numerous figures in politics, parliament, party and religious life who left in recent months and have decided not to return unless security becomes dominant and the government takes control. These embassies have given warning that many of these people have taken out a year's lease on houses and have decided not to return to Lebanon in the current circumstances.

In the opinion of the government, the fact that Lebanon has been emptied of influential, effective political figures could increase the severity of its tension, prevent reconciliation, and eliminate the opportunities for peace. Some ministers have recommended that contact should be made with these figures and that they should be encouraged to return to Beirut at the earliest opportunity.

Observers say that the assassination attempt on Walid Jumblatt prompted some people to leave Lebanon and that the talk in the press about the assassination list prepared to this end has prompted all leaders, all deputies and all party leaders to assume that they are targets.

In the opinion of the newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES, the fact that Lebanon has been emptied of political leaders is a deliberate process whose intent is to empty the stage of armed forces so that the fighting can continue and chances for security and stability may be vitiated.

President Amin al-Jumayyil has directed an indirect appeal to press organizations abroad and to personalities who have been compelled to leave Lebanon because of security circumstances. In his opinion, the presence of these persons could create an opportunity for further domestic cooperation and liberalization and strengthen investment opportunities for businessmen.

Recent statistics show that more than 500 Lebanese figures in the form of political leaders, deputies, party members and influential persons left Lebanon in the last 3 months and have decided not to return. This is a grave phenomenon whose repetition President al-Jumayyil would like to hasten to prevent, lest all Lebanon become a military barracks where there are only fighting men--and murdered persons.

ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIAN RESEARCH CENTER DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Dec 82 p 21

[Article by 'Oded Granot: "Two Aspects of the 'Center for Palestinian Studies' in Beirut: Assisting the PLO with Terrorist Attacks behind a Facade of Academic Work in Beirut; the Center Returns to Affluent Hamra Suburb and Renews Activities at Arafat's Orders from Tunis; Documents Captured by the IDF in Beirut Reveal Secret Activities--Help to Terrorists on Their Missions against Targets in Israel and Abroad; Most Staff--Former Israeli Residents Expelled for Terrorist Activities; PLO Builds New Base in Beirut for Expanded Future Activities"]

[Text] The Center for Palestinian Studies in Beirut, a seemingly academic body of the PLO, has renewed its activities in Beirut after receiving secret instructions from Yasir 'Arafat from Tunis, addressed to his few remaining followers in the Lebanese capital.

'Arafat's instructions were accompanied by a generous contribution for the funding of the large archives captured by the IDF during the war.

The renewed activity of the center, headed by Sabri Jurays, an Israeli Arab who in 1967 was a leader of Fatah in Judea and Samaria and helped recruit volunteers for the PLO, is one of the visible expressions of the enormous effort the PLO is now involved in not only to keep its presence in Lebanon, but also to lay the groundwork for its future expansion.

Under the Nose of the Multi-National Force

The Lebanese press is publishing ads these days advertising new publications of the center, published in Beirut after the IDF withdrawal, under the nose of the Lebanese authorities and the multi-national force.

Since its inception in 1965, the heads of the Center of Palestinian Studies made sure it kept an academic image, dealing with the Palestinian problem and offering its services to foreign investigators. Few knew that behind the academic facade was a PLO intelligence center gathering information on Israel and Jewish objectives for terrorist acts. The diplomatic immunity given to the center in December (at the same time the PLO office in Beirut was given immunity by the Third Arab Summit Meeting) enabled the PLO to prevent foreign

investigators from gaining access to the guarded archives where data on Israel was kept. This also kept center staff from being interfered with while engaging in something other than academic research.

The public activities of the center were quite varied. A large staff of researchers gathered material about Israel and the Palestinian problem from many sources, mostly books, newspapers, periodicals and academic studies written in Israel, in Arab countries and in other countries. A special team listened regularly to the broadcasts of Israeli radio and television. The center library had many books in Hebrew, not only about the Palestinian problem but also the history of Zionism, Judaic subjects and works by Israeli and Jewish writers and thinkers.

#### Files on IDF Officers

As part of its overt activities, the center issued regular publications. The three main ones were:

SHU'UN FALASTINIYAH (Palestinian Affairs), a monthly in Arabic.

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, issued in cooperation with Georgetown University in Washington, DC and financed by Kuwait.

DAILY MONITORING REPORT, which included a summary of Israeli radio and television broadcasts with an introduction and commentary by center writers. This publication had a 1500 circulation and was sent to all PLO leaders and to their intelligence and operational bodies.

The center was housed in a six story building in the affluent Hamra suburb. It was funded by the PLO by decree of the National Council (the organizations' parliament). It received directives from 'Arafat.

Few people knew about its other side. Its covert activities became known mainly after the IDF captured center documents and publications.

A Guide for the Palestinian Fighter, a handbook published in 1972 with data on IDF camps in the Galilee and the Golan Heights. This is the first of a series which apparently includes all parts of Israel. The first page specifies it has "limited and special circulation."

Road Maps for Occupied Palestine, published in 1969. The pamphlet includes 74 maps of Israel's various parts with geographic and other data. The introduction states circulation is limited, since it is intended to help in terrorist acts. It was issued in two parts, one without a cover in order to make it easier for terrorists going out on a mission against Israel to hide it in their clothes.

Detailed list of gas stations in Israel, apparently for operational purposes.

It was also found out that the central archives of the Center for Palestinian Studies followed changes in the command of the IDF by keeping files on senior

officers, including members of the logistic group, such as chief medical officer or chief military police officer.

Among the captured files were also entire files of the PLO intelligence services, including requests for senior terrorist commanders for special investigations for the terrorist organizations.

What was the academic purpose of those publications? It is hard to imagine they were used for anything other than terrorist acts against Israel and helping terrorists sent on an assignment. This is also seen in the fact that the people in charge of monitoring were also active in the monitoring division of the Western Sector (Qasm 77) used by Fatah in its operations against Israel and assigned to listening in on IDF forces, Israel Police, Israeli radio news, etc.

Most of the researchers and staff members are former Israeli residents who have been expelled for terrorist activities. Most were active in the terrorist organizations in recruiting volunteers, and most have had close ties with the leaders of the Palestinian organizations.

#### Ties with Abu Jihad

Sabri Jurays, the head of the center, has served in this capacity since 1978. He was, among other things, 'Arafat's advisor on Israeli affairs. He is in close touch with Abu Jihad, head of the military section of Fatah who is in charge of terrorist acts in Israel.

Elias Shufani, member of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, and one of the senior workers of the center. He has traveled extensively abroad on behalf of Abu Jihad and Abu Za'im (Fatah head of intelligence), recruiting Arabs for terrorist acts in Israel.

'Ahmad Shaqur, an aide of 'Arafat, former Israeli resident. Used to work for the center's monitoring division. In 1970 fled Israel and served as guide for terrorists. Received officer training by the PLO in Albania, and since 1974 has served as the head of the monitoring division of the center. He has close ties with Abu Jihad, and goes occasionally to Europe to recruit volunteers.

Makram Taufiq Yunis, member of the center staff and monitoring division. In 1972 worked as Hebrew-Arabic translator for Fatah intelligence in Beirut. In 1979 recruited Israeli Arabs who went to Saudi Arabia on religious pilgrimage.

#### Monitoring Unit in the Western Sector

Naziya Murad, a former Israeli resident, in charge of the daily publication of the center. Also associated with the monitoring unit of the Western Sector of Fatah. Until the IDF action he used to accompany Fatah units in southern Lebanon in order to monitor IDF units. After he left Israel in 1976 he served for several years as a recruiter of the Western Sector of Fatah. He is close to the head of the security division of Fatah, Abu al-Hul.

The double function of the center in the Hamra suburb of Beirut ended when the IDF entered West Beirut. Now it is expected to renew its activities. If left alone, Sabri Jurays and his men will continue not only their academic studies on Israel, but also their intelligence work and their preparation for renewing terrorist activity, not necessarily from Lebanese territory.

9565

CSO: 4423/58

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### FATAH MEMBER ON PALESTINIAN RIFT ON MIDEAST ISSUES

GF151642 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 13 Jan 83 p 9

[Interview with Nimr Salih, alias Abu Salih, Fatah Central Committee member, by AL-WATAN Damascus correspondent Mustafa 'Ajinah--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] The Palestinian arena is deep in a darkness of information and various ideologies and a Fatah Central Committee member is required to light a candle amid this darkness.

[Answer] All now talk about the Palestinian issue. In my view, what drives people to ask for something new is that it is doubtful that the Americans and Arab countries which support them can liquidate the Palestinian issue. They said during the siege of Beirut and after that that such thing had been completed.

From this side, we can read the Palestinian-Palestinian difference. A difference ensued in Fes on the issue of recognizing Israel unconditionally. The Palestinian delegation split on this issue and we continued dialogue on it during the Central Council meetings in Damascus without reaching an agreement. Conflict in the Palestinian institutions continued until it reached the situation it is at now.

Now there are two Palestinian positions: One calls for siding with the reactionary Arab regimes and participating in the Reagan plan to resolve the Camp David deadlock; this stand is based on a continued call for the fighters' withdrawal from Lebanon under the pretext of protecting our people in Lebanon at a time when these people can be protected through armed struggle and with guns on their sides. The other position calls for rejecting all proposed plans, commitment to fighting, continuously confronting the occupation, returning for a formula to influence others and working with nationalistic Arab countries to create a new confrontation with Israel. That is why difference on assessment of the situation created a rift among us, which began to widen.

[Question] Haven't the Palestinian command and factions put a red line under the horizons of their moves?

[Answer] The Palestinian leaders and factions of various leanings have put a red line under every Palestinian move. This line can be defined as follows: 1) No one supported holding a dialogue with Egypt; 2) there has never been any decision to reach an agreement with Jordan; 3) there was a Palestinian decision after the Fes summit to reject the Reagan plan and we were asked to keep silent about what was going on in the conference. However, during the Fes summit--and indeed until this moment--we did not announce our rejection of President Reagan's plan, a thing which enhanced our conviction that there is an attempt to drag the Palestinian gun to Jordan's bosom and to grant Jordan the opportunity to participate in the settlement on the Palestinian horse. These are some points of difference in the Palestinian arena.

CSO: 4400/164



PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY GENERAL OF PPSF

GF100830 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 8 Jan 83 p 17

[Interview with Dr Samir Ghawshah, secretary general of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front [PPSF], by AL-SIYASAH correspondent Marwan Hazin in al-Biqa' Valley, in Lebanon--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Ghawshah] So that our assessment will be objective and scientific we should first look at what has been agreed by a number of the Palestinian resistance squadron commanders in Aden. I have three documents talking about what was agreed upon in the Yemeni capital, Aden. Each party presents its own view on agreement. I believe that the assessment [of the Aden meeting] should be based upon correct and complete information.

According to our data, we can say that what took place in Aden did not settle the situation in the Palestinian arena decisively, whether or not all the squadrons participated in the said meeting because certain parties that joined the meeting showed reservations to certain points discussed. This is one form of nonagreement in the Palestinian arena.

Basically, the Palestinian command agreed to continue the meetings in the presence of the Palestine National Council chairmanship, the Executive Committee members, and the secretaries general following the meetings of the Central Council. One session was held in Damascus during which agreement was reached to hold several consecutive meetings after some leaders returned from Aden. I believe these meetings were supposed to have begun in early December. However, this did not take place.

We believe that what happened in Aden was an attempt to reach an agreement among a number of squadrons, but it lacked the grounds for a unified national stand of all the squadrons of the Palestinian resistance. As for the results, some people thought what has been agreed upon has settled the situation, but we believe that the meeting left the matter unchanged, and did not settle a thing. And as far as we are concerned, there is nothing new in it.

[Question] Certain Palestinian leaders have described the Aden meeting as being one of the most important Palestinian meetings because of its results.

[Answer] This is one opinion. As I have said, we believe that this meeting did not reach an agreement on a number of issues. Moreover, certain points were not broached or discussed at all.

[Question] How was this meeting held? I was in Aden at the time and learned that all secretaries general were invited to participate in it?

[Answer] This is what you know, but what I know is that the meeting took place suddenly and was not agreed upon.

[Question] How do you explain then the presence of more than one secretary general and 'Arafat's presence during the same period? I was informed in Aden that everyone was invited to the meeting and I believe the PPSF is part of "everyone"?

[Answer] Let me explain to you what exactly happened. During the last meeting of the Palestine Central Council that was held in Damascus--a week prior to the Aden meeting--we discussed many issues. The Palestinian leaders agreed next day to continue to hold intensive plenary meetings in Damascus. This took place in 'Arafat's presence.

[Question] But querying the presence of more than one secretary general and 'Arafat in Aden during the same period remains unanswered?

[Answer] As for this matter I will point out to you that Dr George Habash, for instance, was in Aden on an official invitation. He stayed there for recreation after ending his talks. I happened to visit Aden during the same period--a week before the meeting. Nayif Hawatimah visited the Yemeni capital at the invitation of the Yemeni Socialist Party. Also 'Arafat visited Aden to participate in the 15th anniversary of Yemeni independence day. When the meeting was called, I was not there. I had already left for Damascus. The call was quick and some of us could not return or go to Aden.

Anyhow, from our point of view, we see that the agreement by the Palestinian command to hold plenary meetings in Damascus should have been carried out. Nonetheless, we defined our stand before and after the meeting and I have discussed the matter with Yemeni Chairman 'Ali Nasir. Our view is that if we wanted to reach a unified Palestinian national stand, decisions made by the commanding bodies must be abided by and that all squadrons should participate.

Anything else said in that regard is incorrect and comes under the attempt to harm others. By the way, I did not send any apologetic cables for not attending the Aden meeting and our office director there has defined our stand on the matter.

[Question] In light of the data you have talked about, do we understand that the Palestinian or Syrian withdrawal is out of question?

[Answer] The Lebanese Government, the first to be optimistic about the withdrawal, has begun to reconsider the matter and has become pessimistic

after it had expected an Israeli withdrawal by the end of 1982. So what about us? We, as Palestinians, will not withdraw so long as there is one Israeli soldier in Lebanon and this is also the case with respect to Syria, I believe.

[Question] How do you view the Arab stand in light of what has happened in Beirut?

[Answer] There was no Arab stand on what has happened in Lebanon because there were two groups of Arabs: Those who were collusive and those who pretended to be impotent. I can say that there are Arabs who are leaning toward pressuring the PLO with the aim of pushing it into the labyrinth of U.S. policies and consequently, making it give up its national rights. There are Arabs who want to get rid of the burden of the Palestinian cause and that is why they kept silent during and after the invasion. This does not exempt us from saying that the other Arabs were negligent and did not offer all their facilities. What those have offered was not commensurate with the magnitude of the conspiracy and was not commensurate with the size of the plan which was set for crossing out the PLO and subduing the region to the U.S.-Zionist hegemony.

[Question] Do you mean the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front by the "other Arabs"?

[Answer] Yes. Strictly speaking, I mean the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. This front did not perform the required role, especially because the PLO is one of its cofounders.

[Question] What about the Soviet Union's stand?

[Answer] We appreciate the Soviet Union's stand on our national cause and we appreciate our Soviet support and supportive attempts during the invasion and siege. But from our own point of view, we believe that the Soviet support was not commensurate with the seriousness of the event, which was not only aimed at striking at the liberation movements in the world but also at the first line of confrontation with imperialism and Zionism.

[Question] Why was there not any coordination in the first place? And what was the cause of such a flaw?

[Answer] We do not claim we have the accurate answer to this question now.

[Question] Haven't you noticed that the guerrilla operations inside the occupied territory have decreased?

[Answer] First, the inside operations are continuous. We have to struggle to intensify them and secure our legitimate right to fight from all fronts surrounding our occupied homeland Palestine. The burden of struggle should not be placed on our masses in the occupied territory alone. The problem, however, is not in the size of operations, but also in the fact that certain

people see that the political and diplomatic action should be given greater effort at the expense of the effort exerted for stepping up the military struggle in the occupied territory. The real problem lies in the attempts to drop the military option.

[Question] One final question: The Palestinian popular struggle front is currently reported to be pro-Syrian. What do you say?

[Answer] In a nutshell, we say that those who do not know the truth of stands, especially in the Palestinian arena do not have the right to undermine our independence as a front, not by a hair's breadth. Some people are weird and funny indeed, and this is fabrication and escape from the truth. The truth is there is disagreement in the Palestinian arena. This disagreement cannot be defaced in such ways, mendacities, and escape attempts. Our confidence in ourselves is greater than responding to these methods and this accusation is reversed toward its owners.

We are keen to maintain good relations with Syria and strive to overcome obstacles lying between us within the framework of bolstering the Palestinian national struggle.

This is the truth and as the Palestinian proverb goes: "Lies have short wings".

CSO: 4400/164

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PALESTINE BROADCAST ON KING HUSAYN'S PEACE ROLE

JN162157 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 16 Jan 83

[Palestine broadcast: Talk of the Return]

[Text] Reports from Washington say that the U.S. administration has pinned great hopes on King Husayn entering Jordan in the negotiations on autonomy for the Palestinians at the end of next month. Upon his return from Amman to the United States, Senator Paul Tsongas was quoted as saying that King Husayn had told him of his willingness to enter negotiations on the Palestinian issue and that he would enter these negotiations when he receives an indication of Israel's good intentions.

An official in Reagan's administration said that King Husayn wants to reach a position from which he can make a statement, that he is in need of a green light from an Arab oil state to provide him with financial and political support and a yellow light from the PLO. The NEW YORK TIMES has quoted U.S. officials as saying that King Husayn has been given the green light from an Arab oil state and the yellow light from Yasir 'Arafat. All that remains is for Israel to show good intention by announcing a halt to the establishment of settlements, then King Husayn will participate in the negotiations to join the Camp David table appointing himself as the guardian of the Palestinian issue.

We are not at all surprised to find the Jordanian regime willing to follow the path of al-Sadat's regime, or rather to follow the course it has adopted since the establishment of the East of Jordan Emirate. We are not surprised at all to find that this regime is willing to accept a generous financial price from one or more Arab regimes in return for its courage in liquidating the Palestinian issue. However, we wonder if it is true that Yasir 'Arafat has given King Husayn the yellow light to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Until this moment and despite all that has happened and has been and will be said we do not believe it. Therefore, with what right and upon what authority has such a light been given? Neither the PLO Executive Committee, the Central Council nor the National Council has empowered anyone to give such a light to entrust the king or to join him in a joint delegation. Such authorization would mean the political destruction of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the total destruction of the independent Palestinian decision. No one has the ability to destroy this decision for the simple reason that the Palestinian revolution is the will of the Palestinian people. A leader or a leadership may fall, but the revolution will live on. This matter must be made very clear because the holy [words indistinct] is a fire that will burn anyone who attempts to tamper with it and our people will never allow anyone to tamper with this holy cause.

CSO: 4400/164

BRIEFS

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE BEHIND ATTACKS--Iraq intelligence is behind various terrorism acts that have recently occurred abroad, using Palestinian organizations, including that of Abu Nidal, who claimed that it was responsible for throwing handgrenades at the bus in Tel Aviv. Two Palestinian organizations operated by the Iraqi intelligence are that of Abu Nidal and the "15 May" organization headed by Abu Ibrahim. These organizations receive financial and operational aid from Iraqi intelligence. As will be recalled, it was Abu Nidal's organization that was responsible for the attack against Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. The two organizations have recently returned to more intensive operational activity. Abu Nidal's organization is also responsible for the attack against the worshippers in the synagogue in Rome. The "15 May" organization is responsible for the acts of terrorism that have recently occurred in Australia. In contrast to this, it has been reported that the taking over of the synagogue in Bogota that occurred recently was carried out by local Arabs who were helped by inhabitants of Colombia. [Text] [TA110850 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Jan 83 p 1]

PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY SPLITS--The Palestinian Communist Party has come up against grave difficulties because of the Soviet Union's support for the special relations between Jordan and the PLO, and its support for a confederation between Jordan and Palestine. The leader of the Palestinian communists in the territories, Bashir Baghruti, is opposed to this link because he knows that the communists will not be incorporated in the framework on which this confederation will be established. In contrast to him, ('Awabi 'Awad), the leader of the Palestinian communists in exile, supports the Soviet Union's policy, and because of the differences of opinion between the two, the Palestinian Communist Party, that was established not long ago, has in fact split. [Excerpt] [TA140929 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 14 Jan 83]

'ARAFAT TO MAKE ASIAN TOUR--Damascus, 17 Jan (QNA)--An authoritative Palestinian source announced here today that Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman, will visit a number of Asian countries beginning with Malaysia and Indonesia at the end of February and after the Palestinian National Council session. The source said during this tour 'Arafat will hold talks with officials on developing and bolstering bilateral relations

between the PLO and these countries. 'Arafat will also convey the PLO's thanks to these countries for their stands in support of the Palestinian right and will establish more positive relations with the Asian countries. [Text] [GF180521 Doha QNA in Arabic 1945 GMT 17 Jan 83]

USSR SENDING ARMS TO PLO--The Austrian police believe they have prevented an attempt to smuggle ammunition and light arms from the Soviet Union to the terrorists in the Middle East. Early Saturday morning, the police detained three Austrian and Czech arms smugglers at the border. The three are suspected of carrying in their car all sorts of war material to transfer to the terrorists. The police believe that the confiscated car is only one of many leaving the Soviet Union en route to the PLO or other terrorist organizations through Austria. It has been learned in Stockholm that Algeria sent the Soviet Union \$20 billion about 6 months ago to finance the supply of arms to the PLO following the Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi, who is currently in Sweden, said this in an interview with DAGENS NYHETER. [Text] [TA171058 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Jan 83 p 2]

CSO: 4400/164

SAUDI ARABIA

EDUCATIONAL OFFICIAL DESCRIBES NEW PUSH TO EXPAND TRAINING

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Oct 82 p 3

/Article by Turki al-'Ayyar: "The Deputy Governor of the Technical Education Organization to AL-RIYAD: Training and Vocational Preparation Centers and Commercial Schools To Open This Year"

/Text/ The Technical Education and Vocational Training Organization has set out the plans and programs required to open four training centers and ready two vocational preparation centers, two commercial schools and three on-the-job training centers this year.

This was pointed out by Mr Muhammad al-Sulayman al-Dal'an, the deputy governor of the Technical Education and Vocational Training Organization. He said, "The necessary plans have been set forth to increase the absorptive capacity of the centers and institutes, studies have been made to design and erect 11 training, vocational preparation and on-the-job training centers this year, there are six technical schools and a polytechnic institute (an intermediate technical college), and studies on designing a specialized electronic institute have been completed."

The deputy governor of the organization said, "The rapid growth the kingdom has achieved has, in the initial planning stages, underlined the importance of and need for the development of domestic human resources, as represented by the preparation of young Saudis to cover development needs, be they industrial, agricultural, commercial or social.

"Proceeding from this premise, the past three development plans laid emphasis on the attainment of this objective, which can be realized only through education in all its sectors--general, technical, vocational and higher.

Technical education is one of the fields of education, and perhaps the most difficult. It is different from general education in that it is oriented toward accrediting the individual for a specific activity in which he can obtain the requisite skills through actual practice as well as theoretical study. Attention to technical and vocational education in the kingdom began more than 20 years ago when the technical education department subordinate to the Ministry of Education and the vocational training department subordinate to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs were established. Technical



education includes industrial, commercial and agricultural education. Each of these involves a number of institutes and secondary technical schools, be they vocational technical secondary institutes, commercial schools or agricultural institutes. Technical education in general is restricted to the secondary level, except for the Higher Technical Institute for the Preparation of Teachers and two 2-year commercial institutes after commercial secondary school.

"The industrial institutes include mechanical, electric, electronic and architectural departments. The agricultural institutes also include plant and livestock production, agricultural processing industries and mechanization departments. Commercial technical education includes accounting administrative activities in the form of secretarial work and copying and banking and warehouse activities, and computers are soon to come, God willing.

"Vocational training began in the Ministry of Labor with the agreement of the International Labor Organization, in the endeavor to make up for the shortage that had occurred in trained domestic labor and to convert the greatest amount of that labor from ordinary to semi-skilled workers through relatively short intensified training courses which would be dominated by a practical last. For this purpose, the vocational training centers were established.

"It was then necessary to have centers to guide young people whose ages ranged from 14 to 17 who had not been given opportunities for a general education or had dropped out of the primary levels, in order to provide them with vocational guidance and help them select an appropriate occupation. For that purpose, the vocational preparation centers were established. The training and vocational preparation centers include 11 fields of specialization, in electrical, and mechanical work, metals, woodwork, carpentry, printing presses, and so forth.

"The training and vocational preparation centers grew in recent years, coming to 32 in number, distributed among the main towns in the kingdom. These operate morning and evening programs. In addition to regular training in the training and vocational preparation centers, one very important area of training is on-the-job training in private companies and organizations, which is organized in coordination with the on-the-job training department, organizations and factories in order to set out training programs that are carried out within the industrial installation or organization to raise the level of our workers. In spite of the growth, all these technical education, vocational training and on-the-job training programs have not achieved their objectives, satisfied the aspirations expected of them or kept abreast of the rapid material and economic growth in the kingdom. The main goal of the third development plan has come to be concentrated on manpower resource development and the preparation of the domestic workforce, which has resulted in the creation of the Higher Manpower Council, to draw up labor policy in this area. His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz, minister of defense and civil aviation and the inspector general, heads the Higher Manpower Council, which is made up of a number of responsible government ministers and sets out general policies for the overall development of the workforce. Its purpose is also to establish the technical education and vocational training

organization as one of the executive instruments for developing Saudi manpower by merging the technical education department subordinate to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs within a single organization. The organization's statute specifies that the purpose behind its establishment is to carry out the plans and programs set out to develop domestic vocational and technical manpower in the context of policies which the Manpower Council sets out, within the following limits:

"A. Everything connected to technical education in its various fields-- industry, agriculture and commerce.

"B. Everything connected to vocational training in its various forms and at its various levels, such as vocational training for adults, executive training, vocational preparation on-the-job training and other fields of technical training, outside of the centers the specialized bodies have established or those that are to be established in the future by decree of the Manpower Council.

"C. The performance of theoretical research and studies on the development of productive performance and competence in the workforce. The organization began its activities at the start of the last fiscal year. For the organization to be able to continue administering the facilities belonging to it, in order on the one hand to develop them and on the other hand to set out the plans necessary to carry out its objectives over the long range, it has set out tentative goals for itself which can be broken down into two main stages:

"First, short-term goals, whose execution can be continued, or whose execution can be started immediately, such as material expansion in the number of institutes, centers and schools.

"Second, specific attention to technical education programs and curricula.

"Al-Dal'an said, "A study has been set forth to evaluate the technical education curricula. This was performed by some German and Saudi experts. At the same time, a study was made of the educational level of students, and work is underway in this field.

"As regards vocational training, work has begun on setting out new curricula in eight vocational training occupations with the participation of some American experts. These curricula were set out after careful study of the obstacles in the way of vocational training in the kingdom, and the most up-to-date theories in training curricula were applied, since the curricula were set out in a logical sequence in accordance with the principle of competence and individual training so that each group of units would be in a section and each group of sections will be in a chapter, and each group of chapters would constitute a curricula. An instructor's guide and execution requirements in the form of materials, numbers and equipment would accompany the curriculum. This curriculum would realize many benefits, for one thing, it is based on competence, where the student is given a chance to come in at any individual time without waiting for a group to meet, and students who think for themselves are given an opportunity to complete the course before the time stipulated for the course, while students who need more time can have that. There are many benefits which these programs provide.

"An additional goal on which the organization has laid emphasis in its initial stages has been concern with the educational and cultural levels of the students and trainees. Practical and technical training alone does not qualify students, nor does it have any value, unless the technical workers personality embodies that of a devout Moslem youth who lives his work and is compatible with our Islamic law in his dealings, in terms of honesty, performance of duty and proficiency. Therefore, the organization concentrates on the development of cultural, social and religious activities.

"One of its goals is to prepare teachers and trainers and raise their scientific and practical levels in an organized fashion. To that end, plans have been laid out to prepare Saudi teachers and trainers domestically and send them on fellowship for practical training abroad for the time being, until, with God's help, the construction of the installations for the permanent trainers' preparation institute is completed so that the preparation of Saudi trainers can be done in the kingdom."

He said, "The organization is also concentrating on the following:

"Improvement of the climate of training, for instance specifying and organizing workshops, providing safety and health care equipment in them, and outfitting them with the most modern equipment.

"Devoting attention to the followup and evaluation of graduates' activities and linking employment to on-the-job training, in an attempt to continue the training process during the job following graduation.

"Emphasis on on-the-job training in private companies and organizations, assistance for that, and the provision of a comprehensive, integrated plan for it.

"Provision of incentives to attract students and trainees, be they material, such as bonuses, housing or board, or moral, such as vocational indoctrination and guidance, technical contests, the provision of job opportunities at worthwhile salaries, and so forth."

He stated, "The attainment of most of these goals was started before the creation of the organization, and the organization continued to dedicate and develop them and try to bring the greatest possible number of them into being, however, that has not kept us from sensing obstacles and challenge and from starting studies for more comprehensive development in this field. This is figuratively known as the second stage, or the long-range goals of the organization. First of all, after more than 20 years of the experiment of technical and vocational education, a pause is required for an evaluation. Many questions arise: Is the level of the curricula and programs acceptable? Do the training plans conform to the requirements of the development plan, in terms of quality and quantity? Are the programs now being carried out feasible or adequate? And so on.

"There are clear indications of a deficit in quality and quantity. The number of people being trained or officers have graduated are less than is desired.

The type of program graduates, and their level of education, is also being our expectations and goals. Why is that? In my opinion, there are two essential, basic aspects to this problem. First is the Saudi youths' lack of response to enrollment in technical and vocational training programs.

"The second, which is closely related to the first, is the fact that the ladder of technical and vocational education has been closed. Why should the response to technical and vocational education be low? Can the reason be attributed to the absence of suitable jobs after graduation, as some people say, to the Saudi youths; lack of desire for technical manual applied labor, to traditions and tribal customs which take a low view of this sector, as they say, or to an absence of institutes that are suitably equipped because there are no incentives for students? In my opinion, although these are some of the causative factors, they do not account for the essential factor. Job opportunities exist for graduates, and they also have enticements. The low view of vocational work has started to disappear, well-equipped institutes are available and are operating at below capacity, the technical and vocational secondary institutes to which the response has been extremely low are considered to be among the best of their kind in the world in terms of construction, organization, equipment and curricula as well, and material incentives, in the form of monthly payments, housing and board, exist. Of course these incentives are not available in the general secondary schools where the students compete intensely to enroll, and those who are not admitted to them turn to other institutes, including technical or vocational secondary institutes. Why is that? Why don't competent graduates compete to get into vocational secondary schools as they compete to get into the general secondary schools, although the vocational secondary schools offer material incentives and the guarantee of jobs upon graduation? Electrician graduates can find job opportunities and high salaries that are better than those for general secondary graduates in the event the latter are not admitted to university. This question leads us to the second factor in the lack of large numbers of technical and vocational education graduates. This factor, or obstacle, is the fact that the ladder of technical and vocational training has been closed off, and it is the reason for the lack of response. When we close off the ladder of technical education, that means that we are closing off ambition to young people who have an interest in this area. If the student knows that his educational and scientific aspirations will end with secondary vocational school and that he will be applying for it only under compulsion, which also is the situation in vocational preparation centers, young people between 14 and 17, realizing that their final status will be a 10-month course in a preparation center, will not apply for it and will not apply for training centers either. This problem has resulted in a disruption not only in the ladder of technical education but also in general and higher education both. In most countries of the world, we find that the bulk of the organization's graduates go into technical education. This ratio comes to 80 percent in some developing countries like China and Korea, which are labor-exporting countries, whereas in the kingdom it comes only to 20 percent. Therefore, one of the priorities of the organization's goals is first of all to set out an integrated system for technical and vocational education by which it will be possible to open the ladder of education to a number of students in various stages so they can

advance to higher levels. Naturally this will not be done by the organization alone. Coordination and study with other educational organizations, the Education /Ministry/ and the competent universities will be necessary. Thus, in my view, it will be possible for the percentage of people headed toward jobs and people continuing studies both.

"If just 500 students are studying in an institute, such as the Royal Technical Institute, which takes in 1,500 students now, that means that in the event the ladder is opened up and 1,500 students enter the local market will be able to absorb 1,000 students instead of 500 over 3 years even some of those are universities. This proportion will not exceed 30 percent if they do not amount to more than 500 students. Setting out this system and opening up the ladder should be considered one of the priorities to which the organization is paying attention--opening up the ladder to education in general, for secondary education or even for preparatory or vocational training centers, after a comprehensive integrated system of averages and curricula existing in technical education and vocational training.

"Second, setting out a system for private technical education and vocational training in the private sector, to guarantee the organizations' participation in this field and organize this participation. It is well known that the private sector system has not performed the role required of it in this field although it is compulsory by statute. The major companies are compelled to train no less than 5 percent of their Saudi workers, in accordance with the Labor Statute in spite of the material aid that the organization provides, which is embodied in the disbursement of training salaries to all employees who are trained in any company and receive a salary, even if they are company employees, with a salary paid to the teacher also, it is necessary to set out rules and statutes for this which will take material incentives on the one hand and the application of the Labor Statute on the other into account."

11887

CSC: 4404/86

EMPHASIS ON HEAVY INDUSTRY, POTENTIAL APPLICATION DESCRIBED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 6 Dec 82 p 7

[Text] Riyadh. After 950 days of work, the fire of the first steel and iron complex in Saudi Arabia began to burn, announcing the inauguration of the production plans to produce 800,000 tons of 32-6 mm gauge reinforced iron to meet a large part of the kingdom's needs in the first stage of production.

The cornerstone of the complex was laid on 25 April 1979 in a place covering an area of 4.4 million square meters in the Jubayl industrial region where three of the most important elements essential to the success of the industrial plan are available: (1) ease of reaching the sea and other routes of communication, including a railroad, highways, and air lines, (2) closeness to power sources, and (3) existence of basic equipment to meet the requirements of heavy industry.

The main focus of this project is petroleum gas. Iron does not exist in nature in its elemental state. Rather, it is found combined with another element forming compounds and metals such as ferric oxide. Iron cannot be used in this state until it is separated from the other element to which it is bound, generally oxygen. When this separation is made, iron is present in its elemental state and can be used in well-known forms and articles. Until very recently, no more than 15 years ago, iron was extracted from its natural compounds (regarded as raw material) by smelting it in furnaces with limestone, which absorbs the oxygen component and separates it from the iron. The iron remains in its elemental state melted and is then poured into special molds for shaping according to requirements. However, the idea of using natural gas, a new idea, became popular in regions where petroleum gas is abundant. The quantities of this gas available in Saudi Arabia are found virtually nowhere else in the world. So plants were built for the separation and liquefaction of natural gas in the eastern region to collect and treat 3 billion cubic feet of this gas a day. The process then involves directing the petroleum gas (most of its consists of methane) under high pressure to electric furnaces in which iron ore is present. One of the properties of methane is its ability to remove oxygen from iron. Thus, iron can be easily extracted from the ore. This method, called direct separation, differs from the old ones in its high productivity and cheapness because petroleum

gas is inexpensive. This method of extracting iron from the other elements is flexible in that it can be adapted to any project of this kind regardless of size.

The company's production will aim at covering the local needs for steel articles since the output scheduled for the first stage in the construction of the plant is 800,000 tons of rolled steel a year. Hence there is room for expansion in successive steps whenever there is a demand for it so that the output capacity will reach 4 million tons of rolled steel a year.

To obtain the volume of final product from rolled steel, the following intermediate materials will be produced annually:

(1) 800,000 tons of sponge iron. Sponge iron is usually smelted in areas where vehicles and heavy machinery in Europe, America, and Japan are manufactured. It is shaped according to the requirements of these industries.

(2) 50,000 tons of lime, 20,000 tons of oxytem, and 50,000 tons of steel beams. Also, integrated units will be built in the plant to produce reinforced rods, steel beams, reinforced wires, angle steel, and sheets. All of these items are consumed in significant quantities in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states.

In the course of manufacturing the above-mentioned final and intermediate products, the plant will consume annually the following raw materials:

(1) 1,200,000 tons of iron ore, (2) 100 tons of local scrap iron, (3) 100,000 tons of local limestone, (4) 200,000,000 cubic meters of local natural gas, and (5) 1,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity generated locally.

The plant's use of raw materials will help create other activities and industries that facilitate and assist in the collection of scrap iron, mining of limestone, recovery of gas, and generation of electricity.

The plant's products will also serve as the basis for developing a group of local industries derived from or associated with the production of wires, nails, nuts, springs, and bolts.

Iron ore (ferric oxide pellets of high purity) will at first be imported from Brazil until studies now being conducted by the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mining in the western part of the kingdom in Wadi al-Sawawin, Wadi Fatimah, and elsewhere are finished. At that time it will be possible to use these substances instead of importing them.

#### New technology:

The complex employs several new technologies for the production of iron and steel, for example, the above-mentioned direct separation method (Medarex), which differs from the traditional one with tall smelting furnaces in requiring electric furnaces and using continuous casting in preparation for rolling it into reinforced rods.

A conveyor belt extends along the plant for a distance of 11 km. Its function is to supply the plant with iron ore from the port. There are other conveyor belts between the units from the raw materials (imported) station to the direct separation towers and other belts after the separation of sponge iron and its transport to the steel unit (electric furnaces). It is also distinguished by the integration of the operation and by the existence of the most up-to-date equipment for making rolled steel. There are stations to supply seawater to cool the water that cools the equipment.

The complex also takes new technological precautions to safeguard the environment against pollution and remove the fumes and smoke arising from the furnaces in order to protect the region and workers of the complex themselves. This is in addition to new regulations to protect the plants against fires and a complete list for protective maintenance by means of computers to furnish spare parts for the furnaces and various pieces of equipment.

The Saudi complex is thus regarded as the largest and newest of the modern industrial complexes since the iron and steel industry is one of the strategic and vital industries in building a solid industrial base in view of the fact that the products of these industries are considered intermediate material for many other processing industries, light and heavy. Its importance is shown by the fact that some sources look upon individual consumption of steel in a country as an indicator of that country's economic and social progress. Moreover, it is obviously important as a pivotal industry that attracts other industrial sectors because they grow up around it as do many other basic industries. The Gulf states are a fertile source of natural gas, which is one of the basic elements required for the production of iron and steel by direct separation as we mentioned before, and a rich source of the power needed to operate the furnaces.

The presence of these factors is likely to improve the economics of this industry substantially. A reason for optimism about its future is the desire of the Gulf Cooperation Council states to exploit their resources. This will benefit them through a strong and integrated industrial sector, on the one hand, and a boost in iron and steel production, on the other. If we look at the volume of anticipated production in the GCC states until 1983, we find it amounts to 2.4 million tons of iron pellets, which are not enough to satisfy the iron and steel requirements of the region. Hence it is necessary to resort to imports from other producing states.

Moreover, as we said, there are ample opportunities for this industry to succeed in the GCC states both because of the availability of natural gas and oil and because of the high concentration of capital. The Saudi complex, for example, involved the investment of 3000 million Saudi riyals. This is, of course, a huge sum for investment. Therefore, many states cannot afford to undertake such large projects and they always go to the world market to import the products of this industry.



Suffice it to note in this connection that American production of about 87 million tons of iron pellets represents about 15 percent of the world output. Yet the United States imports an average of 88 million tons a year, or approximately the same amount as it produces. It is clear then that building a base for iron and steel production in the GCC states will produce many benefits, including:

- (1) Ideal exploitation of their natural gas and oil resources and financial surpluses.
- (2) The development of different industries that rely on the iron and steel industry supports and strengthens the industrial sector in these states.
- (3) Diversification of the structure of exports by introducing heavy industry into the composition of their exports and gradual dispensing with imports.

Most important of all is the creation of a major base for Gulf military industries. The Gulf region will undoubtedly continue to have to defend its land and wealth. The various states have tried to support their armed forces with what they require in the way of arms and advanced military equipment through purchase abroad. However, total dependence on imports is incompatible with the national and Gulf security strategies. So there must be Gulf military industries that will start to produce ammunition and light military equipment first and then in time gradually enter into other stages of advanced military industries.

Let the flame that will rise in Jubayl in the middle of next month (December) in the Saudi iron and steel complex be the flame of hope that Gulf military industries will soon come into existence.

5214

CSO: 4404/131

SOVIET AID, TRADE FIGURES VIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 297, 30 Oct 82 p 14

[Article by Sabir Amin, Moscow correspondent: "Soviet Military and Economic Interest in Syria"]

[Text] The Soviets are keeping a close watch on the military situation with regard to the Syrian forces in Lebanon. The newspaper IZVESTIA, which speaks on behalf of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and armed forces, presented analyses of the strategy and tactics and of military commentaries concerning the positions of the Syrian forces and their movements in the Biqa' Plain. They were written by permanent military correspondents living in Damascus. This is what is happening for the first time since 1973 during the Israeli-Arab war and throughout the events in Lebanon and since the intensification of the war this year until the Palestinian forces left Beirut. This situation, which has not appeared in the Soviet military press for years, occurred at the same time as the announcement by a source in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Commerce that the volume of commercial trade between the Soviet Union and Syria has increased to about 240 million rubles (that is, more than \$310 million) during the first six months of this year.

This source added that in the two years since the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria was signed, secondary trade relations have developed rapidly. While the volume of Soviet-Syrian trade in 1980 amounted to \$321 million, in 1981 it increased by 2.9 million rubles all at once. According to preliminary data, it is expected that at the end of this year (1982) the growth will have continued in the same manner.

According to the agreement signed in May last year, the Soviet-Syrian foreign trade volume will increase by about two and a half times during the current five-year plan, which was prepared for the years 1981-1985, when measured against the previous plan. The increase will reach 2000 million rubles, that is, more than \$2700 million. The Soviet trade association has increased its purchases of Syrian cotton, wool, textiles and tricot production, while the Soviets export machines, equipment, automobiles and air transportation resources (that is, aircraft for passengers, for agriculture, and for aerial survey) to Syria, as well as steel equipment, petroleum and its byproducts, lumber, and a large group of other products.

The Soviets add that purchases by Soviet foreign trade associations from Syria are aimed at promoting many branches of the Syrian national economy and supporting and participating in Syria's export capability.

According to Soviet sources, a large and notable group of scientists from Leningrad will head for Syria to participate in oil and mineral water exploration operations in Syrian territory, especially in the Damascus basin, with the aim of achieving a greater supply of drinking water for Damascus as well as water designated for industrial needs, and also to expand the area of land under irrigation.

The Syrians also agreed with the Soviets to participate in setting up complexes for raising sheep with an abundance of wool on land estimated at 74,000 square kilometers in area. Syrian parties also anticipate that the Soviets will work on building a network for irrigating arid land on the basis of ground water sources.

9605

CSO: 4404/93

# IMPORT REGULATIONS IN SYRIA TIGHTENED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 145, 20-26 Nov 82 p 46

[Text] The Syrian government at the start of last October issued a regulation according to which Syrian importers will have to cover the cost of their imports through accounts to be opened at the state trade banks. Any goods imported directly from abroad will not receive official permission to enter Syrian territory.

It seems that the new regulation aims at making the system of granting import licenses more strict in order to control the private sector and hold back military purchases from the foreign sector, although it lowers the deposit required for the accounts from 25 percent to 10 percent of value.

## Private-sector

Importers in Syria complain of the slowness with which the accounts are opened, a process which can sometimes take up to 6 months to complete. The Syrian government has promised to investigate the loss of profits suffered by the importers as a result of the delay, and has undertaken to set the price of opening such accounts.

During 1981, Syria's trade deficit increased to 7,993 million Syrian lira, or \$2,035.8 US. The fall in Syria's foreign reserves was one of the reasons why the Japanese heavy-industry company Mitsubishi decided to suspend its negotiations with Syrian Department of Electricity concerning the construction of a \$150 million electric power generating station.

Syria currently gives preference to military purchases, especially aircraft, and even at the expense of basic civilian goods imports. The Syrian government recently refused a request from the chambers of commerce of Damascus and Aleppo to give priority to basic consumer goods, preferring instead to grant this priority to goods which can be re-exported and so gain foreign exchange.

12224

CSO: 4404/107

## MEASURES TAKEN TO SPUR ECONOMY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 296, 23 Oct 82 pp 15-16

[Article from Damascus correspondent: "Al-Kasm Stimulates Public and Private Economy"]

[Text] Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, Syrian Prime Minister, chaired a meeting last Monday which brought together a number of senior officials and the heads of the chamber of commerce and industry to discuss measures guaranteed to stimulate economic activity and production. In this meeting it was decided to commission the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade and the chamber of commerce and industry to establish the necessary standards to give precedence to opening voucher credits for raw materials and materials required for production operations, and to commission the Syrian Commercial Bank to take whatever measures are necessary to accelerate the opening of the necessary voucher credits.

AL-MUSTAQBAL learned that these decisions, coming as complements to previous economic decisions, were issued by al-Kasm and are related to the areas of production and trade. In the area of production, the government advised that all factories and institutions belonging to the public sector operate at maximum productivity, achieve evolutionary yields, and define accounting and productivity standards for control and supervision. In the area of trade, measures taken by the government were directed at concentrating on giving preference to domestic products by continuing to support them through shifting most of them to the parallel market at a rate which reached 80 percent for certain domestically manufactured goods which are exported abroad. The latter step comes as an important step in the area of stimulating and developing economic activity for both the public and private sectors, suitably smoothing the way for Syrian economic activity to adopt its true role in all fields, so as to accomplish a progressive step on the level of the national economy. It also pushes the established five-year development plans toward their horizons in the coming years.

From another standpoint, statistics announced by Syria's deputy prime minister for economic affairs indicated that Syrian cement production came to three million tons. Syria also achieved self-sufficiency in petroleum by-products, and provided job opportunities for three million citizens. He added that total production rose in 1981 to 99 billion Syrian pounds, an increase of 23 billion over 1979. Average individual income in 1981 was 6956 Syrian pounds, after having been 4496 pounds in 1979. The industrial sector achieved overall progress in 1981 at the rate of 4 percent: in the processing industries at the rate of 11 percent, in foodstuffs 5 percent, in lumber and furniture 14 percent, in printing and paper 18 percent, in metal products 33 percent, and in electrical energy 17 percent.

SYRIA

#### COTTON PRODUCTION FIGURES

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 10 Oct 82 p 4

[Article: "National Seed Cotton Production 355,000 Tons"]

[Text] Aleppo, SNA--Mr 'Ammash Juday', Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform made a statement to SNA correspondents yesterday just before his departure and after he represented President Hafez al-Assad in observing the opening ceremonies of the 27th Cotton Festival. He asserted that seed cotton production for the current 1981-1982 season had reached 355,871 tons, as opposed to 322,819 tons last season.

The minister explained that the ministry plans to require standardization of the type of seeds planted in Syria with the aim of achieving purity of strain and maintaining it in all stages of planting and raising. He said that work is in progress with the seed raising institute to improve the strains of good seeds in order to spread them to all cotton-producing governorates. Also, yesterday morning the Arab and friendly foreign delegations participating in the 27th Cotton Festival visited the laboratories, where they learned about the experiments set up by the cotton office, aimed at discovering the strains which have excellent qualities. The guests showed their amazement at the progress which has been achieved by the cotton office directorate in this field.

9605

CSO: 4404/93

THREE MILLION AFGHANS EXILED SINCE INVASION

Paris LE MONDE in French 26-27 Dec 82 pp 1-2

[Article by our special correspondent, Gerard Viratelle: "An Exodus of Uncommon Magnitude"]

[Text] Three years after Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the resistance is increasing its pressure on the cities, particularly the capital, Kabul, and the garrisons. The war has caused the flight of nearly 3 million persons, and the government of Bakrak Karmal, installed by the Soviet Union, continues to face a veritable generalized uprising of the population.

A. B. Sayef, the president in office in the Afghan resistance fighters' fundamentalist union, has just declared that the latter will stop their "jihad" (holy war) only when an Islamic government is set up in Kabul. In spite of everything, Pakistan is continuing its activities with a view to a hypothetical political settlement, in the hope of promoting the repatriation of the 2.8 million refugees sheltered on its territory.

Surkhab--Surkhab, in the Pishin district of Baluchistan, at least some 100 kilometers from the frontier post of Chaman, accommodates undoubtedly one of the most impressive refugee camps in the world. On the edges of a valley with bare slopes, at times swept by sand winds, there extends over some 15 kilometers a succession of camps or rather villages sheltering 127,000 refugees!

"Newcomers" continue to arrive by family groups, coming mainly from the north and west of Afghanistan. They most often go to find members of the same tribe, paying allegiance to its chief(malik). Family solidarity and the Tissetainsi clan hierarchy, more than Islam, [serve] as the link between exile and the resistance. Here, the tents of the HCR [Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] serve as primary reception shelters, because the refugees have difficulty in becoming accustomed to them and quickly abandon them for traditional houses, surrounded by high walls, which they build with hard packed earth (the HCR now provides the wooden structure). Thus actual villages are formed, with their squares, "market" streets, mosques and, nearly everywhere, the flags of the resistance movements. There is even cultivation around some houses, a sign of a fierce determination to use to the utmost the few possibilities offered by this arid land.

According to Islamabad, the Afghan refugees continue to arrive at the rate of 30,000 to 50,000 per month. More or less in waves, each military operation by the Soviet forces is being followed by an exodus. From the 1978 "April revolution," which saw the fall of the Daoud republican regime, until the entry of Soviet troops, some 200,000 could be counted. The movement speeded up subsequently. With Rabelaisian precision, the Pakistani authorities announce an increased number of refugees each month--2.8 million at the beginning of December. But these figures, which are based on enrollments--which are not obligatory--in the registration centers, are the subject of controversy. Because it is according to these data that the aid allocations are fixed. To the extent that it requests international assistance, it is in the interest of the Islamabad government that these figures be as high as possible. The HCR, is currently calculating its budget estimates on the figure of 2.2 million.

Whatever the real number, it represents more than the population of many states. And nearly one-fifth that of Afghanistan!

We do not exaggerate when we speak of the greatest refugee community in the world. Three-quarters of the refugees are settled in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where they numbered more than 2 million at the beginning of December. Now the province has 13.3 million inhabitants (1881 census). The rest, about 600,000 persons, are scattered mainly along the border of the other frontier province, the vast territory of Baluchistan. If Pathans are in the majority in the NWFP camps, all ethnic-linguistic groups are found in those in Baluchistan: Baluchis, Pathans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras...<sup>1</sup>

From Chitral in the north of the country to the Iranian-Pakistani borders, all the way south of the long Pakistani-Afghan frontier, there are 300 camps, accommodating at least 5,000 refugees each. The Islamabad authorities try to set them up at least some 50 kilometers from the frontier, so as not to give Kabul any pretext for reprisals... For the comings and goings on both sides of a scarcely materialized dividing line are obviously uncontrollable. "The Afghans lay their arms down at the frontier," we are assured by the Pakistani director of a camp.

At Surkhab, as in the other camps we visit, the refugees--men or young men--jostle each other in order to give us their testimony about the raids into the interior of their country in which they have participated. The camps, at least those closest to the frontier, are looked on as rear bases where the resistance fighters come to rest and from where they periodically leave "to go shooting."

Several call out to us, to ask us more for arms than for food. There seem to be many men of fighting age in the camps, even though statistics indicate that on the average, children make up 46 percent and women 26 percent of their population, a fact which cannot but present serious problems to the aid organizers.

This proud and touchy people has no alternative but to rely on international assistance. Of the aid granted to the Afghan refugees, wheat--provided by



the World Food Program (WFP)--is the only type of aid distributed to them fairly regularly, at the rate, in principle, of 500 grams per head per day (Afghans traditionally eat this cereal, except for the privileged class, which also consumes rice). The other elements of the individual ration given by the HCR (sugar, tea, powdered milk, edible oil, cooking utensils, petroleum...) are allocated according to the state of the stocks! So that the food distributed under the heading of assistance rarely permits the attainment of the goal of 2,250 calories per inhabitant. As to the cash allowance, set at 350 francs per month per refugee family, this too is not paid regularly, simply because the Islamabad government does not have sufficient resources (in Baluchistan, it was paid only twice, at the rate of 50 rupees each time).

Lastly, while it was decided to supply, as far as possible, petroleum in order to replace firewood and relieve the pressure on the environment, the refugees seem to pay little attention to this. "They find it difficult to accustom themselves to using a fuel which is not within their traditions, preferring the traditional clay oven for cooking their wheat cakes," it is explained to us. The damage caused by the refugees and their herd--about 3 million head--to earth that is already tragically bare is striking: sometimes the tufts of grass have disappeared in a radius of 50 kilometers around the camps; the refugees tear out even the roots in order to find wood. Now, in these regions, several years are required in order to restore the plant cover. Some reforestation programs have also been started, both to mitigate the damage and give employment to the refugees.

Although the Afghans have extraordinary capacities for endurance, health conditions in the camps are, of course, marked by the socioeconomic conditions characteristic of them. The children seem generally in fairly good health but sometimes suffer from malnutrition, eye and skin diseases. Are vaccinations against cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid fever performed everywhere however? Aid by some nongovernmental organizations has helped to attend to the most urgent things first and to stop epidemics; stationary medical units are increasingly given way to mobile community clinics.<sup>2</sup> Everywhere, the HCR's tank trucks are bringing drinking water, which is subsequently stored in reservoirs where wells have not yet been drilled and pumps put in place, as at Surkhab.

Finally, despite the efforts made to provide schooling for the children, a tiny number (60,000 in June, with very few girls among them) attend the makeshift schools where predominantly religious education is provided by Afghan instructors.

The organization of assistance has entailed the setting up of a real administration--the Pakistani Commissionership for Afghan Refugees--with 7,000 employees. The staffing seems to be at a good level: the Islamabad government is responsible for receiving and distributing aid, the latter in collaboration with the governors of the two frontier provinces. Total outlays occasioned by the refugees are estimated at \$1 million per day. Pakistan guarantees that it will bear 45 percent, the HCR and the WFP 25 percent each; the rest represents Western and Moslem humanitarian aid.<sup>3</sup>

Some 10 nongovernmental organizations are operating in Pakistan, sometimes with some difficulties. On the other hand, Moslem aid, that of Saudi Arabia for example, is all the more welcome since it makes possible the payment of the allowance.

The HCR itself fills the role of coordinator of international assistance. In doing this, it verifies that the vital needs of the refugees are provided for and contributes especially to the setting up of a basic infrastructure in the refugee villages (water supply, establishment of schools, community clinics, etc.). In principle, it does not provide funds, but gives only material aid. In doing so, it covers, when everything is taken into account, a large part of the administrative costs.

The assistance, which initially was of an emergency nature, is gradually becoming permanent, as the flow of refugees continues. Owing to the fact that the principal infrastructures are now in place in the camps, HCR funds have decreased slightly, from \$97 million in 1982 to \$74 million in 1983. Nearly half of these sums are provided by the United States, one-quarter by the EEC as such, the rest by the FRG, Japan and Denmark, etc. As for WFP food aid, this was estimated at \$98 million in 1982, with 50 percent guaranteed by the United States, the rest by the EEC and its member states, Australia, Canada and Japan. In brief, the major humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees is coming from the United States. "It is a way of helping resistance...politically," some observers affirm.

#### Logistic Difficulties and Tensions

The distribution of aid--especially wheat--particularly that making use of the single-track railroads from Karachi, whose port does not have adequate installations, to Quetta, located at an altitude of 1,500 meters, and Peshawar, at the bottom of the Himalayan foothills, creates considerable logistic difficulties. And these can explain the delays occurring sometimes in the distribution of aid. Hundreds of freight cars and trucks are mobilized for these operations every day!

Are there not "losses in cargo," petty theft, during these operations? In a country where there has been a considerable increase in corruption in the last few years, would there not be innumerable intermediaries trying to deduct their "commission," in passing, on the transit of international aid? Who would object to having sacks of wheat depart for Afghanistan by truck or on the backs of donkeys? But it is not uncommon to find HCR vehicles or tents in the Pakistani public services.

Doesn't cohabitation by refugees and Pakistanis also present a problem? "In some frontier zones," states Alain Coat, an HCR official in the NWFP, "the number of refugees is higher than that of the local inhabitants, and the Pakistani authorities find themselves obliged to recommend transferring the refugees to the interior of the country. The absorption of several tens of thousands of potential workers by the job market runs the risk of producing, in the long term, if this is not yet the case, significant socio-economic imbalances."

## A Question of Settlement

For the time being, it is rather remarkable that the frictions have not been more serious.

But the fact that the refugees sometimes have paid activities raises some questions of principle. Should they work in order to be self-sufficient or should they depend only on an assistance which cannot, when all is said and done, constitute a minimum level of subsistence? In carrying this reasoning further: is it necessary to give them vocational training courses to enable them to work and thus reduce aid expenditures? Actually, this debate is somewhat academic. Because of the freedom of movement allowed to the refugees, a large number of them do not hesitate to go to Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi to look for work. Small trades, the supports of all community life, proliferate in most of the camps. And smuggling also prospers thanks to the war. The HCR, for its part, hesitates to become involved in development operations which could promote the settlement, indeed the integration, of the refugees in the receiving country. The agreement of its administrative council was needed in the decision to encourage the manufacture of carpets, in which, unfortunately, children are employed.

Would transferring the camps to the interior relieve the pressure on the frontier regions? The transfer of some camps further to the interior would raise the same problems. And the people of the Punjab, where the authorities have considered installing some camps, have not welcomed this initiative. Indeed, for very understandable reasons, the Afghan refugees wish to remain as close as possible to their country. Only the members of an elite that has been westernized or has at least passed through the German and French secondary schools in Kabul, among others, are besieging the consulates in order to leave for abroad. The result is that there are perhaps as many French as there are Afghan doctors with the resistance. We even meet, in exile, officers who are deserters from the Afghan Army! Some Afghans are not far from seeing "abdication" in this "brain drain." In this respect, even if the Arab Moslem countries willingly accept Afghan officers, they do not practice an open door policy with regard to the refugees.

On the other hand, this summer, Turkey welcomed 4,300 Kirghiz (a branch of the Turkoman people, speaking Turkish and formerly engaged in cattle-raising, of yaks, in particular, in the Wakhrum corridor--small Pamir--sealed off in 1980 by the USSR). The majority of these nomads, responding to their chief Rahman Gul, had a bone to pick with Soviet guards and preferred to leave the territory. Their transfer, by air, without any fuss, was the first of Afghan refugees coming from Afghanistan.

The refugees will continue to enter Pakistan as long as the war in Afghanistan goes on. International aid indeed relieves the Islamabad government and stabilizes the refugee problem to some extent. Would the refugees go back home if the assistance stopped? However vital the latter may be, Pakistani officials nonetheless fear a Palestinian-type evolution even if the question does not in any way present itself in the same terms.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The number of refugees in Iran is not known, as the HCR has not been able to conduct a survey there and Teheran has not asked for international aid.
2. At Surkhab, the International Association Against Hunger (IAAH).
3. Pakistan would need tents, plastic sheets, basic construction materials, vehicles for transport including water and gas, ambulances, medical equipment, drugs, clothing...

9434

CSO: 4619/11

SOVIET ARMY EXPERIENCING BREACHES OF DISCIPLINE

Firing on Afghan Soldiers

Colombo SUN in English 30 Dec 82 p 5

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Dec. 29, (Reuter)--Soviet and Afghan Forces mistakenly fired on each other and security checks caused traffic jams during a massive operation to stop guerrilla attacks in Kabul, Western diplomats reported yesterday in neighbouring Pakistan.

They said security precautions launched in the days leading up to Monday's third anniversary of the Moscow-backed coup which brought Afghan President Babrak Karmal to power, were the most severe since Soviet troops arrived in Afghanistan.

The diplomats said intelligence reports were still awaited on the outcome of planned guerrilla sabotage and assassination raids on the Afghan capital on Monday.

Three days ago four Soviet soldiers were found dead in an empty building near Kabul Airport after apparently being lured there by resistance supporters. The diplomats also said a local Communist Party official was assassinated in the same area.

On Christmas Day Soviet and Afghan government soldiers exchanged fire in a Kabul suburb near the airport where many Soviet advisers live, the diplomats said.

The gunbattle broke out when the Soviets mistook the government troops for Moslem guerrillas. A number of Government troops were killed or wounded.

Uzbek Deserters Helping Guerrillas

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 30 Dec 82 p 4

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Dec. 29--Soviet soldiers from the Moslem Republic of Uzbek helped Moslem guerrillas attack a second major airfield in Afghanistan last week, western Diplomats reported yesterday.

The Diplomats said there was extensive damage to parked aircraft and airport buildings during the raid on the Baghram airfield North of the Afghan capital Kabul.

They said Uzbek soldiers guarding the base guided the guerrillas through minefields around the airfield perimeter.

Afghan guerrillas groups have reported growing support in Soviet Moslem republics bordering Afghanistan.

Earlier this year travellers returning from the soviet Afghan border said guerilla groups claimed to have distributed thousands of their membership cards inside republics.

The diplomats said the exact date of the attack was unclear but it appeared to coincide with a raid on Jalalabad, a major base for air operations against guerrilla infiltration routes on the border.

Baghram airfield is also important in the fight against guerrillas, helicopters from the base provide cover for convoys from the soviet union to Kabul.

The airfield, housing many soviet pilots, was extensively used earlier this year for air raids against guerrilla concentrations in the Panjsher valley, a major resistance stronghold north of Kabul and the base for many sabotage raids on Kabul.

CSO: 4600/193

BOTH SIDES SUFFERING FROM FORTUNES OF WAR

Setbacks for Rebels

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] (AFP, UPI)--On the third anniversary of the Soviet intervention, the Kabul authorities launched a tremendous operation to thwart any rebel action in the capital. Regular forces were doubled, according to a rebel spokesman in Peshawar.

Moreover, three Afghans accused of providing information to the U.S. Embassy were arrested. It was also learned in Peshawar that members of tribes from the province of Paktia had demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs last week against new legislative measures which no longer exempt them from military service as under the monarchy. On the other hand, very few Afghans--only 13 according to reports from New Delhi--protested in front of the USSR Embassy on Sunday 26 December, as they have each year since the arrival of the Soviet troops.

According to the authorities, attacks attributed to the rebels have caused 40 deaths in Kabul since the beginning of the month. On Wednesday 22 December, the rebels also successfully carried out an attack on the **Jalalabad airport**, between the capital and the Pakistani border. The rebel press agency maintained that four tanks and two helicopters had been damaged.

However, the rebels have admitted that they have recently recorded several failures, especially in the north of Afghanistan, and that they are presently experiencing problems with weapons and ammunition supplies. On 18 December, Soviet troops surrounded a group of soldiers in the Zhargun region (province of Khunduz) and the commander of the group was killed.

In the Logar region, to the south of Kabul, about 60 rebels were captured. Afghan radio indicated that groups of "bandits" (the term used by the authorities and by Moscow to designate the insurgents) had been wiped out and large quantities of arms and ammunition seized in **Badakhshan** in the northeast of the country.

The Afghan head of state, who had gone to Moscow at the head of a large government delegation to participate in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's founding, returned to Kabul Saturday night, 25 December.

Finally, the Iranian and Pakistani ministers of the interior met in Islamabad on Sunday and discussed the problems posed by Afghan refugees crossing the border between the two countries.

#### Ordeals of Civilians

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] The following account has come to us from Dr Antoine Lafont, who has just visited Afghanistan on behalf of a medical assistance organization.

The military aspect of the guerilla war is in the forefront and is distracting attention from the real target: the Afghan civilian population.

The Soviets have adapted their strategy very quickly by applying Mao's saying that "the guerilla is like a fish in water." In order to catch it, you must therefore remove the water. In this case, the civilian population must be targeted in order to reach the soldiers.

The civilian population is the object of a threefold aggression:

-Above all: intimidation in the form of massive attacks on villages, torture and the assumed use of chemical weapons (suspicious wounds) and "antipersonnel" bombs, resulting in significant losses of human lives and an exodus from the villages to the mountains. These terrorist maneuvers are also directed toward French medical teams; country hospitals in particular have been bombed;

-On the other hand, the Soviet infiltration of the population has been achieved through extensive study of differences between families, ethnic groups, parties, and religious groups which cause provocations and lead to rifts;

-Finally, the food problem is arousing the greatest concern. The 9 to 10 million Afghans still in Afghanistan are insidiously but systematically threatened by famine in the short or middle term. Proof of this is the deliberate destruction of grain fields in the Kunduz, Faryab, Mazari-Sharif, Baghlan, Ghor, Bamian, Badakhshan, Herat, Kandahar, Logar, Parwan, Nangarhar and Ghazni regions during the harvests by fire bombs; and, similarly, the irrigation systems and storage areas. The 1982 harvest is estimated at 50 percent of the 1978 harvest. Live-stock have been decimated by "antipersonnel" bombs.

In the face of this domestic food shortage, outside contributions are not sufficient because they are not enough; are difficult to transport, especially in the winter, and are often destroyed by bombardments during transport.



This threefold aggression is having serious consequences. Famine threatens the civilian population and malnutrition is striking the children in particular. Between 1979 and 1981 the increase in the prices of basic food staples remained moderate. But, in 1982, prices flared up.

For example, in the Kabul area the price of 7 kilograms of flour, a basic food element, increased from 80 afghanis in 1980 to 100 the following year and to 180 in 1982. At the same time, the Afghan currency remained relatively stable with the dollar rising from 45 afghanis in 1980 to 63 in 1982.

The economic disruption is accelerating the process of pauperization, especially in the provinces of Logar, Ghazni and Bamian where peasants are obliged to sell their lands to survive and are subsequently abandoning them, with the flow of refugees in search of food and fleeing bomb attacks swelling.

Children who died of cold and exhaustion have been found in the snow in Logar.

So, while the West is dozing, the Afghan people are the victims of a silent but effective, massive and indirect extermination. The year 1982 is showing the first results of this process which was set in motion from the beginning of the Soviet invasion.

Geography and the people's self-sacrificing attitude are two key advantages; but for how long?

#### Attacks on Soviet Air Bases

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Dec 82 p 8

[Text] (AFP, UPI, REUTERS, TASS)--Three years after the beginning of the Soviet military intervention in December 1979, the fighting seems to be intensifying in violence in several areas of the country. According to Afghan rebels and to Western diplomatic sources in Kabul and Islamabad, rebels recently attacked the two air bases of Bagram, near the Afghan capital, and Jallalabad, not far from the Pakistani border. Also according to the same sources, Soviet soldiers of Uzbek origin--a Soviet Republic with a Moslem majority--are said to have helped the assailants to enter one of the bases by skirting the mine fields and some Soviet deserters of the Moslem faith were already said to be fighting with the rebels. Soviet and government losses of men and equipment were said to be large.

On the other hand, Soviets and Afghan regulars are continuing their operations against the rebels in the province of Kunar near Pakistan. Losses on both sides are said to be serious.

To the north of Kabul, in the Shamali region, fighting between rival rebel factions--pitting supporters of Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Hezbi Islami against the coalition headed by Messrs Mujaddedi's and Gilani's Jamiat Islami--is said to have caused 24 deaths over the last 6 weeks.

On Tuesday, Soviets and Afghan government members had denounced American policy in Afghanistan. Citing the "confessions" of a former American Embassy guard in Kabul arrested in February, Mr Mohammad Esa, the Afghan press accused American diplomats of having supplied guns, mines and bombs to the "rebels." The Americans termed these accusations as "without basis." As for IZVESTIA, it wrote that: "American Embassy officials in Kabul are grossly interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs by controlling assassins, saboteurs and bandits."

In Moscow, Mr Vladimir Petrovsky, a member of the Soviet delegation to the last UN General Assembly, also accused Washington of using the issue of Afghanistan "not to arrive at a political settlement in this area, but rather to inflame passions in order to pursue its interference in the internal affairs of this nation."

#### Pressures for New Government

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Dec 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Afghanistan Three Years Later"]

[Text] The Soviet intervention has been a failure. The new leadership in Moscow should "take the opportunities which the new year will not fail to offer to reach a solution in Afghanistan." This is what Mr Reagan said on the third anniversary of the invasion on 26 December. The United States, he said, will continue to support the Afghan people's struggle for their freedom. As for Bonn and Rome, they stressed the need to seek a political solution to the conflict, while in Peking the PEOPLE'S DAILY repeated that "the Soviet aggression is an important step in their strategy to dominate the world."

These stands, like the UN vote which has just condemned it again, this time by 114 to 21 with 13 abstentions, do not seem to sway the Soviet Union any more than the political and diplomatic pressure of the Western nations.

The assurance the Soviet Union is demonstrating is probably due to the fact that the ratio of forces on the field is not unfavorable to it. Despite their determination, the rebels do not have the organization or the firepower which they would need to shake the Red Army. The fact remains that although the Red Army "holds" the cities and the major road networks, at least for the moment, it is still far from having placed the country under its control. And this is probably why, to believe Washington, the Soviets are continuing to reinforce their military apparatus.

Rebel divisions are facilitating Moscow's game. Some Islamic fundamentalist movements dream of establishing an Iranian-style regime in Kabul. The most moderate hope to restore the monarchy, while rebel leaders are gaining more and more influence in the interior. No "valid spokesman" is emerging at present and attempts at political settlement through the United Nations are still faltering. Nevertheless, Pakistan is going along with them. Indeed, it feels

the presence of 3 million Afghan refugees in its territory as a "burden" and fears that a radicalization of the struggle for liberation would eventually lead to an extension of the conflict. The fact remains that General Zia Ul Haq's regime so far has profited from the Soviet intervention nonetheless, to the extent that it has enabled it to catch its breath and to benefit from the economic and military support of the United States.

Is the Kremlin really inclined to go along with a political settlement, especially in view of the problems which "pacification" of a country which neither Russia nor England had previously been able to subjugate is encountering and of the extent of the losses, which in all probability are quite high? Mr Andropov's arrival had aroused hope of a more "political" approach to the Afghan problem. For the moment, the attitude of the new Soviet team is more like "old wine in a new bottle." The honors bestowed on Mr Karmal, who owes everything to the Soviet Army, seem to indicate that for the present Moscow has no alternative solution. It is indeed possible that some Soviet leaders are concerned about the consequences of the intervention in Afghanistan and want to prevent their country from being trapped there. However, it is obvious that the USSR does not envisage a settlement which would not enable it to maintain its influence in Kabul and in a region of Asia which is of vital strategic interest to it. Under these conditions it would be wrong to expect a solution in the near future.

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CSO: 4619/16

## AFGHANISTAN

### FIRST WESTERN REPORTER VISITS HAZARAJAT AREA

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 23 Dec 82 pp 1, 14

[Article by Christer Lundgren: "First Western Journalist Visits Central Afghanistan"]

[Text] "It is a different kind of war. The enemy is not within reach. There are few bombings. Instead one fights with agents, political parties, and economic tactics."

This is told by Lena Poolma, the first western journalist to report from Hazarajat. After the beginning of the new year, she will write about her trip in articles in GNISTAN.

The central parts of Afghanistan, called Hazarajat, differ in many ways from the rest of Afghanistan. The population has a different ethnic background, and differ in appearance, language, culture, and religion from the other inhabitants in the country.

There is a trait of mutual friendship, sometimes heightened to contempt, between the hazaras and their countrymen. Such difficulties have, however, had to take second place after the Soviet invasion.

#### Iranian Influence

But the problem in Hazarajat is still different.

"The six parties that have their headquarters in Peshawar have hardly any influence in Hazarajat," says Lena Poolma. "But there are four parties that have ties with Iran. The most aggressive party is Nasr, a fundamentalist Shia-Muslim party, that in a military fashion fights other organisations. Ommat, an underground organisation said to have close ties with the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party in Iran, works within Nasr."

Lena visited Jaghori in the Ghazni province together with members of the United National Front, an opposition organisation that had a delegation in Sweden earlier this year (see GNISTAN issue nr. 20/82). The Front belongs to the "internal opposition," that is those organisations that are not recognized or supported in Pakistan or Iran.

"The Front is not a countrywide organisation, but it is widespread in many places and strong in parts of Hazarajat, for example, in Jaghori, which I visited."

#### Disunity Exploited

During the two weeks Lena spent in Jaghori, she, among other things, carefully investigated the economic situation of the farmers.

"Many of them have had to mortgage their land, and they cannot repay their loans as they can no longer make extra money from jobs in the cities. This means that the creditors, who are mostly businessmen, will take over the land within two years."

These economical and political difficulties are exploited by the Soviet Union. Through agents and infiltrators they know quite well how to act to have a certain control of the situation without the use of military resources.

"Two weeks before I arrived in Jaghori, the United National Front's positions in the neighboring village of Qarabagh were attacked by forces belonging to Nasr. At the same time Soviet helicopters attacked. According to certain reports, they used gas in the attack, which was carried out with great precision although the positions were well camouflaged. Nasr's own positions, which were rather open, were not attacked by the helicopters, which points to an organized effort."

"That episode occurred shortly after a popular election had shown that the United National Front has very strong support. But the Front felt that one should not spill blood in such fights and retreated."

#### Private Murders

Lena also visited Dar-e-Pich (the Pich valley) in the Kunar province in the company of representatives of the local Jirgan,

that is the traditional district administration. This is an area that does not belong to Hazarajat, but even there there are political difficulties.

"It is the six parties in Peshawar, particularly Hezb-e-Islami, that have created the opposition by assaulting their opponents, murdering and raiding. But the local Jirgan, that is the civil administration, has taken control over all the opposition forces in the area, and the death penalty has been proclaimed for private murders and one also burns the home of the murderer. It is also prohibited to make propaganda for political parties. Arguments about land and cattle are to be settled by Jirgan. This way one has managed to reinstate civil order, and people can now move around outside without the fear of being shot or having one's gun stolen."

This purge was so effective that a delegation arrived from the Nuristan district to be advised about how they could do the same.

#### Support from the Outside

"On the whole, the conflict between the six Peshawar parties and the opposition organisations has intensified inside the country," Lena emphasizes. "Maybe it is not altogether bad, because it is an indication that the opposition movement inside the country is getting stronger."

"The internal opposition is founded on the fight inside the country, while the six parties are based on support from outside the country--and sometimes use it to knock down rivals within the country. The help from the outside is absorbed by these parties, and many consider the splintering these parties cause the greatest problem."

"Among the six parties it is Hezb-e-Islami that most openly and directly sabotages the campaign. Much indicates that that organization also has a certain cooperation with the Russians."

"One is now beginning to understand in the West that the really important opposition is inside the country, and the six parties see the risk on their foundation--foreign support--being pulled away."

9843

CSO: 3650/87

## AFGHANISTAN

### EMIGRE WRITERS DESCRIBE CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN KABUL

#### Soviet Occupation

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French No 11, Dec 82 p 10

[Interview with unidentified Kabul resident by J. P. R., in October 1982 in Afghanistan]

[Text] In October, we met a Kabul resident in Afghanistan. Here is his testimonial and analysis.

[Question] What is the state of provisioning in the capital?

[Answer] Provisioning of goods is adequate but the prices have greatly increased. For example, a "ser" (7 kg) of charcoal cost between 12 and 20 afghanis before the Soviet invasion; now one must pay between 18 and 140 afghanis. To give another example, bottled gas from Pakistan can no longer be obtained but the Soviets provide fuel at a very moderate price--8 afghanis a liter (less than 1 French franc). Bakeries no longer heat their ovens with wood but use fuel.

Another very important phenomenon is the development of the black market. The Soviet soldier sells anything he gets his hands on: petroleum, kerosene, equipment, windows, doors, military camp spigots, cables, generators, canned food and automobile parts. I even saw--which will seem unbelievable to you--an armored troop transport vehicle for sale; I looked at the odometer--just over 1,000 km. The largest black market center is located just opposite "Afghans Stores."

[Question] Has the USSR made an effort at urban development?

[Answer] Obviously, because the Soviets only control the center of the city. I only know of one project that has been carried out--an underground walkway for pedestrians. However, it was a long-standing project. It was inaugurated last year with great fanfare. To spread their propaganda, the Russians set up a "House of Soviet Books" in a

shop near the bazar guard post. This store was attacked and destroyed in March 1980. Since then, a grill has been placed across it and street vendors hung children's old clothing on it.

[Question] How has life in Kabul changed since the Soviet invasion?

[Answer] The most important change remains the arrival of the rural population from the surrounding areas. The population may have doubled because of this massive influx. Many recently arrived people become street merchants which is only a form of disguised unemployment.

The second phenomenon is the development of a group of civil servants, many of whom are informers, spies paid from 3,000 to 6,000 afghanis a month (1 afghani is approximately 10 centimes). There are approximately 50,000 people working for the KHAD, the secret police, the equivalent of the KGB [Committee for State Security]. Among other things, this intelligence service uses young women who accost provincial types and offer them alcohol to get information from them.

Finally, the role of television must be mentioned; it has become a very important propaganda weapon for the government. However, doctored pictures are used which are not always very well done. Thus, to enhance the importance of a meeting, pictures of an earlier meeting which attracted more people will be used. Very often, television viewers realize the trickery and deride the stupidity of the system. Moreover, people seek other sources of information like The Voice of Iran and the BBC.

Since January 1982, I have only intercepted Radio Free Kabul three times: the first time for 3 days, the second time for a week and the third time for another week, right before the May offensive in the Panjshir. However, Radio Free Kabul can be better intercepted in the villages around Kabul. This independent information is very important for us.

[Question] What is the government's attitude toward religious freedom?

[Answer] Freedom of the press has disappeared as well as freedom to demonstrate. Freedom of movement remains very limited because of the attacks of the Mujahidin, controls and the round-up of adults for army service. The government is trying to reconcile itself to religion and claims to be the reformer of religion by seeking to limit it as a purely individual matter. Thus, it is trying to gradually wipe out the legal and collective aspects of Islam.

[Question] What is the strength of the resistance?

[Answer] It is difficult to evaluate because there is some confusion between the settling of scores by rival Khalq-Parcham factions and the people's resistance operations. Many of the latter are ineffective



because of the amateurish quality of the equipment used. The Mujahidin would like to have bombs or remote-controlled explosives, instead of bombs that must be set by hand. However, even in Kabul, guard posts are attacked, in general by small groups of from three to five men with no connection to each other.

Two feelings motivate the people. On one hand, it is deeply opposed to this puppet government: even old women in the bus insult Karmal's government. On the other hand, it is disheartened by the general weakness of the great powers. We did not like the French-Soviet gas pipeline project or the sale of wheat to the USSR by the United States. I think that this attitude of the Western powers can perhaps be explained by a desire to help the Soviets find an honorable, negotiated settlement to the Afghan problem.

[Question] Can we contemplate a solution to the war in Afghanistan?

[Answer] I believe there are three ways to answer this question.

If the Russians are only in Afghanistan because of its internal situation, they will try to withdraw in an honorable manner. Indeed, their intervention is costing them more all the time because the resistance is increasingly better organized and determined.

If the Soviet invasion was motivated by regional considerations, to weaken Pakistan by stirring up the Baluchis, or even getting an option on Iran after Khomeini's death, then the war will be prolonged with the Russians trapped in the Moslem quicksand. The aging Communist ideology in fact has little chance of winning, faced with the renewal of militant Islam.

Finally, if the Soviets are in Afghanistan as part of a world strategy, for example to control the petroleum supply lines to Europe and the United States, any move forward by the USSR will make Afghanistan (this new Munich) a battlefield--with others--in an international conflict with incalculable risks.

#### Dissention in 'Government'

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French No 11, Dec 82 p 11

[Article by E.G.]

[Text] Important changes have been made in the government staff charts during the entire summer.

On 28 August 1982, Agriculture Minister Fazl Rahim Mohmand was thanked and sent back to his initial place of work, the statistics department. To our knowledge, at least before the 1978 coup d'etat, he was not a member of the communist party. He was replaced by Abdul Ghaffar Lakanwal, former second deputy minister of agriculture.

On 12 September 1982, it was the turn of the Minister of Higher Education Gol Dad and the Minister of Information and Culture (in other words, propaganda) 'Abdol Majid Sarbuland, both deputy prime ministers, to be sacked. Control of the media was given directly to Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand, and responsibility for higher education was given to Sarwar Mangal, formerly deputy minister of the same ministry. The Ministry of Culture was abolished.

On 24 September 1982, General Rafi was definitively removed from defense and became deputy prime minister. General Qader, who had already taken over temporarily, assumed command of the army.

Only a member of the inner circle can interpret these various changes. We may simply think that the prime minister's power has been extended, in line with statements by his former spokesman, now a refugee, who stated on 10 September 1982 that Soltan Ali Keshtmand was trying to recruit the most personal supporters within the governmental departments.

Other high level changes also occurred, especially in the army which often exacerbated tensions between the two Parcham and Khalq factions of the ruling party. This was particularly true of the removal of General Gol Aqa, political head of the army. This event reportedly was the reason for the shooting in early August 1982 right in the presidential palace between high ranking members of the Khalq and the Parcham. Reportedly this incident left at least six dead.

The rivalry between the Khalq and the Parcham is also very acute at the university. It was said to be the cause of the death on 16 March 1982 of Rector Aziz-or Rahman Saydi and his two assistants, all three Khalqis opposed to the Soviet control of education. The new rector, Assadollah Habib, appointed on 17 May 1982, is a personal friend of Babrak Karmal and known to be pro-Soviet (according to the Afghan Information Center.)

Generally, everyone agrees that the Karmal government officials are increasingly overtaken by the events. President Karmal himself displays the malaise especially; he continues to spend long periods in the USSR for health reasons. His last trip abroad lasted over a month. He left on 19 May 1982 for the GDR and stayed in the USSR from 25 May to 24 June 1982.

#### Fate of Political Prisoners

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French No 11, Dec 82 p 11

[Article by E. G.]

[Text] A four-person delegation from the CICR [International Red Cross Committee] arrived in Kabul on 14 August 1982 to talk with authorities about possible resumption of its humanitarian work in this country. It

visited several hospitals in the city. On 24 August 1982, it was able to visit the Pol-e Charkhi prison. The members, among them a doctor, were able to speak freely and without witnesses with some prisoners.

In other information coming directly from Kabul, we can read about the transfer of many prisoners from block one to block three. Only block one, cleaned and uncrowded, could reportedly be visited by the CICR (memories of Nazi Germany). The Afghan Information and Documentation Center in its August 1982 issue published information obtained from an officer who recently took refuge in Pakistan. He said that supposedly there were 5,200 prisoners in blocks one, two and three of Pol-e Charkhi prison, located about 10 km from Kabul on the Jalalabad road; we published a picture of it in our issue number eight. It is said that each night about 10 prisoners are led to a place called the Polygon to be executed. It was there that executions were carried out at the height of the terror unleashed by Hafizollah Amin.

Members of the resistance organizations like the Harekat-e-Engelab-e Eslami and the Hezb-e Eslami were said to have been mistreated and occasionally tortured as were members of the Shola-e Jawid faction of the Afghan left.

According to a spokesman from the Afghan Information Center, former cabinet members of the governments of Taraka and Amin are still alive but held in solitary confinement.

On 25 May 1982, the prisoners of Pol-e Charkhi revolted. In reprisal, five were reported to have been executed.

There are no Soviet soldiers in the prison but civilian "advisers". There are many other detention centers in Kabul. The most famous are the headquarters of the secret police (the KHAD) and the Ministry of the Interior building. Each district in Kabul is said to have about five or six such places.

In early April 1982, it was announced that the police of the KHAD had arrested eight professors from the University of Kabul, among them Professor Kakar, former head of the mathematics department in the School of Sciences, and former rector Fazl-Rabbi Pajwak, brother of Abdor-Rahman Pajwak, writer and diplomat, former president of the United Nations General Assembly who had just joined the resistance.

#### Defection of Soviet Soldiers

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French No 11, Dec 82 p 12

[Article by E.G.]

[Text] Information remains fragmentary on the state of mind of the Soviets fighting in Afghanistan and about the repercussions of the war in the Soviet Union itself. However, evidence published by the clandestine press finally reaches beyond the borders. Thus, you can read below about the Lithuanian reaction to the Afghan war. The

American weekly magazine NEWSWEEK published a report (2 August 1982) on the impact of the war in Afghanistan in Soviet Tajikistan. This article, which got its author Mr Andrew Nagorski expelled from the USSR, stressed the profound impact of the conflict on the young people in the region. "All over Tajikistan, the war in Afghanistan is first an emotional matter. The Tajiks live on both sides of the border and the Soviets have proportionally sent a larger number of them to fight in Afghanistan. Figures on the losses are kept secret but according to the caretaker of the four cemeteries of Duchambe, one or two caskets come each month from Afghanistan. The Tajiks for the most part accept the Soviet reasons for the war but they go into battle unwillingly because of the faith they share."

An increasing number of Soviets have been taken prisoner by the Afghan resistance. Recently, about 12 Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner in the Panjshir. Two recent captive soldiers were turned over to the International Red Cross Committee which transferred them to Switzerland.

There are currently five Soviet prisoners in Switzerland. One tried to escape because he feared his fate on his return to his country after his detention.

Other Soviets have deliberately decided to fight with the Afghan resistance. Even though their number is small, the fact is of great importance. Several cases have been duly attested--such as that of Sakharov Anatoliy Mikhaylovich (19 years old) who went over to the Afghan Hezb-e Eslami and converted to Islam. Miko Vavaryan, from Armenia, who also converted to Islam, entered the ranks of the Jamiat-e Eslami after fleeing his regiment following a dispute with his commander. He said soldiers of ethnic minorities keep to themselves and do not associate with the Russians.

These few testimonials are not enough to evaluate the morale of the Soviet troops; however, they support the Afghan Mujahidin's often-expressed impression that generally they face, even in the elite units, poorly motivated soldiers.

9479

CSO: 4619/20

RESULTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDIES REPORTED

Expediting Economic Growth

Part I

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 14 Dec 82 p2

[Text] The major duty of our revolutionary party and government in the economic field, with reliance on and the support and participation of the large masses of the people, consists of fighting to eliminate economic underdevelopment, expediting the process of national economic growth and, on this basis, raising the level of material and cultural life of all the people of Afghanistan.

Making revolutionary changes in economic and social areas is among the major duties of our revolutionary party and government in an effort to eliminate underdevelopment. The government of the DRA, under the leadership of the PDPA, is constantly trying to put an end to the long enduring underdevelopment and lack of long-term growth in the country by raising the level of growth of the productive forces and expediting the process of economic growth.

Based on its guiding and regulating role, our revolutionary government constantly makes scientific and organized plans and takes other practical measures to attain this great goal.

Despite the undeclared and imposed war of imperialism, during the first six months of the current year, through the active participation of the working masses, the indicators show that the plan for the period 21 March 1982-20 March 1983 has successfully strengthened the interests of national economic growth. The statistics indicate that these successes are growing from quarter to quarter and year to year.

The evidence shows that during the past six months, the plan for the period 21 March 1982-20 March 1983 has resulted in relative growth as compared to the same period last year. However, the plan for the second quarter has been even more successful than that of the first quarter.

In the agricultural sector, during the first six months, the planting of various crops conformed to the projections 100 percent and in proportion to the cultivated area, has shown an increase of .5 percent. Grain has been sown on 3.37 million hectares, which includes wheat on 2,325,400 hectares. The planting of green vegetables and garden variety plants has been carried out at a rate 4.5 percent higher than the projected plan and the planting of fruit has been 100 percent in accordance with the plan, showing an increase of .4 percent over the figures for the previous year. The production of wheat, vegetables and garden variety plants and fruits, including grapes, has shown an increase of 4 percent, 5.2 percent, and .8 percent respectively over that of the previous year. Citrus and olive output, as compared to last year, has increased 28.4 and 5.3 percent respectively.

With the use of 115 active tractors and machinery available, the mechanized agricultural project has been able to carry on various agricultural activities during the first six months, which, compared to the activities of the first six months of last year, have increased 13 percent. During this period, the amount of chemical fertilizer distributed has increased by 5 percent and the distribution of various plant and animal chemicals by 70 percent in comparison with the same period last year. Veterenary services in various research areas and the service and treatment of animals and poultry have expanded in the government and private sectors. In carrying out these services, there has been an increase of 36 percent as compared to last year.

In the first half of this year, 3.4 million doses of animal vaccine were produced in the various laboratories, which is 300,000 doses more than that produced during the same period last year.

Activities in regards to regulating water in the provinces of the country, cleaning the canals, the construction of dams, collecting hydrological statistics and cooperation with farmers concerning the formation of farmers' committees have been positively carried out throughout the country.

The production plan in the governmental and mixed sectors of mines, industries and energy included 43 kinds of products, the total value of which at current prices shows an increase of 3.7 percent compared to the first six months of last year, of which 3.3 percent is due to the production increase in the second quarter.

The production value of the products of 14 major indicators projected by the council of ministers, based on the prices for the current year, show an increase of 3.6 percent over the first six months of last year. The amount of coal produced in the

period reported has been varified at 103.9 percent of the projected plan, showing an increase of 8 percent in ratio to the real production of the first six months of last year, of which 7 percent belongs to the second quarter of the year.

During the first six months of the current year, the total amount of deep drilling increased by 124 percent, exploratory drilling by 112 percent and recovery drilling by 157 percent, following the plan. Seismographic operations by the (O.K.T.) method were carried out at an increased rate of 6 percent over that of the first six months plan.

The figures for the production of chemical fertilizer have been varified at 104.7 percent of the projected plan for the first half of the year. Of the completed plan, 105.3 percent belongs to the second quarter.

The figure for construction iron production is equivalent to the figure for the production of the first six months of last year. As a result of the regulated and increased transfer of cement, the plan for production in the second quarter has been varified at 125.5 percent.

Following the plan, the production of carded cotton has increased 3 percent over the projected amount in the first six months of the year.

#### Increased Economic Activities

#### Part II

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 15 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Barman]

[Text] In the course of the first half of the year, 18.56 million meters of cotton fabric and 86,000 meters of woolen fabric have been produced. This amount of woolen fabric shows an increase of 28 percent over that of the same period last year.

During the period in question, the production of wheat flour has been varified at 5.4 percent over the amount in the projected plan, which, compared to a similar period last year, shows an increase of 5.1 percent.

Following the plan for meat production in the Kabul slaughterhouse, the attainment of 117.5 percent of the projected output of the six-month plan shows an increase of 14.7 percent compared to the first six months of the previous year. The production of chicken, along with the increase in the above-mentioned areas of production, has been effective in stabilizing the price of meat in the city of Kabul.

Electrical power production in the first six months of the current year has increased by 9.2 percent compared to the first six months of the previous year. A transformer with the capacity of 25 megawatts is scheduled to begin operations in Kheyrkhaneh, Mineh, as soon as possible.

In order to expand the industries of the government sector and encourage, support and soundly expand the private sector of the national economy, the establishment of 35 small and medium-sized quick yield industrial projects, especially in the industries for the production of perishable items and foodstuff, was slated for the first six months of the year with a capital investment of 498 million afghanis, which is more than three times the planned amount, the establishment stage of which is now underway. With the completion and start of the operations of these facilities, work will be made available for 2,119 persons. In addition, during the reported period, 19 projects with an initial investment of 82 million afghanis have recently begun operations and the grounds have been prepared for reactivating the "Rahmani" textile project.

In the transportation and communications sector, the volume of transportation during this period has increased by two and three-tenths times in comparison to the first six months of last year.

The plans for the transportation of passengers and transportation activities have reached 108 and 104 percent respectively during the last six months. The relative increase of passenger transportation and transportation activities has been varified at 136.6 percent and 154.9 percent on the international lines.

In the communications sector, the volume of communication services, comparing the prices of the period 21 March 1978-20 March 1979 to those of the first six months of the period 21 March 1981-20 March 1982, has increased by about 8 percent. The revenues from international communications and telexes have reached the level of the period 21 March 1978-20 March 1979 and in the telegraph revenues there has been an increase of 12 percent. This is the result of the assistance and cooperation of the friendly country of the Soviet Union in the area of the expansion of international telephone and telegraph communications with the Ministry of Communications.

In the social services sector, during the first six months, short wave radio and television programs have conformed to the plan 96.4 percent and 100 percent respectively. The conformity to the plan in the artistic, documentary and news film section has been evaluated at 146.2 percent. The figures arrived at concerning the indicators for categorized products show that during the period reported, production increased by 7.2 percent over the projected amount.



The number of students in the institutions of the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education, who were taken in at the beginning of the academic year, shows a 5 percent increase over last year. The evaluation of the figures of the first half of the period 21 March 1982-20 March 1983 in three institutions of higher education (Puhenton Kabul, Nangar Har and Politekhnik) shows that the number of students accepted into these institutions has increased by 22.5 percent compared to the previous year.

In the sector on essential construction investments during this period, the construction of the bridge over Amu Darya (Pol-e Dusti) has been completed, 200 apartments in the city of Kabul have been completed, the preliminary service affairs of the first stage of the 220-kilovolt transmitting line at the Soviet border, (Khalm), (Polkhomri), and Kabul has been completed and the affairs relating to the third electricity network of Kabul has made about 94 percent progress. Also, 16 meters of the Salang highway have been completed and the proposed plans for the transportation facilities of Kamaz Motors in the city of Kabul, the technical service station in Heyratan and Polkhomri and the tanker repair facility in the city of Kabul have been varified and also, the construction of mill, silo and bread baking projects in the cities of Mazar-e Sharif and Polkhomri have made significant progress.

The construction of 160 Kheybar and Ghanikhil apartments was completed during the same period and they have become operational. Also, during the first half of the current year, 12.3 km of new urban roads under the developmental (sharvali) of Kabul have been tarred and put into operation.

The construction complex of Heyratan Port facilities, with a capacity of 830,000 tons and the construction of the 105-meter-long bridge over the Darya-ye Sefid were completed and put into operation with the economic and technical aid of the Soviet Union.

In the first six months of the current year, the total revenues from domestic sources increased by 3.5 percent compared to the real revenues of the first six months of last year. The total government revenues obtained from the sale of perishable items during the first half of the current year amounted to 15.8 billion afghanis, which, compared to the figure during the same period last year, shows an increase of 1.1 billion afghanis.

National foreign commerce, based on the statistical figures and numbers during the first six months of the current year, increased by \$1.7 billion over the same period last year.

The foreign trade figures during the first six months of the year show that foreign trade, with a surplus of \$61.7 million, is in the interests of the country. In the area of bartering, trade has been positive, at a figure of \$85.5 million, but in the non-bartering area, it has been negative, at an amount of \$23.8 million.

Economic activities in the government sector have increased by 28.5 percent during the first six months of the current year compared to the same period last year.

Concerning prices, with the subsidy from the government budget, the prices of the raw materials needed by the people, including petroleum, diesel fuel, soil, sugar and electricity have remained stable and the provision of a large amount of lumber and wheat flour at fixed prices has had a positive effect in stabilizing prices.

The statistics and figures presented show that as a result of the patriotic hard work and struggle of the authorities and government employees as well as the cooperation of the working masses, the goals of the plan, with the exception of a series of deficiencies and shortcomings, have been successfully met and show relatively desirable economic growth, under the present situation.

10,000  
CSO: 4665/4

INTERVIEW WITH BAHRAIN LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIAL

GF240832 Tehran ASH-SHAHID in Arabic 5 Jan 83 pp 14, 15, 43

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah Mansur al-'Ali, one of the leaders of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain--place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Your Imminence Shaykh, would you please give us an idea about the progress of events and the latest developments in the Bahraini arena?

[Answer] [Passage omitted] The rulers who laid their hands on the necks of the sons of the Islamic nation in Bahrain cannot tolerate the development of religious consciousness among the ranks of the Muslim masses and the maturity of the Islamic movement and have revealed their vehement hatred and long-standing hostility toward anything related to Islam and Muslims. [passage omitted] The current developments [in] Bahrain indicate that our brother Mujahidin who are imprisoned have began a hunger strike and demanded that the regime should stop its torture and reform the trial system to allow an accused to retain an attorney. You can read the details about this in a statement issued on this matter by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Outside the prisons, the Muslim masses and the sons of the Koran are continuing to challenge the tyrannical authorities. They are expressing their rejection and protesting the continuation of the Al Khalifah regime by painting revolutionary religious slogans on walls, by launching surprise attacks on the houses of the security men and by burning these houses. This happened to one of the regime's mercenaries in Bani Amrah. In general, our Muslim people enjoy high morale and spiritual and struggle spirit in face of the policy of suppression and terrorism which is being followed by the regime to subdue the Islamic movement. Our hope in victory is great. [passage omitted]

[Question] You declared last week, "13 December 1982," as a week of solidarity with the political detainees in Bahrain. Would you explain the dimensions of this declaration as viewed by the Islamic Front which represents the rights of the sons of the Muslim Bahraini people?

[Answer] In fact, as a religious movement representing the masses of the Muslim Bahraini people, our subjective from this political move and from the first anniversary of the last year's events which was called by the Al Khalifah the plot to oust the regime is to communicate the voice of our oppressed people

to the peoples of the world and to all the human agencies and organizations because the regime is still practicing the ugliest and most savage means of police terrorism against the nation's sons and is haphazardly sending the people to detention camps and prisons which are now full of the best of the Muslim youths. We want to attract the attention of our Muslim brothers everywhere to our just cause, to the Jihad of our sincere Bahraini people, to the oppression and corruption of the infidel Al Khalifahs in our Islamic country and to the Western and U.S. imperialist presence--the economic, political or military presence in the land of Bahrain. [passage omitted]

[Question] How do you assess the political situation in the region, specifically in the Gulf, especially since the last GCC Summit was held in Bahrain and adopted a number of resolutions regarding security and defense? Did the location of the summit have any connection with the internal situation in Bahrain?

[Answer] Naturally, the region's peoples share a joint destiny. What happens in Iraq for example directly influences the Gulf. What is taking place in Egypt too in the form of executions, prosecutions and popular uprising against the regime has its effects and reflections on the region's states in general, just as what has happened in the Islamic revolution in Iran. [passage omitted]

As you have said the GCC or the tribal council's summit which was convened in Bahrain adopted resolutions on security and defense. Naturally these resolutions were only adopted by one regime and not the others. All the Gulf regimes participated and contributed in planning this comprehensive conspiracy. Their resolutions do not just apply to some of them but to all the Gulf countries, such as the decision to extradite criminals, as they put it, which means the extradition of Muslim revolutionaries who are to be chased from one airport to the other until they are delivered to the sword of terror in the country concerned.

This is exactly the link between the place of the summit and the despicable situation and worry about the Al Khalifah's regime is living through in Bahrain. This step is no more than an admission of tranquilizers to the regime and nothing else.

[Question] Your Eminence, you know that U.S. President Reagan recently announced his intention to establish a security belt that extends from Egypt through the Gulf of Pakistan. This task is to be carried out by the U.S. rapid deployment force which is expected to exceed 200,000 soldiers. Informed press circles have reported that a unit of this force recently carried out maneuvers inside Bahraini territory. Before that, they carried out maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan and Oman. How do you explain the situation in the region and what are the dimensions of this colonial phenomenon?

[Answer] [Passage omitted] It is not surprising that the regime in Bahrain seeks help from the rapid deployment force. It is the one that granted the Americans various facilities to establish different military bases on our land such as the one in Jufayr and the one in Muharraq where they bring their fleets

and naval equipment. They do it so long as it preserves their interests and keeps Al Khalifah's throne far from the anger of the Muslim masses. However, we give the United States and its agents in the region such as Al Khalifah, Al Sa'ud, Qabus and the others the glad tiding that these desperate attempts will do them nothing except speed up their downfall and the elimination of their interests so that Islam can govern anew in the region, so that glory and strength will return to our nation, so that the sun of liberty will rise on the region's masses, so that God will govern and he is the best of all governors. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4604/10

IRAN

PLANS FOR LIBERATION OF BAHRAIN STUDIED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Dec 82 p 9

[Interview with Brother 'Omar, member of the Bahrain Liberation Organization, by KEYHAN correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] Brother 'Omar, a member of the Bahrain Liberation Organization, provided some details on holding Unity Week, the treatment of the people of Bahrain by the government and the effects of the Islamic revolution in Bahrain in an interview with the KEYHAN correspondent.

First, concerning the effects of the messages of the Islamic revolution of Iran and the messages of the imam on the Islamic and liberation movements of the people of Bahrain, he said: The Islamic revolution of Iran, under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, created new hope in the hearts of the Muslims of the world and the region, especially the Muslims of Bahrain.

The people observed the leadership of the imam, which had much influence on them.

When the Islamic revolution was being formed and the imam was in Najaf, the Islamic leanings of the young people in Bahrain increased and after the victory of the revolution, its influence increased, because the Muslims of Bahrain felt that there was an Islamic power which supported them. Hence, after the victory of the Islamic revolution, the Muslims of Bahrain held large demonstrations in support of the Islamic revolution. The messages of the imam from the Arabic radios has had a great influence on them, made them more and more aware of the Islamic movement each day and increased their Islamic awareness. Thank God, this awareness has reached a high level. The educated strata of the society, which had previously joined the leftist or nationalistic groups to fight against the regime, now leaves these groups and comes to the Islamic groups.

## Unity Week

We asked: What was the purpose of declaring Unity Week and what are the goals of this unity?

He said: The declaration of Unity Week marks the passage of one year since the group arrest of the Muslim brothers by the puppet regime of Bahrain. Presently, about 3,000 of the Muslim people of Bahrain are in prison. More than a year ago, 73 of our Muslim brothers were arrested and since then have been tortured barbarically. That is why we have declared Unity Week, for the suffering that our people are tolerating and, secondly, in order to expose the barbaric and treacherous actions of the regime in Bahrain towards the Muslim nations, so that they may take steps to stop these barbaric actions.

We then asked: How dependent are the leaders of Bahrain and under what conditions do the people of Bahrain live?

Brother 'Omar responded: The regime of Bahrain is a tribal regime which came to power with the aid of the British in a coup d'etat. The people of Bahrain consider this regime as usurping and aggressive. For this reason, it has no people's base and it is natural that in order to survive, it must rely on a foreign power.

Concerning the number of political prisoners in Bahrain, he said: The number of political prisoners in Bahrain is about 2,000, while the population of the country is 350,000. Given the population of the country, the percentage of political prisoners is the largest in the world. All of the prisoners have been given long sentences for minor offenses and since the victory of the Islamic revolution, most of the prisoners have been Muslims who participated in the Islamic movements. They are treated horribly and thusfar, six of our combative brothers have been martyred under torture.

The regime of Bahrain martyrs or mames the Muslims and combatants of Bahrain with the most barbaric psychological and physical torture. At the head of the Bahrain security organization are three Englishmen who cooperate with individuals from Jordan and Iraq and SAVAK escapees from Iran, including Parviz Sabeti, to torture the Muslim brothers and sisters.

He then asked the Iranian nation to keep in mind the Muslim sisters and brothers and know that there are brothers beyond the borders who are supportive of and enthusiastic about this revolution and who are tortured and imprisoned for their support of this revolution and the establishment of God's rule in their country.

In conclusion, he said: The Islamic Liberation Organization, in the name of the Bahrain nation, declares to the mercenary regimes of the region who suppress the Islamic movements: The shah's regime was much more powerful than you but could not resist the wave of the Islamic revolution. You are weaker than the shah and you must know that you will also be destroyed. None of these treacherous actions can ever protect your crowns and thrones. We are determined to liberate this entire region from you and we shall keep our pledge until we attain this goal, which is to spread Islam.

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CSO: 4640/75



IRAN

MINISTER COMMENTS ON LEVEL OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Dec 82 p 7

[Interview with Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development, by correspondents of the mass media; date and place not specified]

[Text] In a press and radio-television interview, the minister of agriculture and rural development provided the correspondents of the mass media with his comments on the five-year agricultural plan, purchasing wheat from farmers, the level of output of agricultural products and the rural service centers.

According to the economic correspondent of KEYHAN, Mohammad Salamati, the minister of agriculture, first pointed out the importance of the issue of agriculture and said: Since agriculture has been considered central to the economic development of the country and in accordance with the approved decision of the Economic Council, all the economic sectors are responsible to coordinate their programs in this direction. Hence, the five-year agricultural plan, which will be presented to the Economic Council and the Cabinet soon, is also devised on this basis. He added: We have studied this program from an organizational standpoint and we have established a new system in connection with the centers for agricultural services. The purpose of this organization, which will be implemented with the cooperation of the villagers and agricultural experts, is decentralization and bringing agricultural services to the villagers more quickly. In this connection, all the various dimensions will be implemented. The minister of agriculture added: Along with the fundamental efforts, thank God, the daily agricultural activities have also resulted in good output. Fortunately, we have had good production this year. In regards to purchasing wheat from the farmers, a total of 1,187,000 tons of wheat has been purchased from the farmers up to 21 December 1982, which is rather unprecedented in our agricultural history. In regards to sugar beets, after the victory of the revolution, due to the

clarification of ownership and other problems and difficulties, we faced a significant decrease. But, this year, we are pleased with the increase in production as compared to last year and we hope that it will reach 4 million tons, considering the fact that our total sugar beet production was 2.9 million tons.

Salamati said: The area for cotton cultivation has also increased during the last two years. Thusfar, 201,000 tons of unginned cotton has been delivered to the factories. This amount is more than the total output for last year and it is projected that this year, our output will increase by 20-23 percent. He added: This year, our production of some fresh and dried fruits increased significantly. Apple production increased so much that we were able to export 200,000 tons. Also, our level of output of dozens of fruits and vegetables increased enough to enable us to export some. This year, the level of export of such goods increased from 39 percent of the non-petroleum exports last year to 63 percent this year.

The minister of agriculture said: Fortunately, last year, we were allotted a good budget in the agriculture sector despite the shortage of machinery and expert personnel. Of the total amount of development funds, 89 percent was made very good use of.

The centers for agricultural, rural and tribal services, which had a budget of 10,002,000,000 rials, are able to make use of 15.52 billion rials.

Concerning the coordination of activities, Salamati said: In the centers of rural services which change the administrative system of the Ministry of Agriculture, one of the most important goals is to achieve fundamental and sincere cooperation between the authorities and the farmers. These centers have been very successful in this regard. In these centers, agricultural affairs, in the areas of both providing manpower and financial affairs, are carried out with the cooperation and assistance of the farmers themselves. He added: Thusfar, 479 centers have been established, which will be expanded gradually in other areas as well. In order to coordinate the activities with those of the Reconstruction Crusade, we hold sessions in connection with overlaps in activities to clarify the duties and distribute the tasks. Furthermore, we have created the coordination headquarters to coordinate the daily activities.

The minister of agriculture added: The results of our planning have been very favorable. This is the first planning carried out by Iranian experts, which we can say has been unprecedented. For this reason, we place great importance on it and we hope by mobilizing the people and with the overall cooperation of all the government organizations we will be able to carry it out part by

part. He said: Concerning the establishment of rural cooperatives, which has been carried out in accordance with the government policy, we have been pleased with the output and in this area, too, we have had significant growth.

Then, concerning the welcoming of the agricultural experts, the minister of agriculture said: We are prepared to welcome all those who can help in agricultural development. But not all of them can be used in the capital. Most of our work is in the villages. Therefore, we need anyone who is interested in cooperating with helping agriculture in the country in the villages.

Concerning the import of cows, he said: Presently, we need to import some cows to provide dairy products because the milk production of the previously imported cows has decreased. Until the period 21 March 1986-20 March 1987, 5,000 cows will be imported. Considering the projected program in this area, we hope that we will not need to import cows from 1987 on. Concerning agricultural loans and other institutions, he said: Last year, we allocated 143 billion rials for this purpose. In regard to tractors for this year, 32,000 to 33,000 tractors will be given to farmers. Last year, we gave 143 billion rials in agricultural loans. This amount last year was 114 billion rials [as published].

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CSO: 4640/76

IRAN

RESULTS OF GOVERNORS GENERAL SEMINAR EVALUATED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Dec 82 p 17

[Interview with 'Abbas Akhundi, political-parliamentary deputy of the Ministry of the Interior, by KEYHAN; date and place not specified]

[Text] 'Abbas Akhundi, the political-parliamentary deputy of the Ministry of the Interior, announced the results of the seventh national seminar of governors general.

First, concerning the reasons for holding this seminar, the deputy of the Ministry of the Interior said: In order to carry out the policies and executive activities and to eliminate the difficulties of the governors general and the Cabinet, the seminar of governors general, which is a continuation of the innovative seminars of martyr Raja'i, was held last week.

He added: At the end of the seminar, we benefitted from going to the imam, Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Golpayegani, Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi, and Mr Meshkini.

He then said: Since the governors general are the high government representatives in the regions, supervising all the activities of the implementary organizations of the region, informing them of the general political, social, economic and developmental problems of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the exchange of views between the governors general and the ministers were considered among the fundamentally important issues.

The political-parliamentary deputy of the Ministry of the Interior added: For this purpose, this seminar followed its set objectives by holding general sessions, committees and numerous meetings with the members of the Cabinet and high ranking religious and political officials.

## Issues Examined

'Abbas Akhundi said: In this seminar, the governors general held discussions and exchanged views in seven committees on political and social issues, planning and programs, organization and administrative divisions, law enforcement, development affairs and the reconstruction of war-stricken regions, economic affairs and commerce, communications, description of the duties of the governors general and studying the manpower issue in order to find appropriate solutions to expedite the elimination of the problems and difficulties of their jurisdictions. Through the exchange of the necessary information, the required cooperation was carried out.

The political-parliamentary deputy of the Ministry of the Interior announced: In the committee for political and social issues, which was one of the important committees of the seminar, the general and regional policies and the foreign policy of the government were explained for the governors general and the issues of minorities, the Afghans, the returnees and refugees, the discontentment of the people, methods for communication between the governors general and the people, propaganda issues, and political issues concerning the borders and border provinces were studied, resulting in mutually beneficial gains.

In response to the question of what the role of the Friday imams of the provincial cities will be throughout the country in the implementation of the Islamic policies of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region, by referring to the role of the clergy and the Friday imams in guiding and leading the people, he said: Since the Friday imam and the committed clergy are the authorities for examining and following up the complaints and problems of the people and are fully supported by the people, undoubtedly, if the necessary coordination is created, they will play a major role in eliminating the problems of the areas under the jurisdiction of the governors general.

In this interview, 'Abbas Akhundi praised the unmatched welcome of the people of Kurdistan in participating in the election of the Assembly of Experts and said: The decisive results of the active participation of the people of Kurdistan in the elections shows the domination of the government of the Islamic Republic over the western region and the security provision of this area. The governors general also praised the combatants of Islam in providing security in this region and emphasized that all the people of the country must hasten to the aid of the Muslim people of Kurdistan by way of a general mobilization.

## Criticism of the Press and Radio and Television

In the conclusion of his press conference, the deputy of the Ministry of the Interior said:

I should point out two issues at the outset of the seminar. One is that all the brothers in the seminar seriously objected to the behavior of KEYHAN. Despite the fact that these discussions were all good and positive and that one could choose good and positive headlines from the statements of the authorities, KEYHAN usually tried to choose negative headlines and, in a sense, was uncooperative. Now, I do not know why KEYHAN should want to be uncooperative. And now, I want to point out KEYHAN's past, during the previous regime, and, God willing, they are not related. But, during the past regime, too, KEYHAN, in order to show that it was especially intellectual, tried to print negative headlines and not to print positive ones. God willing, this has nothing to do with that. But, during the seminar, KEYHAN tried to print uncooperative and meaningless headlines in the newspaper, which, God willing, the brothers will note down and which KEYHAN itself, if there are no ill intentions, will print.

The second issue concerned a meeting with Mr Montazeri. Yesterday, we were with Mr Montazeri for more than an hour. Unfortunately, radio and television merely mentioned at the end of the news that the governors general from the entire country accompanied by the minister of the interior visited Mr Montazeri. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, which I looked at this morning, had not even mentioned the meeting of the governors general and the minister of the interior with Mr Montazeri. Now, this can be considered two ways. At the onset of the elections of the Assembly of Experts, we all know that the people all leaned towards Ayatollah Montazeri as the imam. This failure to mention Ayatollah Montazeri--I do not know--if we want to look at it negatively, there is certainly some sort of line at work. And if we look at it positively--God willing, we look at it positively--they have merely forgotten and it has cost us very heavily that JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI did not report it and that the Voice and Vision showed the meeting with Mr Montazeri only very briefly.

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CSO: 4640/76

# ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION CRITICIZES SAUDI REGIME

GF240630 Tehran ASH-SHAHID in Arabic 5 Jan 83 p 13

[Statement issued by the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula [Munazzamat Ath-Thawrah al-Islamiyah Fi al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyah] 29 November 1982]

[Excerpts] Following the popular movements during the month of Holy Ramadan, June to October 1982, the Saudi authorities were afraid of the increasing political consciousness and the spread of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement among the people. Thus in response to warnings and plans issued by Washington and announced by the U.S.'s George Brown [not further identified], it began a sweeping campaign of arrests and did not spare any revolutionary, missionary, intellectual or clergyman and threw them all in prisons.

It was not a secret that the appearance of new Islamic organizations next to the old organizations which renewed their activities has become a real worry to the tyrannical Saudi regime because those organizations which are challenges and sources of internal danger have scared the despotic regime.

Thus the oppressive Saudi authorities can no longer hide their fear or deny their tyrannical practices against our Islamic nations in general and against our steadfast people in particular because the falsehood of its claims about being Islamic and religious have been exposed. Also, the role it is playing for the United States in our fateful Islamic issues has become clear.

The recent police campaigns and repeated aggressions mean:

1. The structure of the regime itself has been based on terrorism, suppression and tyranny since its establishment and it cannot give up this tyrannical nature. How then can it allow revolutionary moves "while the revolution and revolutionaries are its most inveterate foes"?
2. The new gendarme role assigned to it has been enhanced. The regime tries to show itself before its masters as decisive, strong and able to use power against its people to assure them of its ability to protect oil supplies to the Western world.

3. The developments in the region in general have affected the people; they have also been affected by the increasing revolutionary Islamic uprising in Egypt and Iraq and by what is going on in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas.

4. The regime is upset following the setbacks that have afflicted other ruling agent regimes particularly after the execution of As-Sadat, the attempts to execute his successor, Mubarak the unblessed, and the shaking of Saddam's and Numayri's thrones which will be followed by that of Al Sa-ud's.

5. Our revolutionary people are still loyal to the faithful martyrs who were killed by the bullets of the Saudi villain during the glorious Holy Mosque and Muharram uprisings. The more the regime escalates its animosity against the masses, the faster it digs its own grave. Oppression and terrorism will only make the people more challenging and giving.

We, in the name of our tyrannized people and our just cause, condemn all the measures of the usurping Saudi authority and its cowardly practices against our innocent masses. We also denounce the acts of savage oppression and torture to which the detainees whose names were previously mentioned are subjected. These detainees include our eminent rectors who are still in their cells without trial and without even being permitted to have their relatives visit them or to know their status.

We also call on the free peoples of the world, in the name of Holy Islam and the glorious Koran and in the name of the oppressed masses in our Islamic world and in the name of the tyrannized and oppressed people in the Arabian Peninsula; and from the position of responsibility and religious duty call on those who have conscientious hearts and missionary stands to raise their voice to condemn the crimes of the Saudi regime and its tyrannic practices against our steadfast sons, to stand alongside our Muslim people in the Arabian Peninsula, to demand the release of innocent prisoners, clergymen, honest religious rectors and all the ill-treated detainees and to stop the barbaric and mad campaign against the intellectuals and missionaries of our people.

We promise our brothers in the prisons and detention camps as we have promised our martyrs that the honest blood which was shed by the whips of the executioners and bullets of the treacherous will not be given in vain. The cries of the mothers and the sufferings of the dear people are a sacred duty and will only strengthen our steadfastness and determination and the steadfastness and determination of those in the detention camps to go forward in the revolution making more sacrifices until the banner of Islam triumphs with God's will.  
[passage omitted]

[Signed] The Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula

CSO: 4604/10



## IRAN

### PAPER ELABORATES ON KHOMEYNI'S 'EIGHT-POINT MESSAGE'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Dec (pp 1, 14), 29 Dec (pp 1, 16)  
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[Text] It has been about a week since the imam's message was issued, a message that, as interpreted by Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani, has begun a new chapter. Unfortunately, during this period, we were prevented by a slight illness from having run an editorial about the imam's message. In any case, the imam's eight-point message and his emphasis on it from the implementary, judiciary, propaganda and guidance standpoints, makes it all the more our duty to interpret and explain it. As Hafez says so beautifully: "The sorrow of love is but one thing, but strangely, from each tongue I hear it, it sounds different."

What must be pointed out here is that on the basis of what we have perceived, his honor, the imam, has been and is especially mindful that this message must be followed up and that everyone must feel responsible concerning it and must question each other. And they must truly "provide justice" and "benefit the faithful." I was and is a special blessing that the above-mentioned message, when it was first issued and announced, was very noticeably reported through the mass media in such a way that the public could sense its special significance. Hence, the mass media rightly gave it more coverage than usual for our own and other people and authorities.

The imam's attention to the most active and significant handling of this message by the mass media and propaganda organizations stems from the fact that, as everyone knows, the judicial issue is the most important of issues, dealing with the life, property and social prestige of the people and everyone knows how Islam deals with this important issue. On the other hand, the conditions for a better follow-up and more precise implementation of an issue is to do more strong propaganda and better announcements. For this reason, not only should there be no criticism of the press, but, should there be any, it should be that they should have done better and more than they did.

But, of course, as any truth or correct phenomenon can be incorrectly interpreted, in this case, too, some people might be subject to certain suppositions and imaginings. To quote Eqbal: "The Masnavi is like the Koran, it guides some and misguides others." Such false suppositions and misuse was what the imam himself called attention to in one of his recent talks. He said: "It is possible for a group of people to appear in some corner who might want to take advantage. But no such advantage should be taken."

Some might have imagined that, God forbid, after this message, the forbidden would be allowed, sins were eliminated and all was wiped clean and that, for instance, God forbid, drinking alcohol, using narcotics, using lecherous instruments, corruption and prostitution would be declared permissible and without sin, that no one would bother anyone regarding such actions, that such actions would not be among the forbidden acts and one would not have to fight against them!

It has been reported that in some places, opportunistic persons have, for instance, openly displayed tapes of the corrupt, corrupting and obscene music of the past or similar such things. Fortunately, the imam has explicitly expressed the point in a religious decree that "spying" into personal affairs and lives of the people is contrary to Islam, but "openly displaying" debauchery and committing sins is also against religious law. Both are violations and legal action may be taken against both. This was by no means a new explanation, but the text of Islamic law. Both spying and displaying are forbidden, offensive and punishable. Displaying stems from the word to go public, meaning to do something openly and publicly. In other words, it is the same as doing something in public.

Hence, the same way that no one has the right to try to find out what goes on in this or that house, for instance, whether anyone is smoking opium, no one is allowed to smoke opium in public, in a place or under circumstances where he can be seen. Such would no longer be a hidden sin, it would be out in the open, which precisely describes displaying debauchery, corruption and sin, for which the officials can pursue the person who displays debauchery in accordance with the same regulations which govern their work.

In the same way that no one has the right to search someone's house in order to see whether or not the owner of the house has instruments of debauchery in his possession, no one has the right to, for instance, turn up the sound of a music tape or even non-music tape so loud as to bother his neighbor. If they are among the forbidden sounds of debauchery, this is considered "displaying debauchery." Other than that would be "bothering the faithful" and also prohibited. The common interpretation of

bothering the faithful means bothering the people, which is sinful.

No one has the right to spy or search out, to move one way or the other to eavesdrop, directly or with equipment, to see whether or not there is, God forbid, prostitution, debauchery or sexual offense somewhere or whether or not there is a house of ill repute. But, too, no one has the right to commit sins and offenses self-assuredly, because the same actions which are prohibited from being uncovered through searches, once they are discovered and proven--for instance, in the presence of the judge, once definite, reliable evidence is given, the offense is proven and the judge becomes certain that the offense has been committed--then, it would be too late and no one would have the right to prevent the punishment of the offender or offenders. The offender will be arrested, tried and God's punishment will be carried out, even in cases of adultery between a married man or woman, in which case, stoning is the punishment. In other words, there will be executions; all has not become very simple and easy!

Also, as no one has the right to search a house for suspected deviant acts in the use of narcotics or the commission of corruption, prostitution or the like, as the imam has said, neither will anyone have the right to establish a "pleasure house," accept or distribute narcotics or have a network of production, sale, purchase and distribution.

Such actions are not considered personal and hidden corruption and although no display of corruption or debauchery may yet have occurred, it is "corruption," corruption on earth. More often than not, such offenders are the corrupt of the earth, and the "destroyers of generations and the results of their work," that is, the destroyers of the property, wealth and material and human resources of the country, and must be punished by such things as execution. The "corrupt of the earth," the "destroyers of generations and the results of their work" and "those who attempt corruption and destruction" are terms taken from the Koran. The person who commits a hidden sin commits injustice against himself (although indirectly he also harms the society). But, the person who causes the spread of sin is, in fact, attempting directly to bring destruction to the society, especially the young generation. This is much greater sin, in which case, whenever the conditions and regulations dictate, the judge might issue a search warrant.

Besides, it is possible for uninformed or ill-informed persons to imagine that if a sin is committed in private and a person commits an offense privately and secretly, it would not be a sin or an offense. No, this has not been the case and it shall not be the case. A sin is a sin, whether committed in private or

in public, whether limited to a person or related to the society. Of course, there are varying degrees of sin. But, God can see and the unseen heavenly officials are not like the officials of the court for fighting prohibited acts to have the right to search! They are the "noblest of writers" who pass through the closed doors, veils and darkness with the permission of God. The scene of sin before them and more importantly, before God, is more clear than on a bright day or a night under the spotlights. Of course, this is just an example; it is much more comprehensive than this. Hence, a sin or an offense does not change in nature in God's court. Yes, in this world and in this environment, before the judge knows about an offense, it is not called an offense, because they do not know whether it has taken place or not. But, in reality, deviations from religious laws are deviations from religious laws and a sin is a sin, even if no one searches it out.

But, another way to take advantage and misinterpret which might have occurred in this connection is that certain people could imagine or try to pretend that the imam's views on the committees, the mobilization, the revolution courts and the dear Guards have changed and that these brothers commit offenses and violate the laws and restrictions. This supposition was also promoted by the counterrevolutionaries and the propaganda bugles abroad and it was escalated in the same way that other nonsense has been and is being advertised on various occasions and which were responded to by our Friday imam in his prayer sermons. The conscious enemy, and probably the uninformed friend, tries to create a new atmosphere through such suppositions and scene setting in order to make the most serving, loving and self-sacrificing children, youth and young people the targets of injustice and, God forbid, make them become disappointed and despondent.

Perhaps the speech of the imam in a visit with the Guards and mobilization brothers involves this issue. The alert and honorable leader of the revolution might have, in fact, wished to make enemy and friend understand that the global counterrevolutionary propaganda is empty and hollow and that, as ever before, "the mobilization, the committees, the Guards Corps, the army, the tribes and the military and law enforcement forces are the hope of Islam and the source of our pride and we are proud to see their faces." This was a harsh response to what the counterrevolutionaries had sung out through their bugles day and night to the ears of one person or another.

But, addressing the Guards and mobilization brothers, the imam said: "I am fond of you; a father loves his child." Is it not true that the more a father loves his child and wants for his good, the more he reprimands him and the less he forgives his mistakes?

The enemy has not yet and will not understand the spirit of our revolution and the relationship between our leader and nation. Neither does the magnificent, encouraging praise of the imam for the authorities and the brothers who serve in the institutions and organizations of this country mean that they have no weaknesses or make no mistakes and that they should become proud and boastful, nor do the criticism, warnings and just reprimands of the imam to these same authorities and people who serve mean that the praise has ended. Such are the suppositions of the experts of Western and Eastern societies, based on their materialistic yardsticks and standards and bringing to mind those very realities and values which are some sort of evaluation based on themselves.

Hence, following our imam's policy, we are responsible to wholeheartedly praise the servants of Islam in this country and to be proud of their heroic self-sacrifices. At the same time, we must not consider anyone in any position more dear or honorable than our ideology, our Islam and the rules of our school of thought. We must criticize anyone who deviates in any place and for whatever reason. We must be thankful for his services and stand up against his deviations. This is the meaning of the reported saying that love and enmity both belong to God. On this basis and from this very position, we also engage in "praise" and "criticism" through the editorials of this newspaper.

Following the recent message of the imam of the people, some might say: We told the authorities a long time ago not to encourage individuals to spy on each other, but the authorities responded that spying and making searches are not prohibited by Islam but necessary. Now, those days have passed; you have realized the negative effects of such actions and prohibit spying and searches.

These statements are made by two groups of critics. One consists of the counterrevolutionaries, the enemies of Islam and the Islamic Republic, who can essentially be called neither critics nor avengers. They either have their mouths or their ears to the propaganda bugles. In other words, they either blow into these bugles from beyond the borders or they are the listeners to and customers of the news agencies. But there might also be another group who, either because of deviant, one dimensional, pseudo-religious ideas or ignorance and lack of information, make such statements and state such views. As for the pseudo-religious kind, the imam said long ago: "They have written to me asking: Does not the Koran say, 'Do not make searches'?"

In any case, such individuals imagine that conflict and contradiction exist between these two kinds of behavior and two kinds of statements. Most of the calamities inflicted upon us from the suppositions, interpretations and judgments stem from such

imperfect and one-dimensional information and beliefs and superficial and shallow understanding. Once during the period 21 March 1971-20 March 1972, martyr Hasheminezhad pointed out a very interesting example in response to certain written questions (in the center for religious discussions and criticism) which have been raised today in many instances and in many places and the efforts of which can be observed. He said: You have seen a person carrying water or kerosene in an earthenware or tin container on his shoulder. If the container is full, although it might be a little heavy, it can be easily carried and if it is empty, it is also easily carried. But, God save us, when the container is neither completely empty nor full but partially full --half, one-third, one-fourth, and so on--it is really difficult to carry. That little amount of water or kerosene constantly sloshes to one side or the other, goes up and down, pours out, gets everything wet, gets everything soaked with kerosene, throws you forward and backward, makes you dance, makes you tired and ultimately makes the carriers quite miserable!

This is true of a person who has a little knowledge in one area. He is neither so uninformed and illiterate that he would have no questions, subjects for discussion or problems on his mind and who can rest comfortably, nor does he have enough knowledge and information to satisfy him and enable him to consequently confront the issues in a mature and calculated way. After all, he has heard certain things and this is precisely what bothers him. To quote one of the religious scholars (who said in the session of lessons and discussions to some of his hasty and proud students), "You have memorized something, but much is hidden from you."

Now, such people who feel a contradiction in the authorities' two ways of handling of the issue of searches and also many others who want to express their knowledge in similar cases and who document what they say with verses, reported sayings and rules or try to teach this or that person a lesson in Islam and the Islamic approach must be told: Yes, you have heard something, but there are things that you have not heard and that you do not know. The problem stems from the fact that the container has little water in it.

In any case, the truth of the matter is clear. When the imam of the people gives instructions on searches, which are still valid, he intends those searches to protect the existence of the Islamic Republic and preserve the principles and foundations of the government and the revolution. That is why he explicitly stated: "If there is a threat to Islam and the Islamic government, even spying is obligatory." Right at this moment, if the people of an area or the residents of a building become suspicious of a house or a place, it is their duty to keep watch and inform the proper authorities at the first opportunity. In face, in an Islamic

society, everyone must keep everyone else under watch. But, this is primarily to protect the government, the revolution and the regime from the threats of terrorists, conspirators and foreigners and to prevent them, God forbid, from deceptively controlling any Muslim through trickery and to consequently deal with it legally and judicially. Secondly, it is to improve the circumstances for making a liveing and the concerns of the other world, which are based on morality and faith and which consist of caring and not finding faults and covering up. It is neither exposing, helping and correcting nor severe treatment and interference.

Spying and searching, which are instructed by Islam, concern the elimination and ejection of security threats to the borders of the government and the regime and are obligatory and necessary only within these limits. The imam has even emphasized and explicitly stated such once again in his eight-point message in a separate article. No one, including military personnel and civilians, should be weak in this regard. Although, thank God, through the self-sacrifice of the Guards and the noble people, terrorism has subsided and the terrorists have been dissolved along with their analyses, the kind of spying and searches which have been declared forbidden and prohibited are spying and searches in regard to affairs which have no relation to the regime, the government and the basis of the revolution. Searching in order to uncover the morals nad the psychological makeup of individuals and their private lives as well as sins which they might secretly commit are among those cases in which searches are unnecessary. Searching and going beyond "general and mutual overlooking by Muslims of each other in order to improve their lives and their other world" and breaking the boundaries in order to uncover the private and secret affairs of individuals and discovering their secrets is prohibited and in certain cases would be considered "spreading sin" and are among the greatest of violations.

We see that the same school and the same religious jurist who instructs on searches most severely and decisively here prohibits then severely and decisively. And there is no contradiction. Both decrees, the instruction and the prohibition, have been, are and will be in Islam. To quote Hafez: "When you hear the words of the people of the heart, do not say they are false. You do not understand, dear one, and that is the mistake."

Here, the question might arise: If it is as you say and both decrees have been the rule from the beginning (both instructions to carry out searches in cases of conspiracy against the regime and their prohibition in private and personal matters, then why did the imam find it necessary to once again issue such an important and decisive decree? Yes, this is a proper question, which is raised not by the enemies but by the friends of the

revolution, Islam, the Islamic government and the line of theocratic rule.

Of course, we have sometimes seen and we have read that some have tried to answer and anticipate questions of this kind when they declared: Nothing has occurred; this message is simply a second copy of the previous one, which was issued some time ago addressed to the judicial branch and in which much emphasis was placed on Islamicizing the Justice Department and the tyrannical laws of the past. Some others say: Previously, in the past months and years, the imam has frequently repeated these decrees and messages and the recent message in various speeches and writings? (This is evidenced by the fact that once or twice, on the occasion of such warnings and advice by the imam, we spoke in detail in this column about judicial issues and judicial intricacies and complications and spoke of "prison, the offender and punishment.") Then what has happened to warrant the imam, this old man who is acquainted with the pains and is constantly crying out, feeling the need to issue this message once again?

Was not what the imam said in this message a repetition of the rules of Islam, religious jurisprudence, judicial books and lessons on morality? Had these rules remained unknown to anyone? Or, did anyone consider them unimplementable? If the imam, by way of discussions, spoke of such issues explicitly, implicitly and, as usual, in company with other issues to a group of visitors, the issue would have been simpler and there would be a way to explain it. But, what he found necessary, he wrote as a separate eight-point message, categorizing the subjects, and did not deal anywhere in it with any issue other than the manner in which the authorities should deal with the people. And, on the whole, expressing the issues in the form of such a message demonstrates its importance and significance.

The reasoning of Mr Hakimi in this regard, whether the imam's message dealt with "examples" or general "principles," was a satisfactory explanation; (as he said) the necessity of making the laws religious and Islamic was an obviously essential issue. Previously, the imam had raised this issue in a general or specific manner and had emphasized it. There are few who would deny or try to interfere with this general principle and essential issue. But, the examples and the cases can be interpreted, explained and analyzed. In this message, the imam wanted to emphasize the examples which he had categorized and numbered.

In fact, the spirit of the imam's recent message was: These definite and clear cases are each examples of the general and essential principle of "making the laws, attitudes and behavior religious and in conformity with Islam." What do we understand by the fact that we see that the imam has implicitly referred to



certain issues very generally in his speeches and writings previously on various occasions and has once again summarized and presented them with clear examples and cases? This repetition shows that certain contrary cases have actually occurred and what the imam had mentioned before had been deviated from in certain instances. The brothers who say that the imam's recent message was nothing new and that he had said these things before many times, and question why the newspapers should create such a "commotion" in dealing with it, might not have paid attention to the fact that the answer to this question is hidden in the question itself. Why did the imam not find his prior warnings sufficient and decide to deal with them in this manner? This in itself proves that there was an important issue in mind for this message to be announced and advertised in order that this important issue be implemented and sensed in the atmosphere of the society.

By the way, if the imam's previous warnings and recommendations had not been confronted with any kind of deviation by us or through our actions and behavior, would the imam not have taken this time to engage in praising and approving of our actions and behavior and if there were any criticism or objection, would it not have been far milder, limited and implicit than before?

In fact, what kind of bad habit is it that causes some of us (although motivated by Islam and love for Islam and the imam) to imagine that should anyone who openly confesses in one or more cases, or should Islamic laws and the imam's directives be violated by an authority or an implementor from the party of God, this would cause the weakening of the regime and provide the enemy with a weapon, thus pressuring the servants of Islam and the revolution? This is a great mistake. Today, the enemy is too miserable and exposed to use such a weapon. The forces of the revolution are much stronger, more recognized and beloved than to be weakened by the wrong actions of one or a few and the probable deviations of one member of an institution or organization could not cast a shadow over them.

No, today, the foundation of this regime has achieved such strength based on faith and the people that it cannot be shaken by such things. This tree has established its roots and grown large; it is a willow which does not tremble at such winds. We can all remain secure, strong, unshaken and calm, for not only does the pursuit of the violators not weaken the regime, it actually strengthens it. Even trying and dismissing them would do the same.

What is very important is that we all look at and interpret this message of the imam with the sense that this message was issued for friends, not for enemies. The enemies are the enemies and the imam has always expressed his views and given his decisive

opinions on them. We expect nothing from the enemy. The message of the imam concerns the violations of our friends, revolutionaries and followers of the ideology. In this message, the imam does not speak of the counterrevolutionaries, he speaks about these sincere children who serve the revolution, even though his tone, words, sentences, expressions and the form of his statements might be harsher, more decisive and more reprimanding, a tone of warning. Hence, neither should a person who has committed a violation or thinks that he might do so imagine that with such a message, he is called a counterrevolutionary, corrupt, anti-religious, and the enemy of Islam and the revolution, nor should others think of him as such.

The above-mentioned message concerns the violations of these very beloved children who have served and are serving God, but think that on the path of God and with good intentions they can do anything. Once, in this column, following a message by Ayatollah Montazeri (in the beginning of the decade of dawn), we wrote about an issue entitled "The Troubles of Being Good."

Sometimes a human being is really good, but gradually and in becoming more aware of "being good," begins naturally, gradually, delicately and unintentionally suffer from certain particular psychological maladies. For instance, the notion that he is like cleansing water. You know that from a religious standpoint, cleansing water is a definite amount of water which does not become unclean or change its appearance with any sort of pollution. It is both pure and cleansing.

A good and serving human being might have such notions at times. He might have become sure that the water is "cleansing water," unaware that even this cleansing water, once it has become stagnant and extremely polluted, then becomes "waste" water.

This supposition and notion existed formerly among some of the mystics. They thought that if one attains God and truth, he would no longer need religion and religious laws. This kind of thinking at times reached such extremes as to be misused. There were those who said that for the person who attains God, the commitment of no small or great sin can affect him nor would the refusal to do what is considered obligatory for all the people put a distance between him and "God." This is no longer a notion of being like cleansing water, it is thinking of oneself as seas and oceans: it is considering oneself the sea!

In any case, this spirit and imagination make a human being proud and consequently careless. He would pass judgments freely, issue verdicts, labels, become suspicious, threaten, consider himself in charge of the affairs of others and consider himself the sole receiver of Islamic inspirations. For instance, suppose you and I are commissioned to arrest a person in accordance with

the ruling of a judge. We go late at night to find the person. I run in haste, ring the bell and perhaps there is some commotion and a gun is fired. You, who are in charge, cry out for me not to be hasty or harsh in my treatment, because there are people around who are resting. I answer proudly and with self assurance that there is no problem, after all, we are working for God to preserve the revolution and eliminate crime and sin!

This is precisely what we were talking about: the troubles of being good. Add to this frame of mind another interpretation, which is, in addition to the fact that I am an official, I sacrifice for God and I am among the good, while the person or persons I am going after and want to arrest and take to the court are among the offenders and violators, or perhaps counterrevolutionaries. This second supposition doubles the fire of pride. You tell me not be harsh in my treatment, not to be hasty, not to deal with this individual outside the religious restrictions and boundaries. But I respond: Are you instructing me about a sinner and an anti-religious, anti-theocratic rule counterrevolutionary? He is a counterrevolutionary; it makes no difference how one deals with him. He should not have committed the sin or offense.

Such a frame of mind and such suppositions which may have been displayed in certain instances, and which may even have had practical results, force the imam to cry out for God and Islam. It is here that the imam says: From here on, silence is not allowed. Anyone who commits a violation or causes injustice deserves to be published and the wronged person, even if it is the offender himself, may take retribution.

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CSO: 4640/73

LATEST PLAN FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS EXPLAINED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Dec 82 p 5

[Text] The general points of the proposal for national administrative divisions was approved by the Cabinet. This proposal has been devised to change the national administrative and political system and conform the administrative system to the goals of the Islamic revolution. Eliminating discrimination between the people of the villages and cities, coordinating and balancing the national administrative divisions and decentralizing administration for the purpose of attaining the Constitutional objectives are among the fundamental goals of this proposal. Studying the economic situation of the various areas of the country with emphasis on increasing agricultural, animal husbandry and industrial production is among the other goals of this proposal. With emphasis on this issue, the national administrative units move toward procuring their general regional needs. The distribution of national revenues in the new administrative divisions proposal shall be based on the needs of the various regions. In the implementation of this proposal, efforts will be made to obtain the direct participation of the people in providing local services.

A seminar with the participation of the governors general and national authorities was held to examine the proposal for the new national administrative divisions and to study the various issues of the political and administrative divisions of the country. According to the authorities, the change in the system of national administrative divisions has been on the agenda of the responsible organizations since the victory of the Islamic revolution. They said: The system of administrative divisions of the country during the past regime was based on

centralization, the unquestioned power of the central government and the consolidation of the autocratic system. The dependent Pahlavi rule followed certain incorrect goals in the national administrative divisions in order to strengthen the capitalist system and the political and economic power of imperialism. According to the experts, the most important goals of the past regime in the national administrative divisions was to eliminate agriculture and create, strengthen and expand consumer cities. Creating discrimination among the regions and non-participation on the part of the people in the destiny of their area and their country were among the other goals of the administrative divisions of the past regime. In order to provide the grounds for the domination of U.S. imperialism and the domestic capitalists in all parts of the country, the past regime would invest in areas which would yield the most profit for the oppressive foreign masters and their domestic agents. With emphasis on such a goal, in a small number of provinces, such as the Province of Tehran, industrial centers (of course, dependent assembly industries) were created and welfare services were put at the disposal of the residents of these areas. Under such circumstances, most of the provinces and areas of the country were left in a state of poverty and backwardness as a result of the anti-people policies of the past regime. Experts say that by paying too much attention to areas such as the Province of Tehran and spreading industrial and service investments in these areas, the past regime imposed discrimination extensively throughout the country. On the basis of the administrative divisions of the past regime, large land ownership and landlords existed in many areas of the country and at the same time, religious and ethnic differences were used to disunite the people of various areas. All the instances which have been pointed out were for the purpose of strengthening the unquestioned rule of the hated Pahlavi regime and its plundering masters in various areas of the country. Hence, the inhabitants of various areas and provinces considered the whole country a place for the domination of foreign plundering powers and did not pay attention to the system of administrative and political divisions in the country.

#### Administrative Divisions in the Islamic System

According to the authorities, the administrative divisions of the present regime must be fundamentally different from those of the previous regime. Based on the research and studies of the experts of the Ministry of Interior, in order to prepare the plan for new administrative divisions, we must refer to the important articles of the Constitution.

In the opinion of the experts of the Ministry of Interior, the Constitution contains the general lines concerning administrative divisions. In Articles 3, 4, 100, 103 and 10 of the Constitution,

the general lines of the new plan for administrative divisions can be found. Article 3 of the Constitution emphasizes the participation of all the people in determining the political, economic and cultural destiny of the country. Emphasis on councils is stressed in another important article of the Constitution in which, according to the experts, in the Islamic Republic, councils have been chosen as one of the important kinds of decision-making organizations. Article 47 of the Constitution clarifies another distinct line concerning the administrative divisions. According to this Article, exploiting the natural resources and using the national revenues in the provinces and various areas of the country, there should be no discrimination. Article 100 of the Constitution emphasizes the rapid development of social, economic, developmental, health and cultural programs in various areas such as districts, towns, cities and provinces. According to this principle, the councils in the villages, districts, cities and provinces will take steps to advance economic, cultural and other goals and their duties are determined by law. Finally, Articles 103 and 10 of the Constitution clarify other areas concerning the general lines of the plan for administrative divisions. By studying the important articles of the Constitution, the experts of the Ministry of Interior have obtained the general outlines and goals of the proposal for administrative divisions. Based on these studies, human beings and the family are considered the primary unit for planning and divisions. Considering the important articles of the Constitution, experts believe that the plan for new administrative divisions must be in a form that would prepare for the participation of the people in regulating the affairs through the council in the provinces, cities, towns and districts. Using the capital, resources and the growth capability of every area, the appropriate distribution of economic activities and the elimination of discrimination among cities and villages and urban, rural and tribal people are among the concerns of the new proposal for administrative divisions. Decentralization and the coordination of administrative, political and service responsibilities and restrictions with each other and with the related councils as well as replacing consumer development with production development are among the other goals which shall be implemented with the new proposal for administrative divisions. Therefore, the new proposal for administrative divisions has been devised based on the Constitution. As was said earlier, writing the new proposal for administrative divisions has been a concern since the beginning of the victory of the revolution. The Majlis made the Ministry of Interior responsible to prepare a new proposal for administrative divisions through a single article ratified on 25 October 1980. The writing of the proposal was not completed until October or November of 1981. At that time, the Majlis once again made the Ministry of Interior responsible for preparing the new bill for the administrative divisions and

presenting it to the Majlis. Finally, this bill was prepared and then ratified on 29 November 1982 in the Cabinet.

In the introduction of the report, the objectives of the new proposal for administrative divisions were pointed out and the issue was raised that if human beings and the family are considered the smallest collective unit and social administration of the people, from the standpoint of those who prepared the new proposal for national divisions, in considering factors such as distance and the expansion of communication and services, of primary concern must be putting these tools at the disposal of the divisional units, the family. The elimination of discrimination between city and village are among the goals that have been anticipated in the new proposal for administrative divisions.

In finding the roots of this problem in the previous regime, the experts of the Ministry of Interior pointed out that the present administrative divisions are based on the Constitution of the period 21 March 1937-20 March 1938, which promotes discrimination between city and village. In the opinion of the experts, after the growth of capitalism, industrial centers were created around the cities and the population of the cities began to grow. The growth of capitalism caused the absorption of the population into the cities and the political-administrative system of the cities became quite different from that of the villages. Attention to service and welfare issues in the cities also caused the increase in the advantages of the cities over those of the villages. In Iran, this problem stemmed from the fact that the cities, as opposed to similar examples in capitalist societies, became merely consumer centers. Large Iranian cities have scarcely become industrial and production cities. Allocating all the welfare, health, cultural and other services to the cities created a gulf and discrimination between cities and villages. Based on what was said, one of the main goals of the proposal for administrative divisions is to eliminate the gulf and discrimination between the cities and the villages. The experts believe that based on the understanding of human beings, in the Islamic government, the discrimination which exists between the cities and the villages is un-Islamic. In the new proposal for administrative divisions, a villager must participate in the destiny of his country as much as a city dweller. It is with this view that the experts say welfare resources must be justly distributed throughout the country between the cities and the villages. The officials believe that in order to eliminate discrimination between the cities and villages, the political-administrative, economic and social factors of this problem must be identified. Replacing consumer development with production development is another essential line in the new proposal for administrative divisions. Encouraging and supporting agricultural production is one of the government policies. In

accordance with this policy, in preparing the proposal for administrative divisions, the government has taken into consideration the issue of production development in various areas to replace consumer expansion. One of the experts of the Ministry of Interior said in this regard: "One of the policies of the past regime was to develop the cities and consumer societies to create more dependence. In order to move in the opposite direction, we must consider the proposal for administrative divisions as a model for revitalizing the development of production centers. In order to attain this goal, the development factors must be identified and the positive factors must be encouraged and supported. One of the objectives of the human-producing school of Islam is to provide moderate and legitimate welfare for all the members of the society. The area which should enjoy more welfare benefits is that area which has a better production return. More work, effort and production in addition to manpower must be based on natural resources for the production and development of every area and the development of every area cannot be accomplished by exploiting the resources of other areas."

He added: "During the previous regime, we witnessed the expansion of cities such as Tehran and Zahedan. Not only was the expansion of these cities based on consumption and the exploitation of the production and labor of the people of other areas, but also, these cities essentially lacked the physical resources to provide the primary needs of its inhabitants. Today, we witness that the consumer needs of such cities were provided at the expense of the destruction and wasting of natural resources and the developmental resources of the neighboring areas."

In the opinion of the experts of the Ministry of Interior, in order to create a balance between welfare, production and work, it is necessary to establish a direct relationship between them. The development of various areas must be done without consideration for the urban or rural characteristics of the society. With emphasis on what was said and based on emphasizing the agricultural policies of the government, the experts said that the government must, on the one hand, encourage service and welfare investments in the agricultural areas and, on the other, the consumer communities, especially the cities, must pay the costs of their consumer services. In the opinion of the experts of the Ministry of Interior, this policy will cause the restriction of the development of the cities and will result in the development of and absorption of forces in the villages.

#### Coordination Among the Units of the Administrative Divisions

In the opinion of those who devised the new proposal, one of the most important shortcomings in the existing divisions is the imbalance among the divisional units. In other words, at the



present time, there is a great variance between the area, the population and the number of divisional units. The experts of the Ministry of Interior, based on their research in this area, have reached the conclusion that the ratio of the area of the smallest to largest provinces is 1 to 14, while the ratio of the population of the smallest to the largest provinces of the country is 1 to 22. On the basis of these studied, the experts have reached the conclusion that the most significant motivation in the administrative divisions remaining from the past regime has been to safeguard the political objectives, whereas the administrative divisions must distribute the administrative, service and welfare resources fairly among the various regions. Another problem in the existing divisions is the situation regarding the procedures for the division of authority and responsibility in the ranks of the national administrative divisions. One of the experts of the Ministry of Interior said in this regard: "According to the policies of the past regime, whose main goal was centralization in the capital and the consolidation of the dictatorial domination, authority was, to a large extent, concentrated at the head of the pyramid of the national administrative management while little attention was paid to the base of the pyramid."

In order to eliminate the lack of coordination and balance in the units of the administrative divisions, the new proposal provides for the units of administrative divisions to be balanced and coordinated. To enable the creation of the necessary coordination and balance in the units of the administrative divisions of the country, the experts suggest that the large units be divided into smaller units. In other words, large provinces should be divided up into a number of smaller ones. Another solution to this problem is to combine the small divisional units and create larger units. To implement this plan, the smaller provinces should be combined to create larger provinces. Creating smaller units of districts in the administrative divisions and increasing the number of existing districts by dividing the large districts into small districts will be an effective factor in the distribution of authority and the responsibilities of the administrators and the distribution of national resources for the welfare of the people.

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CSO: 4640/77

ARABIC PAPER REPORTS MUTINY AT SAUDI AIRBASE

GF231944 Tehran ASH-SHAHID in Arabic 5 Jan 83 p 10

[From the "Here and There" Column]

[Text] The situation in the Arabian Peninsula deteriorates and public indignation prevails in various regions. Following is a news report issued by the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula [Munazzamat Ath-Thawrah al-Islamiyah Fi al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyah].

Within the wave of public indignation against the tribal regime in the Arabian Peninsula, a military mutiny took place during the last few days at Khamis Mushayt Airbase, which is one of the five biggest military bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The others are : Dhahran, Riyadh, Jidda and Tabuk. It is believed that this was a coup attempt against the Saudi authority and reports coming to us indicate that this was a joint military and civil attempt.

Our sources also indicate that the government used the national guard forces to crush this mutiny, including the forces stationed in the eastern region, the oil region, where they have been since the Islamic uprising against the Saudi tribal regime in November 1979.

It should be noted that the Khamis Mushayt Airbase is a short distance away from the city of Abha, the capital of the southern region. It is also used for observation of the border with the YAR and the PDRY and for rapid interference in the internal affairs of the two countries.

The report adds: Eleven journalists working for the newspaper AL-YAWM which is published in Ad-Dammam in the eastern region fled the country after the arrests of their colleagues of the same newspaper, whose names we released in a previous statement. This comes within the wave of public dissent among journalists and honorable scribes who refuse the censorship imposed by the Al Sa'ud tribe.

The report says: The revolutionary youth struggling against the tyrannical Saudi authority burned the trophy archs and decorations which were set in the eastern region to receive Fahd, "The White House Servant," where he was scheduled to visit the region. Following this, Fahd was forced to call off his visit. All these events are within the Islamic uprising and revolution flaming in the region.

CSO; 4604/10

# NAVY, REVOLUTION GUARDS TO ESTABLISH SINGLE BASE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Dec 82 p 2,15

[Text] Military Service - During a six-hour meeting, commanders and deputies from the Revolution Guards and Navy discussed and examined issues relating to the solidarity, relations and maximum unity of the two forces and the formulation of a joint Navy-Guards base.

The meeting was attended by Capt. Afzali, commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohsen Reza'i, Revolution Guards commander, the Guards deputy commander, a group of Guards commanders, deputy commander of the Navy, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ellahi, director of the Naval Political-Ideology Section, and naval deputies and directors.

The meeting convened following a visit by the Guards general commander and his deputies to the Navy staff headquarters. Capt. Afzali began by updating the Guards brothers concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman and the resources of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region. He then explained the Navy's short and long-range plans for dealing with the probable threats of any aggressor.

## Guards-Navy Ties

Then Hojjat ol-Eslam welcomed the visitors, and during his speech stated: Ties between the Navy and the Guards has been one of our long-cherished hopes. We have brought up the necessity of unifying the Guards and the Navy with officials of the Islamic republic many times. We have pointed to this matter in meetings with His Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri, with the president of the Islamic republic, and the speaker of the Majlis. We requested guidance in this regard. Ayatollah Montazeri laid great stress on this matter.

We believe that we need to integrate the three elements of faith, the people and conventional forces in order to defend the waters of the Islamic republic. Coordination between the Guards and the Navy will achieve this goal.

While speaking on various naval matters. Hojjat ol-Eslam Ellahi asked the Guards to repeat these meetings so that the ground can be prepared for complete unity between the Guards and the Navy in the cultural, training and operational fields.

Then in a speech Mohsen Reza'i stated: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Since our dear combative brothers in the Navy agreed to receive their Guards brothers so that the Guards could become familiar with the missions, function, and problems of the Navy and so unity of mind could be created. God willing this action will be a foundation for further, closer cooperation. In particular, the Guards have been ordered by officials to create naval battalions and units. We have the duty of utilizing the popular force on the seas in order to protect the country and the revolution's interests.

We hope that Exalted God will give us further opportunities so that we can be of further service of our dear brothers.

The Guards commander added: Following the great glorious revolution, our nation shattered many of the equations throughout the region and the Indian Ocean which includes the Red Sea, the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and also shattered the vast power that extended over all this region. It brought about transformations. Naturally, based on this new movement and the shattering of the equations, plans and interests of the United States and other powers, some basic, serious thinking had to be done to protect and guard the revolution's achievements.

However, since the enemy first started on the land, and the land action took priority, the revolution's main force was occupied with the enemy on the land.

Our land situation advanced greatly, God be praised, and we made the fullest possible use of the popular forces in confronting the enemy on the land.

Now an opportunity has presented itself so that we can sit down and plan the revolution's future programs for the protection of the country's accomplishments existence and territorial integrity. We hope that if the Guards and the naval brothers invest more time we can attain these coordinated, aligned plans and start moving.

#### Formation of a Joint Base

Mohsen Reza'i added: The Guards' proposal is that we make a joint base with the help of the Naval, just as we did with the Army. We will make a joint base and activate our own naval sections so that we can carry out the maximum activity and effort on the seas, God willing.

The reason that we believe in this project and suggest it is that we make very great use of our joint base with the Army. The Guards-Army base has only caused the activation of the land forces and the Army brothers, but has allowed us to attain remarkable advances in the areas of operational guidance, operational planning, maneuvers that were carried out, and other matters only soluble with the help of the popular forces.

He added: Perhaps it can be said firmly and definitely that 85 percent of the war is now in the hands of the popular forces. Even from the angle of maneuver planning, mine removal, identification, attack, counter-attack and assault, 85 percent of the war is on the shoulders of the people. They are fighting. Of course, if we want to move towards complex, extensive technology, perhaps we cannot in the near future. Of course, in the future we will be compelled and duty-bound to take actions with regard to part of this technology. God willing, officials will support us so that we can attain this.

At the minimum, this technology should be found and we should make some of it ourselves.

However, at this instant the utilization of the popular forces on the seas is an important issue. By activating a joint Guards-Navy base, we can accomplish this movement and move forward.

The Guards general commander also said: Also, as to developing this base, we can comply very well with the message of Ayatollah Montazeri, who had ordered the Guards to increase their relations with the Navy. We believe that anyone who serves the Islamic republic for one hour is an honorable human being and he must be given importance. Despite what they say in the Guards or in other places or even in other organs, these things absolutely do not exist. If there are persons and elements spreading these rumours, we and the officials of other organs never think this way. We greatly value and esteem anyone who spends an hour on the sea. You can see that the nation's imam pointed in his historic message to matters which might cause corruption and obscene things in our society, and what strict orders he gave about what should and should not occur.

Thus, based on the command of His Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri, we urge that this joint base will be created and become active, God willing. We hope that we can offer help to the Navy in the ideological, military and political areas and any other areas we can.

We want a strong, active Navy both from the human standpoint and the standpoint of the resources that in the future, God willing, we will purchase, make or God willing, export, or take as plunder. We want to have an active, strong force which, with the support and help of the Guards, can preserve the Islamic republic's control of the seas and territorial integrity.

#### Unity of Thought and Policy

Concerning the rapidity of the base's formation, the Guards commander said: The root of the matter is unity of view, belief and policy, and praise God, we can feel that this unity exists. This is the very root of the matter. Meaning that if we are usually united in belief, opinion and policy, which is now the case, the remaining minor problems are quickly solved. We hope that in the near future it will be possible to have good maneuvers throughout the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

Concerning the interest in cooperation between the Guards and the Navy, and the Guards brothers' interest and impulse to serve, Mohsen Reza'i said: The motivation of a guard is to seek martyrdom and to work. A guard goes with all his heart and soul wherever is work for him. He usually appears wherever he can scent the export of the revolution and the revolution's manifestation.

Now that the arrogant world is investing in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, the Guards brothers have gotten wind of this scent. Therefore they feel totally prepared to coordinate completely with the Navy brothers.

He added: One reason why this link did not exist before was the shortage of time due to continuous participation in the land war, in which we had extensive activity. Another reason was that the necessity for it was not felt before as it is now.

Now it is felt we must bring the practical initiative which we have had in the land war and are continuing to the seas. We must achieve a level of preparedness and readiness in the Sea of Oman, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and other spots so that we can continue our battle on the field of war by taking the initiative any time we desire.

Concerning the role of the Political Ideology Section in this coordination, Mohsen Reza'i then said: The Political Ideology brothers can take very effective steps in this connection.

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CSO: 4640/71

# NEW TEXTBOOKS TO BE PREPARED FOR SCHOOLS, COLLEGES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Dec 82 p 18

[Text] The president of the republic at a meeting with professors of faculties of literature, literature teachers and experts from the institute for research into textbooks: "Textbooks are and will be our most important production."

A group of professors of faculties of literature, of secondary-school literature teachers and of experts from the institute for research into textbooks, accompanied by Dr Haddad-'Adel, deputy minister of education for research, met night before last with Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president of the republic. At this meeting initially Dr Haddad-'Adel informed the president about the report on the compilation of textbooks. Subsequently, the president said during the talk: "The efforts and activities you have conducted on this issue and the impact your work has on the direction of the general conditions in the country, the revolution and society is known to everyone. For us, to know the literature of other nations is a skill or a science and an art, but it bears no influence on the actuality of our life and our move toward our future thought and ideals. But for us Persian speakers, Persian literature, or the literature of every language for those conversant in it are easy, but at the same time difficult. Their being easy derives from the fact that language rules humans, and learning the literature of one language for those who speak it is learning about mysteries and details about reality and nature whose origin is available to learners. Their being difficult is due to the fact that it is natural, since language is a matter related to life. This proper knowledge and use will influence the nature of goals, ideals and thoughts and the general direction of society.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i, referring to the fact that the nature of learning language and culture brings about a difference of opinions and direction, said: "It may be that the cause of this confusion and lack of progress in literature is that the learning of literature as a commodity and a tool necessary for society which influences its future destiny and is fundamental for the entire life of humanity, has been neglected. Surely if one looks at it from this point of view, there would be greater development and more talent, good taste and ability to serve literature, a fact that would be to the benefit of humanity."

The president added: "Textbooks themselves are and will be our most important production and if we can compile books in a correct manner which can guarantee

the growth and development of Persian literature and can move along a correct line of thought and be put to the service of our revolutionary thought, then we would have achieved the greatest service to Persian literature and the Persian language."

In conclusion, Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i, referring to the fact that education under the former regime was slavish and meant servitude of men by men, stated: "In our revolution, culture is a monotheistic one for serving God in the sense of liberation from all limitations and shackles and salvation from all problems. Islamic culture in the true sense is like that, and this culture must be reflected in all our literature books."

CSO: 4640/89



PROSPECTS OF IRON WORKS IN ZAHEDAN DISCUSSED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Dec 82 p 17

[Text] Zahedan. The largest ironware warehouse was constructed and put into operation in Zahedan with a capacity of 20,000 tons, an area of 25,000 square meters and at a cost of more than 20 million rials by the central office of commerce of Sistan and Baluchestan. With this operation, the potential for consumption of the share of ironware of this province will increase.

Brother Mohsen Mehtari, the managing director of commerce in Sistan and Baluchestan, in an interview with the correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY in Zahedan announced the above statement and said: Since the beginning of the current year, 36,000 tons of various kinds of ironware have been purchased by the central office of commerce of the province, of which 15,000 tons was transferred to the Islamic revolutionary institutions and government offices for the purpose of carrying out governmental and industrial development and 21,000 tons for the construction of building units to the people of the province. Also, during this period, 66,000 tons of rice entered Zahedan through the Port of Chahbahar, which, after satisfying the needs of the province, was also sent to the neighboring provinces of Kerman and Khorasan. Also, in regards to the trip of the minister of commerce to this province which took place some time ago, he said: The visit of the minister of commerce to Zahedan had positive and effective results. During the visit, it was determined that the responsibilities Tehran had in regards to exchanges of goods with Pakistan through this province would soon be transferred to the central office of commerce in Sistan and Baluchestan in order to enable the merchants of this province to obtain permits for the import or export of goods without going to the capital, by coming to the central office of the province. This in itself will be an effective step in activating commerce in this province. He added: Presently, medicinal plants and dried fruits are exported to Pakistan in exchange for such things as fabrics, grains, and leather, which are imported to Sistan and Baluchestan. The managing director of commerce of Sistan and Baluchestan said to the correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

NEWS AGENCY: In order to store the goods needed by the people of this province, this year, with funds amounting to 100 million rials, steps have been taken to build 11 warehouses, the operations of which have made 20 percent progress. Considering the operation of the Port of Chahbahar, the large ironware warehouse in Zahedan will be increased from 25,000 meters to 50,000 meters, with a capacity of about 50,000 tons. In this connection, 60 million rials have been allocated for the expansion and equipment of this warehouse.

10,000

CSO: 4640/75

# FACTORS FOR DETERIORATING ECONOMY SCRUTINIZED

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 20 Dec 82 p 11

[Article by Aditya Man Shrestha]

[Text]

NEPAL is inexorably heading toward a crisis which the present leadership seems incapable of stopping. Political analysts in Kathmandu observe unmistakable writings of the brewing trouble on the wall and describe the prevailing calm as a precursor of an approaching storm.

Serious efforts were made to keep the country united and the kingship invincible during the political turbulence that rocked Nepal in 1979. But all the political exercises made since then seem futile.

This tiny Himalayan kingdom with 14 million population today look as divided as two years ago despite the formation of an elected government.

The political parties banned since 1960 have not joined what the second elected Prime Minister, Surya Bahadur Thapa, repeatedly calls "the national mainstream." The Nepali Congress, under the leadership of a triumvirate after the death of the deposed premier B.P. Koirala last July, spearheads the democratic forces in Nepal and has asserted its existence with strong stance against the present establishment despite a heavy crackdown on its workers.

The Communists are equally active and vehemently opposed to the Panchayat (local assembly) system. Although King Birendra has to contend with these opposition groups, he has nevertheless benefitted from the open fight between the democrats and the leftists.

This became clear when the two student factions — one supported by Communists and the other by

Democrats — clashed in Biratnagar in November last year, resulting in one death and injuries to several others.

The Government took a neutral stand in these clashes but nevertheless came under severe criticism from both sides. The democrat as well as the communist leaders called the Government "fascist."

The situation is reminiscent of the pre-1979 period when the pro-Communist and anti-Communist students clashed, leading to a traumatic change in Nepal politics. At this stage, the Thapa Government appears to be playing one opposition group against the other as a strategy of survival instead of falling back on its strength of performance.

And this is where the danger lies, because it exposes the King and his system to the vagaries of rising political troubles, according to political observers.

The historic referendum announced in 1979 and held one year later on the two political alternatives of a multiparty and a partyless systems was expected to resolve the controversy. But neither the referendum nor the general elections following it exactly one year later could achieve a "national political reconciliation."

The democratic and leftist political forces boycotted the legislative elections, claiming massive vote-rigging and other poll anomalies in the referendum whose results supported a partyless panchayat system advocated by royalists.

But even the royalists are divided. Prime Minister Thapa, who was unanimously elected to his post a year ago with the blessings

of the King, does not command the loyalty and respect of the pro-establishment, according to competent observers.

He is said to be buying their support by "dividing the spoils of the political war" among his supporters. But there is a limit to this. He managed to steer sessions of the popularly elected National Panchayat but political observers doubt he could do the next in the same manner.

The last session was critical of the Government for corruption, food crisis, financial mismanagement and nepotism.

Thapa's biggest challenge has come from the former Nepalese premiers like Dr Tulsi Giri and Kirtinidhi Bista who, in fact, urged King Birendra to dismiss the Thapa Government "and assume power as King Mahendra had done in December 1960."

Prime Minister Thapa has a difficult and complex task of satisfying not only the people and the National Panchayat, to which he is constitutionally held responsible, but also the Royal Palace notwithstanding the democratisation process in Nepal.

In his bid to hold on to power, Thapa is trying to tide over the famine and to bring about a relief to the economic hardship of the people. He publicly admitted he had neglected, for the last two years, the economic problems because of political exigencies. Now that the country has taken what he believes "the definite direction" toward "panchayat democracy," he will look into the economic problems of the country.

For a start, Thapa decided to speed up the slow-moving bureaucracy. He shunted senior civil servants from one post to another. But that bore no fruit in the overall government performance. Then he resorted to massive dismissal of civil servants.

However, the Government seems to have lost its grip over the civil service which silently but effectively defies the political bosses. On top of it, corruption has become widespread — a situation which critics describe as having no parallel in the country's history.

But it is the runaway price

which are bothering the common man of Nepal the most. Inflation shot up, as recorded by official economic survey, in 1980 by 12.2 per cent in Kathmandu valley, by 8.1 per cent in Tarai (southern Nepal) and by 9.8 per cent in the hilly region.

The price situations, as indicated by the national consumer price index, got alarmingly out of hand since 1978. It recorded an increase of 11.2 per cent that year and 9.8 per cent in the two following years.

Nepalese leaders tend to blame external factors like rising oil prices for the high inflationary trend. But the Nepalese, 40 per cent of whom are found to be below poverty line, have taken note of what the critics call "the unconvincing justification of the Government's incompetence and unaccountability."

What actually rankles many discontented Nepalese is the widening gap between very few rich and the bulk of the abject poor.

Although the Government has given top priority to agricultural development, production went down by 1.1 per cent during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1975-1980). Agriculture is the mainstay of Nepal's poor, contributing about 62 per cent of the gross domestic product and 80 per cent of total exports.

The Government attributed the decline in farm output to the continued drought for three years. The impact of the drought is worst this year. Consequently, Nepal changed since 1980 from a food exporter to a food importer.

And this has told badly on Nepal's foreign trade. Official statistics show that exports increased by 5 per cent while imports rose by 14.1 per cent annually during 1975-80. In 1975, the trade deficit jumped to 925 million rupees (US\$62.6 million), then went up to 2,372 million rupees (US\$160 million) in 1980.

What looks distressing is the sheer lack of natural resources for Nepal's future development. Nepal has already used up its rich forest resources for pressing human settlement. Land use has reached a saturation point.

SMUGGLING FROM AFGHANISTAN CRITICIZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 Nov 82 p 9

[Editorial: "Smuggling's Parallel Trade System"]

[Text] Mr. Abdullah Ismael, President of the Department of Business and Commerce in Karachi, has directed the attention of the Federal Ministers of Treasury, Business and Commerce to the heavy damage that the unobstructed, illegal sale of the so-called "duty-free Afghan cargo" in Pakistan is doing to the national treasury and the country's industry and commerce. According to Mr. Ismael, smuggling has now become so widespread that the Pakistani manufacturers of tires, tubes, crockery, parts and tools for motor cars, pens, pencils, etc., and the importers (with official tax) of betelnut are apprehensive that their businesses may collapse. He warned that if strict and immediate measures are not taken to curb the widespread practice of smuggling, the factories which produce these products within the country will close.

The practice of smuggling every kind of foreign goods and equipment from Afghanistan is a very old one, and the result of the incomprehensible overlooking of this by the officials involved has been that the goods smuggled from the Afghanistan route which were previously just in the tribal areas in Lundi Kotal, Barrah, etc., or in Baluchistan in Chaman, Quetta, Noshki, etc., have now spread to all parts of the country, and now there are "Barrah markets" in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Karachi, etc. which are known to the public and the officials alike. The situation which resulted in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion was worrisome from the point of view of Pakistan's freedom and security, but some began to think that now the smuggling of goods from Afghanistan into Pakistan would decrease and gradually end, as Afghanistan was absorbed in its own worries. But instead of decreasing, the smuggling has increased, because the smugglers have now clearly made it common practice that the goods Afghanistan legally imports with tariff duties from Pakistan are coming into the custody of smugglers in Pakistan before reaching there. It is said that the same thing is happening with the foreign goods Iran imports from Pakistan because the Gulf routes have become restricted due to the Gulf war. There is nothing hidden about this illegal, parallel system of trade through smuggling, but the government officials concerned don't seem to be doing anything to remove this secret (but obvious to everyone) cause of severe damage to the country. They have considered it an easy enough remedy, however, to increase government revenues by raising the tax rate, even though

on the one hand this increases the burden on industry and commerce, and on the other hand gives indirect encouragement to the practice of smuggling.

These details are not hidden from any knowledgeable person, but the authorities in the federal ministries of the Treasury, Commerce and Industry have not felt any need of effective preventive measures, and the speech of the president of the Department of Industry and Commerce in Karachi seems equivalent to trying to tell them, "Oh Sir, wake up and take a look, or we will turn to ashes before you know it." It is true that sympathy for the preservation of Pakistan's freedom and security has increased in the world because of the situation in Afghanistan, and because of this it is easier to secure foreign aid and loans than it was before. The turmoil which was becoming commonplace during the previous regime has lessened, and the abundance of wealth from foreign exchange sent by Pakistanis living abroad has increased, which has also increased the revenues of the government, but these are not such permanent and fixed positive matters that we should be dazzled by them and become complacent and have made it a commonplace to ignore and be insensitive to the weakening of the country's economic foundations by smuggling and its attendant destruction of values and character, and administrative shortsightedness and corruption.

Realism, intelligence and farsightedness demand that in the interest of the country the permission for Pakistanis living abroad to bring or send back every kind of goods should be somewhat restricted, and in this regard, this privilege should be conditional upon legally sent foreign exchange rather than length of residence. But instead of positive actions along these lines we are witnessing an increase in smuggling with great indifference. The interest of the country demands an increase in production within the country, but the lust for foreign goods has increased to such an extent that the distinction between legal and illegal means has been erased. This is not a symbol of confidence and ambition but of shortsightedness and unforgivable negligence of the best interests of the country. The present government of Afghanistan, by taking illegitimate advantage of the benefits of transit taxes is embarked on a policy of hollowing out the foundation of Pakistan's economy by making Pakistan an open market for the whole world's smugglers. That is why it should be impressed upon them that the conditions and privileges of these benefits can also be given an immediate second look. In addition, there should be immediate and strict control of those elements in Pakistan which have made smuggling a widespread parallel trade system.

9914

CSO: 4656/52

# PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS OF INDIAN SECURITY CONCERNS ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Dec 82 p 7

[Article by Brig. A. R. Siddiqi (Retd)]

[Text]

Pre-eminence appears to have become the popular and convenient euphemism for hegemonism and pre-dominance. The expression 'superpower' itself is coming into bad odour and China — admittedly the third superpower — resents it like a swearword.

It is amazing how a mere change of appellation can make what is bad look less bad without, of course, altering its essence and reality. In the final analysis, it is just a PR ploy, a plain and simple exercise in image-building or just a form of deliberate cultivated modesty in international relations.

India's dream of regional supremacy, born on the eve of political independence and adumbrated in K.M. Panniker's geo-political and Jawaharlal Nehru's utopian formulations, turned into an achievable ambition and a veritable thrust soon after independence, more particularly since the dismemberment of Pakistan, in 1971. It appears to have acquired a sense of destiny now.

Like the US, the Soviet Union and China, pre-eminent nations in the international sense, India would like to be accepted and recognised as the pre-eminent nation in the regional setting. It has the demographic, territorial and the technological factors in its favour, and is fast building up its military power (conventional and nuclear) to establish its claim to regional supremacy.

Pre-eminence, unlike pre-

dominance, is a more convenient cost-effective posture relatively free from the hazards of actual armed conflict and military occupation. Unless over-exerted, pre-eminence can be just as effective as pre-dominance without its ill-effects.

Having achieved its aim of halving the united, bi-zonal Pakistan, (posing a threat to its north-western and north-eastern flanks in the Subcontinent and rankling as a thorn in its side internationally as the fifth largest nation of the world) India need no longer get itself physically involved in yet another armed conflict with unpredictable consequences. It could now depend more on a projection rather than an actual use of force in its future dealings with Pakistan and its other neighbours, including China.

As a developing country faced with the twin threats of population explosion and dire poverty it seeks peace in the region but without compromising its status as the 'regional influential'.

Of the twin pillars of India's strategy for peace and security in South Asia, the first is a freeze or a de facto recognition of its existing borders, including the actual line of control in Kashmir and the disputed territories with China, like Arunachal Pradesh in the North-Eastern Frontier Agency. The second is the exclusion of superpowers from South Asia and the Indian Ocean so as to be in a better position to exert pressure on the smaller and the weaker littorals.

It is noteworthy just the same that in spite of its great allergy to superpower presence in and

around the Subcontinent and its firm commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement, India remains the only country of the region with a defence arrangement with the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of August, 1971. Furthermore, it virtually condones the strong Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and is not opposed to the continued presence of foreign troops in Kampuchea.

Reverting to Kashmir, the main asus belli, India considers itself absolved from all its international commitments towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute through a *lebenskräftige*. Indian scholars use a good deal of sophisticated, though not necessarily sound reasoning, to riggle out of the problem. For example, K. Subrahmanyam in his paper at the seminar on South Asian security held recently at Islamabad, traced the origin of the Kashmir issue to the Transfer of Power Act that propounded the doctrine of lapse of paramountcy at in his opinion encouraged various despotic princes to try to stay out of the two dominions.

"But for this attempt at Balkanization, the subcontinent there would have been no Kashmir issue at all", quipped Subrahmanyam. From the above premise, it would follow that the root of the Kashmir issue lay in a legal flaw or a deliberate mischief committed by the outgoing colonial Power, and accepted condoned, by both the Muslim League and the Congress leadership.

In other words, the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India and its subsequent forcible occupation by the latter had nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of the Indian secularism. Here, however, Subrahmanyam shifts his ground in disregard of paramountcy creating the whole problem. "The Kashmir issue", he argues rather paradoxically, "is not stated as a territorial or a boundary dispute but one questioning the basis of the transfer of power act on the basis of religious affiliations. India's acceptance of any *lebenskräftige* on the principle of reli-

gion determining nationality (something analogous to the Zionist approach) is totally unacceptable.....".

The above statement is plain sophistry with very little sense or logic. It raises no end of questions: suppose paramountcy, the instrument controlling the special relationship between the British Crown and the Indian princely states outside British India, would have been transferred to the successor governments of India and Pakistan, would not the state of Jammu and Kashmir have become a part of Pakistan quite automatically without compromising the secular character of India?

Furthermore, if Kashmir was indeed so important a matter of life and death for the Indian constitution, why did India accept the various UN resolutions for a peaceful settlement of the dispute? Why was the dispute, at the end of each armed conflict, recognised and a solemn commitment made to resolve it peacefully? What is the meaning of the Tashkent Declaration and the Simla Agreement? Would a divided Jammu and Kashmir, as at present, testify more to India's secular character than a re-united Jammu and Kashmir according to the wishes and verdict of its own people?

The trouble with the Indian scholars (since this is largely an argument at the academic level, official planners and policy-makers are excluded for the moment) is that would like to have just so much of every thing as would suit them without regard to a mutuality of interest. For instance, Subrahmanyam makes a case for "a common recognition that interventionism of extra-regional Powers pose a great threat to our common security than our own petty squabbles".

"In India", he goes on to say, "any perception of linkage of a country of the subcontinent with extra regional powers stir up the historical memories of the past instances of collaboration between some of the Indian princes and extra regional forces that let to the invasion of India".

The history of foreign invasions

of India is the store-house of many an agonising memory of betrayal and intrigue by one Indian ruler against another, and should best be left alone. In any case, how is it at all relevant to the present circumstance when India is no longer India but the South Asian Subcontinent — the home of so many independent and sovereign States.

Once again, Subrahmanyam hastens to shift his ground realising his own country's special linkage with the Soviet Union. Elaborating his view of "a common security perception", he says, "Let it be clear this is not an advocacy of a Xenophobic middle Kingdom approach of no contact with external world....".

"Since the region is a developing one and there is not enough surplus within the region to sustain optimum development, there has been a flow of aid from outside. Even for acquisition of military hardware the country may have to adopt differentiated policies....".

Of the Pakistani offer of a no-war pact to India, Subrahmanyam says, "...a no-war pact will not be enough, especially in view of the memories of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Panchsheel Agreement (of 1954 between China and India).

There are cases in which the No-war Pact became a cover for preparations for war there must be a recognition that peace and security in South Asia cannot be achieved by a mere no-war pact without embedding it within the larger active process of promotion of peaceful co-existence".

The question is how can the "larger active process" get under way at all if smaller and more specific issues are not even considered. The ring of arrogance and over-confidence in the Indian argument is too loud and clear to miss. India would either have a thing on its terms or would have none of it at all.

The least India would settle for is unqualified recognition of its pre-eminence in the regional setting as the principal pre-condition for any meaningful and serious effort towards a subcontinental strategy for peace and security.



CHANGE OF RULER DOES NOT CHANGE SOVIET POLICY

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 Dec 82 p 3

[Editorial]: "The Warning of the Soviet Diplomatic Mission"

[Text] The claim made by a representative of a high-ranking Soviet diplomatic mission in Islamabad that the Soviet Union to this day has not attacked any country, and that it will not attack Pakistan either, is a doubtful claim, but his statement that the governments of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will not tolerate external interference in the internal affairs of the country very long, and that the Soviet Union has made its position in this regard clear to the Pakistan government is synonymous with a veiled threat.

This warning from the Soviet diplomatic mission should give pause to those circles in Pakistan who have begun to express optimism in reference to the recent change of leadership in the Soviet Union on the basis that the former President Brezhnev gave the order for the invasion of Afghanistan against the advice of the then leader of the secret organization, the KGB, Yuri Andropov, so that now that power has come into the hands of Andropov himself, he will change the Soviet policy in regard to Afghanistan. This circle supports its optimism by making particular mention of the fact that on the occasion of the funeral of the late Brezhnev when a great many leaders had come to Moscow from various countries, among the four or five leaders Mr. Andropov made time to see was our President Ziaul Haq, who a week before the death of Brezhnev had said in Jakarta (Nov. 5) while on a tour of the Far East that, "We have had indications that the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and Pakistan has no reason to disbelieve the Soviet Union on this matter." Upon his return to Islamabad too, President Zia had described his talk with the new Soviet Leader Mr. Andropov as "beneficial and useful," and had also said that "both sides expressed a desire to have additional discussions on an appropriate level."

The President's statements are undoubtedly important in their place, but it is a universally accepted truth that there is no immediate or fundamental change in the policy of ideological countries like the Soviet Union because of a change in rulers, and this is confirmed by the thoughts being expressed by those knowledgeable and mature Western observers who are reacting to circles there caught up in a false optimism who hope that the policies followed by the Soviet Union under the late Brezhnev will change with the coming of

Mr. Andropov. According to these observers the only thing which can be relied upon to change Soviet policy is whatever kind of positive effort the Western countries under the leadership of America can make to counter the boundless military power of the Soviets with a united and effective effort.

The fundamental point which one must keep in mind in regard to the Soviet Union is that its philosophy (which is for communism to conquer the entire world), which is reflected in its system of government, is inculcated in every aspect of national life, from the beginning of education onward, and no opposition to this philosophy is tolerated. From the most ordinary worker to the highest official belief in this philosophy is given the utmost importance. So they become more deeply dyed with this philosophy as they increase in age and status. So the men (the members of the Polit Bureau) in whose hands the reins of government are at the present time, have spent their entire lives in the shadow of this philosophy and in testimony to its implementation, and as common parlance has it, they have been completely "brain-washed." And it is as a result of their firm convictions, or their remaining within the bounds of their own ideology, that, although the United Nations General Assembly has with a large majority demanded four times in the last three years that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan so that the people there may have an opportunity to freely decide their own affairs without any external interference and oppression, and although the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned countries too have emphatically and repeatedly made demands of the Soviet Union along the same lines, still the rulers of this super power have not taken any particular notice of this worldwide demand.

9914

CSO: 4656/52

JI DEMANDS LIFTING OF BAN ON POLITICAL PARTIES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec. 27: Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, Naib Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami, has said that if the government was serious about restoration of democracy in the country, his party would consider to co-operate with it.

Addressing a Press conference here today, he observed that the Martial Law regime has disappointed the people during the last five and half years and has proved to be worse than the previous government.

He said if government sought co-operation of the political parties it should withdraw the bans from political parties and allow political activities under an agreed code of ethics.

Censorship in its different forms should be lifted immediately and

political prisoners and detenus be released forthwith, 1973 constitution be restored and elections be held on the basis of proportional representation and separate electorate, he demanded.

He observed that 12th of Rabiul-Auwal, was the most suitable day for an announcement accepting the above demands. He said that only if People's Party apologised for its past misdeeds, J.I would consider to co-operate with it.

In reply to a question he said he knew nothing about any proposed civil government nor had he received any indication in this regard.

In reply to another question he observed that in his opinion any party which was committed to 1973 Constitution but was not in favour of implementation of a system in accordance with Quran and Sunnat was not patriotic.

CSO: 4600/196

# CHANCES OF CONCILIATION AMONG TEHRIK FACTIONS TERMED NEGATIVE

Karachi DAWN in English 21 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec. 20: Possibility of a rapprochement between the two warring groups of Tehrik-i-Istaqlal has been ruled out by the political circles here.

The Working Committee of the party is scheduled to meet on December 23 at Peshawar to discuss the situation within the party created by internal strifes and groupings.

The differences in the party surfaced in September when the Central Working Committee decided, by a majority vote, to remain with the MRD following MRD's decision to constitute its

It is said that the top bosses of the party, including Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, acting President Muneer Shah, and Secretary-General Musheer Pesh Imam, were against this decision. But the majority did not endorse their views and the day was carried by Mr. Nafees Siddiqui who was supposed to be the leader of the pro-MRD group in the party. Later, Mr. Nafees was expelled from the party on the plea that he accepted an office in MRD against the decision of the party. This was

followed by the expulsion of Mr. Yunus Khan, acting Secretary-General of T.I., NWFP, and Mr. Humayun Gauhar Information Secretary of T.I., Sind, for criticising the expulsion of Mr. Nafees.

A reconciliation attempt was made recently by Mian Mahmood Ali Qasuri, the ailing Vice-President of the party. A meeting of Muneer Shah and Nafees was arranged at a dinner in Lahore hosted by Mr. Aitezaz Ahsan for Mr. Nafees when the later visited Lahore early this month.

As a result of the meeting the Central Committee was summoned for Dec. 23 and there were chances that the expulsion notices issued to all the three persons would be withdrawn.

Recently a statement made by Mr. Muneer Shah claimed that Mr. Nafees had apologised for his role and his apology would be considered by the Central Committee. Mr. Nafees in a rejoinder categorically denied this and challenged that his letter of apology should be published within a week. This challenge was replied with a statement that Mr. Nafees had offered a verbal apology. This encounter between the two leaders has completely ruled out the possibility of a patch-up.

CSO: 4600/195

## IDBP LOAN RECOVERY REPORTED IMPROVED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 27 Dec 82 p 7

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec. 26: The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan recorded significant improvement in the approval of financial assistance, recovery of loans, implementation of approved projects and disbursement of loans throughout the country during the year 1981-82, according to the Bank's Annual Report, released after the Annual General Meeting of the bank's share-holders here today.

The amount of financial assistance approved by the bank during 1981-82 aggregated Rs. 605.05 million as against Rs. 453.30 million recorded during the preceding year, a 33.5 per cent increase. This is the highest level of approvals ever recorded by the bank in a single year.

The new projects sanctioned by the Bank during 1981-82 numbered 162 involving Rs. 450 million, which constituted 80 per cent of the total number of projects sanctioned during the year. As against this, 150 new projects involving Rs. 389.9 million were approved during the preceding year. The remaining 20 per cent of the projects approved by the bank during 1981-82 were for expansion, balancing and modernisation of ongoing projects involving loans aggregating Rs. 155.05 million.

In the total amount of loans approved in 1981-82, the relative share of Baluchistan province increased to 6.9 per cent from 3.4 per cent in the previous year and that of NWFP to 22.2 per cent from 21.8 per cent.

Local currency loans disbursed by the bank during the year under report, registered an increase of 14 per cent over last year's level. Disbursement of foreign currency loans, however, declined by 34 per cent as the foreign exchange resources of the bank were completely exhausted and the fresh IDA credit of U.S. dollar 30 million became operative late in June 1982

and could not be utilised during the year. The disbursement of foreign currency loans is expected to pick-up in 1982-83.

The share of NWFP in total loans disbursed by the bank during 1981-82 increased by 343 per cent and of Baluchistan by 155 per cent over the disbursement of loans by the bank during 1980-81.

During the year under report, 93 projects involving loans of Rs. 214.6 million were completed as against 65 projects involving Rs. 178.7 million completed during the preceding year. The bank-financed projects completed during the year are estimated to have created about 2,500 new jobs. The foreign exchange earnings through the export oriented projects completed during 1981-82, are estimated to be around Rs. 117.8 million.

During 1981-82, the bank took concrete steps to recover maximum amount of outstanding dues as a result of which recoveries increased to Rs. 273.7 million from Rs. 242.1 million in the preceding year, registering a rise of 13 per cent. It was the largest amount of loans ever recovered by the bank.

At the same time, intensive efforts were made by the bank to revive sick and closed units by formulating rehabilitation package deals under the Beg Committee constituted by the Federal Government for the revival of sick units.

With a view to enable the country to save foreign exchange, the bank continued its efforts in promoting the use of locally fabricated machinery. The sanctions for projects based on locally fabricated machinery during the year, increased to Rs. 184.09 million from the last years level of Rs. 146.89 million indicating an increase of 25 per cent.

The bank earned a net profit of Rs. 17.2 million during 1981-82 as against Rs. 14.3 million in 1980-81.

# LACK OF SERIOUS PROGRAMMING IN MUSLIM LEAGUE CRITICIZED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 7 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Irshad Ahmed Haqqani: "Muslim League: How Long Will These Easy-Going Politics and Leadership Last?"]

[Text] In light of the fact that all political parties in Pakistan have been inactive for the past 3 years, it is not necessary to discuss the resultant problems in these organizations. The ineffectiveness of these political parties is not surprising, given the present political climate. However, now even some of the more prominent parties take positions on various events in the country and, it can be said, in the process at least give us some idea of what kind of policies they are pursuing. There is one party, however, that, except to its own leadership, has become a puzzle to everyone as a result of its activities. This party not only considers itself one of the more prominent political organizations but also labels itself one among the "two and a half" parties in the country. Additionally, the leadership of this party claims that only it can save the country, and it has the self-delusion that it deserves honors and the keys to power whether there are popular elections or not. As for the other one and a half parties, this particular organization thinks that one of them had a very dark recent past infested with corruption and that it has lost popular appeal. The second "half" party also has a discreditable past; thus, all credits and glories must go to this particular party, according to its president. He does not, however, feel any need to elaborate on the what, when or how of it.

The Muslim League does hold a prominent place in our country's history. As long as the leadership of Quaide Azam Jinnah guided this party, it remained a democratic and principled organization with clear goals. Bad days followed and it fell prey to internal strife. Its leadership did not demonstrate any outstanding traits and the late Ayub Khan used its name in grinding his own axe. We are well aware of the ups and downs this party went through after that. Until recently, there were three factions in the party; according to the grapevine, it now has two. One faction has a clear political stand and is using its old and well-known methods. One could disagree with this faction openly or even label its leaders as traitors; this faction maintains its stance and openly opposes enforcement of martial law. The second faction considers itself the original Muslim League. The claim of this faction seems to be about right, as most of its membership is

composed of well-known Muslim Leaguers. This faction, considered the larger of the two within the party, is very vague about its activities, policies, preferences, political philosophy and allegiance. Its leader has been bragging about his connections with [the military] G.H.Q. for some time and still claims to be close to it. He claims to be opposed to the martial law but still wants the establishment of a sovereignty under the martial law!!! He refused to sign the draft prepared by his closest ally, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, because he felt that this petition did not seek the type of sovereignty demanded by the faction's leaders. This party demands one and a quarter years of planning between a decision to hold public elections and the actual elections. This party opposed the establishment of the Federal Advisory Council on the grounds of a difference in principles, but those who were opposed to this decision are still party members. The leader of the party entertains members of the council on behalf of the party and accepts Koranic manuscripts from them. The country is going through a serious, almost critical period. The differences between the government and politicians are increasing daily. The wise and the far-sighted are expressing their distress at the harm that the present circumstances might do to the country. Some are even worried about the future of the country's central government. Those in power do not think it is necessary to hide their own ambitions while discussing the establishment of a democratic government. President Zia recently announced that it is not possible to hold elections for a civilian government for several years. The leaders of the large Muslim League, however, are acting as if a big show was being staged in the country. Easy talk, joking and clowning have become a ritual with them. Even the most serious political problem is treated as a subject for humor. Their whole world revolves around discussions of dinners, shami kebabs, samosas, [snacks] cakes, and various dimensions of "round," "crooked," "straight" and "square" tables. And on top of this, they all have the nerve to proclaim themselves as the only benefactors and owners of the country. They want the right to govern, elections or not.

Even more surprising is the fact that the rest of the leadership of this founding party of our country is observing all this as if it were the proper attitude. Perhaps they are enjoying it. Some tragic plays have built-in funny scenes to provide comic relief, which is understandable but in this play we see nothing but clowning and joking. No one offers a serious solution to the country's problems. They have neither any clearly stated position nor any demands. This condition of the political party that claims to be the founder of Pakistan as well as its present leader and pilot is not only surprising but also puzzling. Power at any price has been the weakness of several Muslim Leaguers and now even some of its members hesitate to take a clear stand on martial law because of this weakness. The more bizarre aspect of this party is the lack of any sensitivity on the part of its members or their opposition to the ineffectiveness or lack of seriousness of its leadership and politics. It seems as if the entire membership of the party is treating the problems of the country as a joke. Of course, the Muslim League has seen its ups and downs in the past. It has its weaknesses but there are some serious and principled members in it as well. There are even some people who have worked

with Quaide Azam. At least these people should show some concern about the image of the party and not let it become a laughing stock of the country. They should form a clear stand on various issues, offer it seriously and in keeping with the great past of the party and play an important role in the political life of the country. The party cannot impress the intellectuals and the serious people of the country by cutting huge expensive anniversary cakes. There cannot be any better way to disillusion the youth of the country about the Muslim League than this attitude. If not for themselves, at least for the political image of the country, the members of the Muslim League are advised to take action and establish serious politics in their party.

7997

CSO: 4656/54



## INCREASE IN NUMBER OF LANDLESS FARMERS REPORTED

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Dec 82 p 12

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 24: The number of landless farmers in Pakistan has increased to three to four million — almost doubled since the land reforms 1972.

Provision should be made in the sixth Five-Year Plan to remedy the situation.

These observations were made by a panel of economic experts and researchers at a symposium held to elicit public opinion on the next Plan.

The symposium was organised by "Group 83", a forum set up to suggest measures to the Government for improvement in the fields of agriculture, industry, economy, science and technology. This was the first meeting forum which would continue to meet every month till the Sixth Five-Year Plan is finalised.

The meeting observed that the last two land reforms (1959 and 1972) failed to deliver the goods, and as such the farmers had become dependent on landlords. Speakers suggested that a broad-

based concept of land holdings and higher yield should be adopted in the next Plan, either by converting the existing uneconomical land holdings into profitable ones or by introducing a system of share holding for large-scale mechanised farming.

According to official figures, quoted by speakers, the numbers of uneconomical land holdings amounts to 90 per cent of the total cultivable land.

It was also observed that in the coming years, Pakistan was going to be an industrialised country and, therefore, planning should be made to maintain a balance between the availability of labour force and development projects. In future, measures should be adopted so as not to increase the number of landless farmers.

At present about two millions landless farmers were awaiting orders from the Government for the possession of land acquired after the reforms, the speakers noted.

CSO: 4600/196

## SEPARATION OF NORTHERN AREAS FROM FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TERRITORY DEMANDED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 27 Dec 82 p 4

[Article by Anwar Iqbal]

[Text] RAWALPINDI, Dec. 27: Students from Gilgit and Baltistan at a joint Press conference today, have demanded the separation of the Northern Areas from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the NWFP as "this partnership has always been a stumbling block in the progress of the Northern Areas. They said that the Northern Areas had nothing in common with the Tribal Areas rather they were poles apart; ethnically, politically, geographically and linguistically. The Tribal Areas were given representation in the Senate and the National Assembly of Pakistan in the past whereas the Northern Areas were not, they added and said, even in the present Federal Council these areas had been dealt with separately which showed that Gilgit and Baltistan had a separate and distinct political entity and therefore could not be merged with the Tribal Areas only for the convenience of the Establishment Division.

The students who belonged to the Gilgit, Baltistan Students Central Organisation, further said that the Tribal Areas were provincially administered by the Government of the NWFP while the Northern Areas come directly under the

Federal Government and had a separate Martial Law Administrator as well.

They said the separation of Gilgit and Baltistan from the FATA would help the candidates from the Northern Areas in having more representation in the CSS and other occupations. Presently, they said, the three districts of Baltistan, Gilgit and Diamer had a joint quota of four per cent with the Tribal Areas of the NWFP. This partnership had always been a stumbling block in the recruitment of candidates from the extremely backward parts of Northern Areas.

They also demanded a raise in scholarships and said that presently a student from the Northern Areas was getting a scholarship of Rs. 2,500 per year which was not sufficient as tuition fees, hostel charges and all other expenses had been doubled by the government itself, therefore, the government should also consider the scholarships, revised about five years back and raise them to Rs. 3,500 per student annually.

They also demanded more seats in the medical, dental and other professional colleges for the educational year 1983-84 and said that in the past there was a fixed quota of 10 students in the cadet colleges and public schools as well but it was later cancelled by the government. This quota should immediately be restored, they further demanded.

diately be restored, they further demanded.

Their demands also included more quota for the students from the Northern Areas for further education and advanced training abroad, construction of a degree and an intermediate college in Gilgit and Skardu and a new building in Gilgit for the intermediate college, opening of the secondary education board in Gilgit, cancellation of all boy's domiciles issued to the student who did not belong to the Northern Areas and a fool-proof system for putting an end to this practice, establishment of a high power institute to look after the interests of these areas in civil services, an end to the hegemony of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs regarding the affairs of the Northern Areas, more hospitals and medical staff for Gilgit and Baltistan etc.

They also demanded that instead of the out dated Folker Friendship aeroplanes, new and all weather interceptor type planes should be introduced on the Northern route as these old planes could not go to the Northern Areas in bad weather. They further demanded that to link the far flung areas of Gilgit and Baltistan where even jeeps could not reach, with the other parts of the country a helicopter service should be introduced.

# LACK OF CLEAR POLICY ON ENERGY CRITICIZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Dec 82 p 4

[Editorial: "Energy Policy: Another Victim of Ad-hocism"]

[Text]

ACCORDING to reports, a serious energy crisis is in the making in the country, largely due to the fact that there has been very slow progress in the evolution and consequently, implementation of a proper energy development plan. It appears that the Planning Commission had entered into an agreement with the Geneva-based International Energy Development Corporation in April this year under the terms of which the IEDC was to submit a draft on a 20 years energy plan in addition to acting as the principal adviser on energy development to the Government. It was expected that the recommendations made by the Corporation would be included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan scheduled to be launched on 1st July. However, the drafting of the energy plan appears to have run into snags and we are now told that the Government is not in a position to take a final decision on how to overcome the impending energy crisis.

In a recent statement the Chairman WAPDA has said that due to low water level in the rivers and the closure of canals, a shortfall in power of around 700 MW is expected which will require load-shedding involving the shutting down of commercial centres at sunset, staggering of holidays by industry and the banning of illuminations. At the same time, the government has decided to stop new Sui Gas connections to private consumers since it is required by a number of industrial projects which were put on it to bring down costs of production that have been steadily rising because of an increase in oil prices in the international market. The decision to put the country's major industries on gas appears to have been taken rather haphazardly without considering its long-term implications. Midway the Government has realised that the Sui Gas fields have reached a stage of saturation and that reserves are liable to last for only the next 20 years or so if the present levels of gas extraction are maintained. Now the Government has directed these industries to reduce gas consumption with the result that certain projects which were entirely dependant on gas have had to be closed down for an unspecified period.

Earlier this year there were rumours that the Government was considering a multi-million dollar energy development plan for striking a long term balance between the national requirements and production capacity with a view to closing

the gap between supply and demand. At present there is a total generating capacity (including thermal, hydel, and nuclear) of only 3700 MW for a population of 80 million, which means that in terms of per capita consumption of power, Pakistan's levels are amongst the lowest in the world even less than the Asian average. To raise the present level of 180 units per capita consumption to 500 units will require a five fold increase in the country's capacity by the turn of the century. The combined oil, gas, coal and hydel resources will be unable to support this capacity. It is for this reason that the development of nuclear energy has become a must. At the same time, there is an urgent need for the Government to adopt an energy policy which will tackle the present crisis with a view to over-coming it and to chalk out realistic measures and targets in this field. A 20-year energy policy is perhaps too ambitious at this stage and perhaps somewhat Quixotic. The primary concern should be to do away with the present ad hoc-ism that has governed energy policy so far and instead of adopting vacillatory and contradictory measures to evolve a clear-cut and consistent plan for immediate implementation.

CSO: 4600/196

# RESHUFFLE IN SIND ADMINISTRATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec. 28: The Sind Government has, with immediate effect, ordered the transfers and postings of a number of high officials in the province.

According to an official notification, Ali Dino Paniwar, Secretary Education has been transferred and posted as senior Member Board of Revenue, Sind at Hyderabad relieving Ali Mohammed G. Shaikh of the additional charge. Allah Bux Soomro, Director General Agriculture Extension Hyderabad, has been posted as Secretary Agriculture Livestock, Fisheries and Food Department while S.M. Wasim's services have been placed at the disposal of the federal government on promotion.

Mazharul Haq Siddiqi, Secretary Services and General Administration Department, has been

transferred to hold the charge of Finance Department only till return of Abdul Karim Lodhi, Finance Secretary when he will take up as Secretary Education Department. During the interim period Additional Secretary Education will hold the additional charge of Secretary Education Department.

Syed Sardar Ahmed, Director Sind Regional Plan Organisation, has been transferred and posted as Commissioner Karachi Division vice M.M. Usmani who has been transferred and posted as Secretary Services and General Administration Department.

Through another notification the Sind Government transferred Hameed Ahmed, Chief Conservator of Forests, Hyderabad and posted as Secretary Sind Wildlife and Forest Department vice W.A. Kirmani who has been posted as Inspector General Forests under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Islamabad.

CSO: 4600/196

## SIND FARM RESEARCH PROJECT STARTS

Karachi DAWN in English 20 Dec 82 p 4

[Text] NAWABSHAH Dec 19 The Government has commenced Sind agricultural extension and adaptive research project with the financial assistance of World Bank, sponsored by Sind Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Department from October 1982.

This was disclosed by Deputy Director, Agriculture Mr. Abdul Hakim Dayo, here on Saturday.

He said that the project which involves a total outlay of Rs 153.25 million, include a soft loan of Rs 89.1 million from international development agency, whereas UNDP would provide a grant of Rs 6.40 million. The rest Rs 57.75 million are to be financed by Government which include a foreign exchange component of Rs 41.63 million. Besides, UNDP has agreed to provide consultants services at an estimated cost of dollars 6,46,800 as a grant.

Mr Dayo said that the project area comprises irrigated areas of Sind, with special emphasis and intensive extension work in Hyderabad, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Sukkur and Larkana in the first phase, which have been provided with organisational readjustment, transport and adaptive research facilities. These facilities, he said, shall be provided throughout 12 rural districts of Sind in the second phase.

He said that the increase in staff together with provision of housing

throughout province is intended in the second phase. Meanwhile, in Nawabshah district 37 houses for field assistants have been takenover, while 20 houses are under final touches.

The project is based on proved advantages of extending modern technology to small farmers and to backward areas aiming to attain self-sufficiency in wheat (the main concern) and to increase production of rice and cotton for domestic consumption and export.

Mr Dayo emphasised that the project would contribute to improve productivity of small farmers in the irrigated area who, he said, constitute majority of the farming community.

He said that the project also aims to attain an annual growth rate of 6 per cent for the agriculture sector, as envisaged in fifth Five-Year Plan against the estimated population growth rate of 3 per cent per annum.

The project which was scheduled to commence in February 81, started 20 months late in October '82, due to requisite preliminary proceedings.

The project is scheduled to be executed for a period of five years.

Telling the principal features of the project, the Deputy Director said that four adaptive research farms with the provision of necessary machinery and equipments as needed according to conditions of

the area have been established at various places of the project together with establishment of 15 training centres located at convenient distance for the trainees in the project area.

Regarding job opportunities for the local persons, he said that additional 460 positions in the extension service together with housing facilities and adequate vehicles have been created.

Mr Dayo said that pest scouting will also be introduced for the cotton crop on a pilot scale in Nawabshah district, through providing five pest scouts and suitable scouting equipment.

Deputy Secretary implementation, Chaudhry Shah Mohammad, who was on monitoring tour of the project area, told this correspondent that the project would cause increase in production of wheat, rice, sugarcane, cotton and other crops.

This increased production, he said, will have a major indirect effect on the Government revenue in as much as the Government will have to import less grains and oil seeds and increase cotton and rice exports.

It may be stated that the price of imported vegetable oil is generally twice the financial costs of oil obtained from home-grown sources.

Mr Chaudhry disclosed that a total of 5,475,000 hectares will be benefited by the project.

## TROLLEY BUS SYSTEM PLANNED FOR ISLAMABAD

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 82 p 4

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec 21: The Capital Development Authority has approved a 97.87 million dollar project for the introduction of the electric trolley bus system to improve transportation facilities in the Federal Capital, C.D.A. sources said here on Sunday.

The plan has been submitted to the Ministry of the Interior, and the work on the project will start after its approval by the Planning Commission.

The trolley bus system energised by electric power is successfully serving commuters in Shanghai, one of the world's most populous cities.

An attractive aspect of the system is that most of the necessary equipment required can be manufactured within Pakistan. The local industry will be able to build all the components of the electric trolley bus system with help from China.

A 7-member Chinese experts team had prepared a report on the establishment of the system in the capital. These experts during their stay in Pakistan, visited various industrial units of the country and reported that most of the equipment for the trolley bus system can

be manufactured locally.

The trolley system will be plying on routes from the Zero Point to Aabpara, the Melody Chowk, the Super Market and upto the Secretariat. The second proposed route is to the Peshawar Chowk via the Zero Point from Aabpara, while the third proposed route will be from the Super Market via the Jinnah Super Market upto the Zafar Chowk. The fourth route which may start a bit later will connect Chandni Chowk on Murree Road with the Zero Point.

According to the programme 50 trolley buses will be purchased from China including model S.K. 541 with a maximum capacity of 80 passengers and model S.K. 561 with a maximum capacity of 120 passengers.

The planners has been considering various proposals like electric trolley system, extension of railway line and increasing the number of buses and wagons to evolve rapid transit system between the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi and on the inter city routes of the capital.

In order to solve the transport problem in the capital and to save the precious hours of the people, the Capital Development Author-

ity conducted a survey, which thoroughly studied the suitability of various means of existing transport services including buses of the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation, private wagons and minibuses, Zuzuki vans, taxis, scooters and cycles.

According to the survey, 25 per cent Government employees in the capital have their own transport. More than 5 per cent own private cars, eight per cent have motorcycles or scooters while 12 per cent use cycles.

Seventyfive per cent Government employees besides the workers of private, autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies have to depend entirely on public transport.

The researchers of the survey, expected that the cyclists would shift to the use of buses if the public transport system improved.

Buses and wagons carry almost equal number of passenger, but in the inter-city routes of the capital, the wagons are dominating the buses.

The wagons provide transport facility to 42 per cent of the travelling public as against 30 per cent extended by the buses.

## PLEA FOR EXCHANGE OF METALLURGY EXPERTISE

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 82 p 4

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 21: The national seminar on Metallurgy and supporting materials, (which was inaugurated by the Federal Minister for Production and Railways, Lt. Gen Saeed Qadir) has recommended that the Government should arrange frequent exchange of expertise with friendly countries on engineering, materials, and their technology besides organising frequent visits and training programmes for the transfer of technology from the developed countries.

The seminar, which concluded here the other day, observed that the mineral resources of the country continue to be ignored as regards their proper exploration and exploitation. The country has not yet been able to reduce foreign dependence on raw materials despite the fact that steel industry has been established at a colossal cost.

It was also recommended that in view of the vital importance of this sector a separate ministry should be created to look after the various aspects, viz. exploration of indigenous raw materials and their exploitation, cost of production, utilisation

of the products of iron and steel industry, and their marketing. There was consensus of opinion on the need to provide financial support to the Pakistan Institute of Metallurgical Engineers as well as the departments of Metallurgical Engineering at various universities in order to enable them to undertake professional and research programmes.

The seminar also urged for re-examination and technical auditing of the sick metallurgical units both in public and private sectors with a view to their revitalisation.

Other recommendations of the seminar urged for simplification and streamlining of existing procedure for notification of facilities offered by friendly countries, integration of teaching and training courses at universities based on a system of cooperation between universities research organisations and industry, announcement of the national science and technology policy and filling of jobs falling within the domain of metallurgical engineering by qualified metallurgical engineers.

CSO: 4600/195



## RESENTMENT AGAINST MULTINATIONALS EXPRESSED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 18 Dec 82 p 4

[Editorial: "Wolf &amp; The Lamb"]

[Text]

WHAT Jeane R. Kirkpatrick, the US envoy to the United Nations, said at a breakfast meeting of a private foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, should not come as a rude shock to the people living in the Third World countries. Ridiculing aid to the developing nations, she said the UN efforts to redistribute wealth from the richer industrial countries to the poorer underdeveloped ones was an exercise in 'global socialism.' She said that such UN efforts were based on a distorted theory of 'class struggle.' According to her, the United Nations was trying to regulate business along 'an awesome range' and behind the moves was a 'kind of gross adaption of Marxist philosophy.' Challenging the theory, Kirkpatrick said 'wealth is not created by theft. It is created, as Adam Smith well understood, by innovation, investment and entrepreneurship.'

How true she is! The Western rule over the colonies was not exactly theft. As a matter of fact it was a colossal robbery and banditry. The world knows about the innovations through which the West grew rich. It also knows how the West came to rule over the colonies and how they were denuded of their raw materials and minerals. These colonies were divided into thousands of territories only to be gobbled up by Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and others. The people living in these colonies were treated like slaves and were made to slog at subsistence level. They were made to sell their agricultural produce at ridiculously low prices and made to buy back their manufactured products at exorbitant rates. Doesn't all this requires innovation, ingenuity and lot of entrepreneurship?

The world also knows how the multinationals operate. Their arbitrary and ziz-zag policies applied during the colonialist dominance and immediately

after are responsible for the developing countries' backwardness in all respects, be it economic, social or structural. Today the majority of developing nations are incapable of any sustained development to the point of self-sufficiency. The developed countries have always considered the Third World countries as a source of raw materials, agricultural products and cheap labour. Still their approach is the same, and this is the reason why there is flow of riches from the developed to the less developed economies. They have been and still remain a source of growing profits for the West and for the multinational companies.

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the annual average of income generated from foreign investments in the developing countries in the mid-seventies grew up to 26 billion dollars from 5.4 billion dollars in the sixties. Even these figures do not reveal the full information on actual incomes because they remain a guarded secret. On the other hand, the developing countries have lost in ten years about 175 billion dollars as a result of Western countries' manipulation of transfer prices. These are artificially reduced prices under which the affiliates of multinationals stationed in the developing countries export their products to the West while charging inflated prices for obtaining materials, equipment and patent rights in return. When the Third World is clamouring to bridge the wide gap between the rich and the poor, the industrialised countries are still bent upon exploiting the poor nations. At the last Cancun Summit the US suggested that the South should look after itself by abolishing its public sector and encouraging foreign investments. In other words the rich countries want to perpetuate the intervention by the multinationals in the developing economies of the poorer nations. Is this what Kirkpatrick calls innovation, investment and entrepreneurship?

CSO: 4600/195

## BRIEFS

ENGLISH FILMS BANNED--ISLAMABAD, Dec 21--As many as 12 English films have been banned by the Central Board of Film Censors over the past few months, causing a loss of over Rs 20,000 to NAFDEC. The NAFDEC, a Government-controlled body, is seriously considering changing its policy of importing English films. A comprehensive report in this connection has already been submitted to the Ministry concerned to determine the kind of films to be imported in Pakistan. The report was prepared by the MD, NAFDEC, who had visited UK and US to watch the rising trend of violence in the films. The Ministry concerned has been told the kind of violence which thrilled the American cinemagoers will not enchant the people in Pakistan. In US people love to watch those films having scenes of cannibalism, the report says. The final decision about the kind of films to be imported here will be taken by the Ministry of Culture, in consultation with the members of Film Censor Board. Meanwhile, the Board has asked its members to give up the trend of entertaining their friends and children by showing them pre-censored films at Censor Board. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 82 p 4]

PLEA FOR NATIONAL DRESS--LAHORE, Dec 21--The Idara-e Qaumi Tashkhush (Organization for National Identity) is undertaking a campaign for propagation of the Pakistan National dress as part of its celebrations of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's birthday celebrations later this month. The President of the Organisation, Dr. Akhtar Ali, and General Secretary Prof Malik Nooruddin, have appealed to Pakistanis to adopt the national dress. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 82 p 4]

CSO: 4600/195

NEW GOVERNMENT-TULF TALKS

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 3 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by D. B. S. Jeyaraj]

[Text]

A fresh round of talks between the Government and the TULF is likely to be initiated with immediate effect.

"The Island" learns that Dr. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, head of the Department of Political Science at the University of New Brunswick in Canada who is at present in the island will be instrumental in the conducting of these talks.

Leader of the Opposition, Mr. A. Amirthalingam, is expected to come down to Colombo this evening to participate in the talks.

Dr. Wilson was the primary force behind the on-going dialogue between the Govt. and the TULF which commenced last

year. Dr. Wilson came down from Canada to help in the initiation of the talks last year so as to bring about rapport between the Government and the TULF.

It is learnt that the new round of talks will primarily concentrate on the granting of District Ministerships to the TULF.

It is also learnt that the posts of Districts Ministers in five districts and a co-district Ministership would be offered to the TULF if the talks are successful.

It is understood that more powers may be allocated to the post of District Minister post if the TULF will accept those posts.

Dr. Wilson is the son-in-law of the late Mr. S. J. V. Chelvanayagam.

CSO: 4200/292

SAUDI ARABIA ORDERS LOCAL PRODUCE

Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 29 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] The five-man fruits and vegetables export mission visiting Saudi Arabia for the first time has returned with orders exceeding Rs. 10 million.

The previous Middle East mission to the United Arab Emirates netted orders worth Rs. 90 lakhs. "The response from the Saudis was so encouraging, some members of the mission telexed Sri Lanka to airlift supplies immediately, said a spokesman for the Export Development Board which spent Rs. 2-1/2 lakhs in sponsoring the mission.

The mission visited Jeddah, Riyadh, and Damam in Saudi Arabia and paid a second visit to Kuwait on the way home. Orders have been clinched with supermarkets, central markets, and commission agents at these places

The five exporters on the mission received orders for local leafy vegetables and yams and fruit--pineapple and mango. The members of the mission paid a handsome tribute to Sri Lanka's diplomatic representatives in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for the meticulous arrangements made to enable the exporters to meet the buyers.

The country was now assured of continued Middle East custom in fruits and vegetables said an EDB spokesman. He dispelled fears that local supplies would be affected, in the context of an average annual production of 600,000 tons of vegetables where exports totalled less than one percent of this amount.

"But a dark cloud was threatening an otherwise bright scene--Air Lanka is to up freight rates from January and this means we will lose out to the Indians and Bangladeshis", he said. An Air Lanka official confirmed that cargo and passenger rates on all routes were going up on January 15

An official of the Fruits and Vegetables Exporters and Producers Association, which includes Consolexpo, said Air Lanka's decision to up the rates next month was going to upset all their calculations. The cost and freight (C and F) values they had worked out showed the national carrier stood to benefit substantially from the new exports deal. They were meeting Air Lanka representatives this week to seek a compromise formula.

At the last Exporters forum held at the BMICH Trade Minister Lalith Athulathmudali said this matter would receive the attention of the Export Council of Ministers.

CSO: 4200/292

NEW INVESTMENT DIRECTION FOR 83-87

Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 31 Dec 82 p 1

[Text] With the country's political stability now assured till 1989, national planners are pressing on the effort of sustaining the unprecedented flow of aid that Sri Lanka has received in the past five years.

The Development Secretaries' Committee has been told by Dr. W. M. Tilakaratna, the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, that the public investment program for 1983-87 must be finalised by March 15.

"It is proposed to submit to the next aid group meeting a list of project ideas, with tentative costs and benefits, for which funding will be sought", he has said.

The Director of National Planning has advised that the tea, rubber and coconut tripod, on which the economy had long sat, needs the highest priority. The immediate need is to increase output, productivity and quality on the existing plantations, the planning authorities stress.

The possibility of making the traditional plantation sectoral development a lead project in the public investment program has been advocated.

Government economists believe that quick returns and effective cost--benefit results can be realised by such an effort.

Official sources said yesterday that the Mahaweli project which absorbed 40 per cent of the government's capital budget in 1982, limiting to some degree investment elsewhere in the agriculture sector, will not continue to swallow as much of the available capital resources in the next few years.

By 1985, the Mahaweli's share of the capital budget would have dropped to around 20 per cent. Planners stress that this massive development on which much of the country's economic hopes rest, must be made productive as speedily as possible with Mahaweli land brought quickly into cultivation.

"The priority of the Mahaweli is to complete the on-going program and bring the land in this area under cultivation expeditiously. No new programs should be started", the Director of National Planning has said.

The planners say that outside the Mahaweli there are too many long-gestation irrigation projects and have pressed for priority in the investment program for rehabilitation, maintenance and proper water management of already built irrigation capacity.

It has also been pointed out that investment on livestock subsidiary food crops and minor exports is still "very thin".

CSO: 4200/292

JAFFNA MP INTERROGATED BY POLICE

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 3 Jan 83 p 1

[Text]

The M.P. for Jaffna, Mr. V. Yogeswaran was quizzed by the C.I.D. for three hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. yesterday at Gurunagar.

Mr. Yogeswaran who declined to comment on the nature of the questioning described the whole exercise as "polite" and as conducted in a "cordial atmosphere."

"The Island" learns that an army major an Assistant Superintendent of Police and an Inspector of Police were present at the time of questioning.

It is learnt that Mr. Yogeswaran was questioned about his association with the

priests and professionals in custody, his connections with the Catholic church, his views about "Eelam" his connections with expatriate groups etc.

He was also interrogated about a statement made by a person in custody that the Jaffna M.P. had taken persons wounded in the Chavakachcheri police station attack for medical treatment in his car.

"The Island" understands that the Jaffna M.P. had denied the allegation.

Prayers and poojas were held at several places of worship in Jaffna yesterday for the well being of Mr. Yogeswaran.

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## MINISTER ASKS SOFTER STAND ON TERRORISM

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 3 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by D. B. S. Jeyaraj]

[Text]

Strong moves are afoot within Government ranks to effect a concessionary approach towards the terrorist problem in the north.

*'The Island'* learns that a prominent Minister from a minority community is initiating such moves which envisages commutation of sentences for those convicted of terrorism, the speedy release of incarcerated youths where there is lack of tangible evidence, and also the trying of offenders under the normal law and not the Terrorism Act if and when possible.

Informed sources told *'The Island'* that these moves were not aimed at condoning terrorism but rather at diffusing the sense of estrangement the Tamil public feels towards law-enforcement agencies engaged in anti-terrorist operations.

*'The Island'* understands that there is no possibility of the Prevention of Terrorism Act being repealed in the manner the TULF wants.

Informed sources said the Government would be trying to

remove certain irritants facing the Tamil people without resorting to a dialogue with the Government and that concessionary approach towards alleged terrorists was one.

According to informed sources the death sentences passed on Kuttimani and Jegan may be commuted to life imprisonment if the current appeal made by them is turned down. A few others convicted for robberies, too, may get their imprisonment terms shortened.

In the case of alleged terrorist offenders, the future possibility would be trial under the normal laws of the land instead of the Prevention of Terrorism Act whenever there is positive evidence to do so.

Also, about forty youths presently in custody against whom no tangible evidence has been forthcoming, may be released without condition. This may coincide with the installation of the new President on February 4.

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NORTHERN CLERGY CHARGED WITH TERRORISM LINK

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 2 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Peter Balasuriya]

[Text]

Six suspects, including three Roman Catholic clergymen alleged to be involved in acts of terrorism in the North, are to be indicted next week before the High Court, Colombo, informed sources told *'The Island'* yesterday.

Investigations into their activities connected with the terrorist movement have been completed and the relevant papers sent to the Attorney-General's Department.

The suspects are Fr. A. Singarayer, Fr. S. Sinnarasa, Fr. Jayatilakarajah, Dr. Jaya Kularajah, a medical practitioner (brother of Fr. Jayatilakarajah), and Mr. Nithianandan, a lecturer in economics at the Jaffna University and his wife Nirmala.

The first three suspects are to be charged with involvement in the Neerveli bank robbery, for having helped Prabakaran by hiding the loot (Rs. one million), investing it under different names and later returning the money to Prabakaran. They are also to be charged for failing to inform the authorities.

Fr. Jayatilakarajah, Dr. Jaya Kularajah and Mr. and Mrs. Nithyanadan are to be charged with harbouring three suspects injured in the Chavakachcheri Police station attack, until they recovered. They are also said to have given instructions in first-aid prior to the attack on the station. They are also to be charged with concealing evidence.

The suspects are to be charged under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In terms of this Act, the suspects will be remanded until the conclusion of the trial. The penalty for these offences are terms of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 20 years, according to a Justice Ministry source.

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JAFFNA BISHOP STATEMENT ON DETAINED PRIESTS

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 2 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by D. B. S. Jeyaraj]

[Text]

A statement by the Bishop of Jaffna, Rev. Dr. B. Deogupillai regarding the status of Fr. Singarayer and Fr. Sinnarasa within the Jaffna Diocese and particulars about money and receipts valued at over a million rupees being found at the "Amalautpayam" a Catholic preachers rest in Jaffna, was recorded by the CID last week.

Informed sources told *"The Island"* that the Bishop's statement was recorded to clarify certain things that transpired when the two Catholic priests were questioned at Gurunagar.

*"The Island"* learns that security authorities had first informed the Bishop of the necessity for his statement to be recorded. Thereafter the authorities had gone to the Bishop's House twice as the Bishop was not present on the first occasion.

The statement recorded by an assistant Superintendent of Police is now being processed at Gurunagar.

Rev. Dr. Deogupillai, however, declined to comment on the affair. *'The Island'* was informed by an aide at the Bishop's house that the Bishop was not keen on talking to the Press. "The Bishop wants to be left alone" *"The Island"* was told.

The Jaffna MP Mr. V. Yogeswaran will make a statement to the authorities today at 10 a. m. in Gurunagar.

A statement from attorney-at-law Mr. Xavier, who has been involved in the defence of persons detained in the Gurunagar, was also recorded.

Meanwhile Defence Ministry sources told *'The Island'* that the three priests, Doctor, Lecturer and wife were brought to Colombo from Gurunagar on their own request.

Rev. Jeyathilakarajah and Dr. Jeyakularajah are at the Magazine Prison while Fr. Singarayer and Fr. Sinnarasa along with Mr. and Mrs. Nithianandan are at the Welikade Prison.

## BRIEFS

PARLIAMENTARY TULF RESIGNATIONS DECISION--The Tamil United Liberation Front will take a final decision on whether its MPs will withdraw from Parliament in August 1983, at its annual convention in Jaffna next April, Opposition Leader A. Amirthalingam said. TULF MPs have already submitted their letters of resignation to the Secretary-General of their party. Further action awaits the annual conference. The Secretary-General of Parliament Mr. Nihal Seniviratne, citing the constitution said that in the event of a vacancy he (as Secretary-general) would have to inform the Elections Commissioner who would then write to the Secretary of the political party concerned, to nominate a successor. On receipt of such a nomination from the party secretary, the Commissioner of Elections will declare the nominated person MP for the relevant place. [Text] [Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 29 Dec 82 p 1]

TERRORIST GANG CAPTURED--The police have rounded up 12 youths who are believed to have extorted money and jewellery from Jaffna citizens for a terrorist fund. The arrest followed questioning of two youths who were arrested before Christmas on information given by a teacher in an attempted extortion case. Mr. P. B. Rajaguru, D1G Northern Range said yesterday that the police have recovered some jewellery from a house of a mistress of one of the arrested persons at Kilinochchi. He said investigations have revealed that the group had collected over Rs. 100,000 in cash and jewellery in a very short period. Most of the victims were elderly women, pensioners and wealthy businessmen. In one instance when they could not extort money from an old lady for the fifth time, they had stripped off the jewellery on her person. Investigations have also revealed the collections have been credited to a terrorist fund in a bank according to information received by the police. [Text] [Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 29 Dec 82 p 1]

WOMEN OPT FOR SMALLER FAMILIES--The recent contraceptive prevalence survey (CPS) has indicated a strong preference for small families and that at least half the country's young women don't want more children when they are past 27. Seven years ago, when the world fertility survey (WFS) was completed here the age at which women wanted to stop having babies was 28. Currently, the desired family size (in statistical terms) is 1.7 children against 2 children at the time of the world fertility survey. The census and statistics authorities, who have been comparing the two surveys, have found that in general the desire to stop having babies and limit family size is consistent with fertility levels among the sub-groups of the population. The comparison revealed

that Colombo, the coastal areas south of the capital and the urban centres "were decidedly low fertility areas", while the hill country and the adjoining eastern and north central plains had comparatively high fertility rates. The Census Chief, Mr. W. A. A. S. Pieris, said an interesting fact that emerged from the contraceptive prevalence survey was that women with schooling had decidedly low fertility

ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE LAUNCHED--The anti-corruption unit in the Presidential Secretariat will begin functioning next year, "SUN" reliably learns. This new unit will be directly under President J. R. Jayewardene. It will investigate allegations of corrupt practices against politicians, bureaucrats, corporation bosses and those in higher rungs, and report to President Jayewardene. .... The anti-corruption unit is being modelled on the lines-of that introduced in Singapore by President Lee Kuan Yew. It is empowered to conduct searching inquiries into allegations of corruption. The setting up of this unit, "SUN" reliably learns, is receiving President Jayewardene's priority consideration. It is expected to be one of the highlights of a series of changes he will effect shortly. According to authoritative government sources, President Jayewardene, who meets his Ministers for the first Cabinet session after the Referendum tomorrow, is likely to discuss new measures the government will adopt now that it has been given a fresh six year term. Leaders of the ruling UNP are of the view that anti-corruption measures should be given important consideration. The proposed unit, it is learnt, will function in addition to the existing machinery to deal with corruption, which includes the Bribery Commissioner's Department. The government is also expected to go ahead with the proposed Public Contracts Law. The draft law is now before the Cabinet sub-committee on Economic Affairs which is chaired by President Jayewardene. The draft law requires that Sri Lankan representatives of foreign principals vying for contracts and tenders register themselves with the competent authority. [Text] [Colombo SUN in English 28 Dec 82 p 1]

TERRORIST GANG WARS--Jaffna Police yesterday sought detention orders from the Ministry of Defence, in respect of an extortionist gang who were rounded up in the northern peninsula during the past week. The eighth member of the gang surrendered to the Jaffna Police yesterday. Applications have been made by the Jaffna Police to detain these eight suspects under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Though the arrests have been made under this act Police believe the gang has no direct links with 'Liberation Tigers'. This gang, operating independent of any other organisation, political or otherwise, had made maximum use of the prevailing situation in 'the peninsula, terrorising the citizens on the pretext of collecting funds for the terrorist movement. Police believe 'the eighth person's surrender to the Police was because terrorists had been on the lookout for him. Pamphlets had been distributed in Jaffna under the Liberation Tiger letterhead, denouncing the activities of this gang and stating that these funds never reached the Tiger Movement. Police have

already recovered Rs. 20,000 in cash and some other pieces of jewellery from the gang members. [Text] [Colombo SUN in English 30 Dec 82 p 1]

TERRORISTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEFTS INCREASE--New militant organisations now in the formative stage are believed to be responsible for the recent spate of thefts, hold-ups and acts of extortion in the north. Intelligence reports indicate that these groups forming up to fight for a separate state comprise youth who have been disillusioned with the activities of the two main terrorist groups which are in conflict. Doubts have also arisen whether these groups had in fact used any of the massive sums of money collected for the 'cause'. These new revelations followed the recent arrest of two youths who held up a petrol shed at Point Pedro. The two youths who had tried to escape with the Rs. 220 they had taken had however been overpowered by the villagers who had handed them over to the police. A special police team has now been detailed by Jaffna SP T. E. Ananda aja to track down the three remaining members of the gang. Police have learnt that the youths had purchased the home-made pistol found in their possession from a man for Rs. 1,3000 and the cartridges for Rs. 75 from another individual. The team is now attempting to trace both the 'gunsmith' and the man responsible for the sale of the cartridges. [K. Arasaratnam] [Text] [Colombo SUN in English 4 Jan 83 p ]

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END